krb5/Solaris/kt_solaris.c

/*
 * Copyright (c) 2011, 2015, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
 */

/*
 * kt_solaris.c is to provide set of keytab interfaces contracted with SMB team.
 */

#include "k5-int.h"
#include <errno.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <strings.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include "kt_solaris.h"

#define AES128      ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
#define AES256      ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
#define DES3        ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1
#define AES_ENTRIES 2
#define HOST_TRUNC  15
#define SVC_ENTRIES 4

static krb5_error_code
k5_kt_open(krb5_context ctx, krb5_keytab *kt)
{
    krb5_error_code code;
    char        buf[MAX_KEYTAB_NAME_LEN], ktstr[MAX_KEYTAB_NAME_LEN];

    memset(buf, 0, sizeof (buf));
    memset(ktstr, 0, sizeof (ktstr));

    if ((code = krb5_kt_default_name(ctx, buf, sizeof (buf))) != 0)
        return (code);

    /*
     * The default is file type w/o the write.  If it's anything besides
     * FILE or WRFILE then we bail as quickly as possible.
     */
    if (strncmp(buf, "FILE:", strlen("FILE:")) == 0)
        (void) snprintf(ktstr, sizeof (ktstr), "WR%s", buf);
    else if (strncmp(buf, "WRFILE:", strlen("WRFILE:")) == 0)
        (void) snprintf(ktstr, sizeof (ktstr), "%s", buf);
    else
        return (EINVAL);

    return (krb5_kt_resolve(ctx, ktstr, kt));
}

static krb5_error_code
k5_kt_add_entry(krb5_context ctx, krb5_keytab kt, const krb5_principal princ,
    const krb5_principal svc_princ, krb5_enctype enctype, krb5_kvno kvno,
    const char *pw)
{
    krb5_keytab_entry entry;
    krb5_data password, salt;
    krb5_keyblock key;
    krb5_error_code code;

    memset(&entry, 0, sizeof (entry));
    memset(&key, 0, sizeof (krb5_keyblock));

    password.length = strlen(pw);
    password.data = (char *)pw;

    if ((code = krb5_principal2salt(ctx, svc_princ, &salt)) != 0) {
        return (code);
    }

    if ((krb5_c_string_to_key(ctx, enctype, &password, &salt, &key)) != 0)
        goto cleanup;

    entry.key = key;
    entry.vno = kvno;
    entry.principal = princ;

    code = krb5_kt_add_entry(ctx, kt, &entry);

cleanup:

    free(salt.data);
    krb5_free_keyblock_contents(ctx, &key);

    return (code);
}

/*
 * krb5_error_code k5_kt_add_ad_entries(krb5_context ctx, char **sprincs_str,
 * krb5_kvno kvno, uint_t flags, char *password)
 *
 * Adds keys to the keytab file for a default set of service principals for
 * the specified host (or local host) in an Active Directory environment.
 *
 * where ctx is the pointer passed back from krb5_init_context
 * where sprincs_str is an array of service principal names to be added
 * to the keytab file, terminated by a NULL pointer
 * where domain is the domain used to fully qualify the hostname for
 * constructing the salt in the string-to-key function.
 * where kvno is the key version number of the set of service principal
 * keys to be added
 * where flags is the set of conditions that affects the key table entries
 * current set of defined flags:
 *
 *  encryption type
 *  ---------------
 *      0x00000001  K5_KT_FLAG_AES_SUPPORT (core set + AES-256-128 keys added)
 *
 * where password is the password that will be used to derive the key for
 * the associated service principals in the keytab file
 * where hostname is the unqualified hostname of the system that will be used to
 * derive the key salt. If NULL is specified, this function will use the hostname
 * of the local system.
 *
 * Note: this function is used for adding service principals to the
 * local /etc/krb5/krb5.keytab (unless KRB5_KTNAME has been set to something
 * different, see krb5envvar(5)) file when the client belongs to an AD domain.
 * The keytab file is populated differently for an AD domain as the various
 * service principals share the same key material, unlike MIT based
 * implementations.
 *
 * Note: For encryption types; the union of the enc type flag and the
 * capabilities of the client is used to determine the enc type set to
 * populate the keytab file.
 *
 * Note: The keys are not created for any AES enctypes UNLESS the
 * K5_KT_FLAG_AES_SUPPORT flag is set and permitted_enctypes has the AES
 * enctypes enabled.
 *
 * Note: In Active Directory environments the salt is constructed by truncating
 * the host name to 15 characters and only use the host svc princ as the salt,
 * e.g. host/<str15>.<domain>@<realm>.  The realm name is determined by parsing
 * sprincs_str.  The local host name to construct is determined by calling
 * gethostname(3C).  If AD environments construct salts differently in the
 * future or this function is expanded outside of AD environments one could
 * derive the salt by sending an initial authentication exchange.
 *
 * Note: The kvno was previously determined by performing an LDAP query of the
 * computer account's msDS-KeyVersionNumber attribute.  If the schema changes
 * in the future or this function is expanded outside of AD environments then
 * one could derive the principal's kvno by requesting a service ticket.
 */
krb5_error_code
k5_kt_add_ad_entries(krb5_context ctx, char **sprincs_str, char *domain,
    krb5_kvno kvno, uint_t flags, char *password, char *hostname)
{
    krb5_principal  princ = NULL, salt = NULL, f_princ = NULL;
    krb5_keytab kt = NULL;
    krb5_enctype    *enctypes = NULL, *tenctype, penctype = 0;
    char        **tprinc, *ptr, *token, *t_host = NULL, *realm;
    char        localname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
    krb5_error_code code;
    krb5_boolean    similar;
    uint_t      t_len;

    assert(ctx != NULL && sprincs_str != NULL && *sprincs_str != NULL);
    assert(password != NULL && domain != NULL);

    if ((code = krb5_parse_name(ctx, *sprincs_str, &f_princ)) != 0)
        return (code);
    if (krb5_princ_realm(ctx, f_princ)->length == 0) {
        code = EINVAL;
        goto cleanup;
    }
    realm = krb5_princ_realm(ctx, f_princ)->data;

    if (hostname == NULL) {
        if (gethostname(localname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN) != 0) {
            code = errno;
            goto cleanup;
        }
        token = localname;

        /*
         * Local host name could be fully qualified and/or in upper
         * case, but usually and appropriately not.
         */
        if ((ptr = strchr(token, '.')) != NULL)
            ptr = '\0';
        for (ptr = token; *ptr; ptr++)
            *ptr = tolower(*ptr);
    } else {
        token = hostname;
    }

    /*
     * Windows servers currently truncate the host name to 15 characters
     * and only use the host svc princ as the salt, e.g.
     * host/str15.domain@realm
     */
    t_len = snprintf(NULL, 0, "host/%.*s.%s@%s", HOST_TRUNC, token, domain,
        realm) + 1;
    if ((t_host = malloc(t_len)) == NULL) {
        code = ENOMEM;
        goto cleanup;
    }
    (void) snprintf(t_host, t_len, "host/%.*s.%s@%s", HOST_TRUNC, token,
        domain, realm);

    if ((code = krb5_parse_name(ctx, t_host, &salt)) != 0)
        goto cleanup;

    if ((code = k5_kt_open(ctx, &kt)) != 0)
        goto cleanup;

    code = krb5_get_permitted_enctypes(ctx, &enctypes);
    if (code != 0 || *enctypes == NULL)
        goto cleanup;

    for (tprinc = sprincs_str; *tprinc; tprinc++) {

        if ((code = krb5_parse_name(ctx, *tprinc, &princ)) != 0)
            goto cleanup;

        for (tenctype = enctypes; *tenctype; tenctype++) {
            if ((!(flags & K5_KT_FLAG_AES_SUPPORT) &&
                (*tenctype == AES128 || *tenctype == AES256)) ||
                (*tenctype == DES3)) {
                continue;
            }

            if (penctype) {
                code = krb5_c_enctype_compare(ctx, *tenctype,
                    penctype, &similar);
                if (code != 0)
                    goto cleanup;
                else if (similar)
                    continue;
            }

            code = k5_kt_add_entry(ctx, kt, princ, salt, *tenctype,
                kvno, password);
            if (code != 0)
                goto cleanup;

            penctype = *tenctype;
        }

        krb5_free_principal(ctx, princ);
        princ = NULL;
        penctype = NULL;
    }

cleanup:

    if (f_princ != NULL)
        krb5_free_principal(ctx, f_princ);
    if (salt != NULL)
        krb5_free_principal(ctx, salt);
    if (t_host != NULL)
        free(t_host);
    if (kt != NULL)
        (void) krb5_kt_close(ctx, kt);
    if (enctypes != NULL)
        krb5_free_enctypes(ctx, enctypes);
    if (princ != NULL)
        krb5_free_principal(ctx, princ);

    return (code);
}

#define PRINCIPAL   0
#define REALM       1

static krb5_error_code
k5_kt_remove_by_key(krb5_context ctx, char *key, uint_t type)
{
    krb5_error_code     code;
    krb5_kt_cursor      cursor;
    krb5_keytab_entry   entry;
    krb5_keytab     kt = NULL;
    krb5_principal      svc_princ = NULL;
    krb5_principal_data realm_data;
    boolean_t       found = FALSE;

    assert(ctx != NULL && key != NULL);

    if (type == REALM) {
        krb5_princ_realm(ctx, &realm_data)->length = strlen(key);
        krb5_princ_realm(ctx, &realm_data)->data = key;
    } else if (type == PRINCIPAL) {
        if ((code = krb5_parse_name(ctx, key, &svc_princ)) != 0)
            goto cleanup;
    } else
        return (EINVAL);

    if ((code = k5_kt_open(ctx, &kt)) != 0)
        goto cleanup;

    if ((code = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(ctx, kt, &cursor)) != 0)
        goto cleanup;

    while ((code = krb5_kt_next_entry(ctx, kt, &entry, &cursor)) == 0) {
        if (type == PRINCIPAL && krb5_principal_compare(ctx, svc_princ,
            entry.principal)) {
            found = TRUE;
        } else if (type == REALM && krb5_realm_compare(ctx, &realm_data,
            entry.principal)) {
            found = TRUE;
        }

        if (found == TRUE) {
            code = krb5_kt_end_seq_get(ctx, kt, &cursor);
            if (code != 0) {
                krb5_kt_free_entry(ctx, &entry);
                goto cleanup;
            }

            code = krb5_kt_remove_entry(ctx, kt, &entry);
            if (code != 0) {
                krb5_kt_free_entry(ctx, &entry);
                goto cleanup;
            }

            code = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(ctx, kt, &cursor);
            if (code != 0) {
                krb5_kt_free_entry(ctx, &entry);
                goto cleanup;
            }

            found = FALSE;
        }

        krb5_kt_free_entry(ctx, &entry);
    }

    if (code && code != KRB5_KT_END)
        goto cleanup;

    code = krb5_kt_end_seq_get(ctx, kt, &cursor);

cleanup:

    if (svc_princ != NULL)
        krb5_free_principal(ctx, svc_princ);
    if (kt != NULL)
        (void) krb5_kt_close(ctx, kt);

    return (code);
}

/*
 * krb5_error_code k5_kt_remove_by_realm(krb5_context ctx, char *realm)
 *
 * Removes all key entries in the keytab file that match the exact realm name
 * specified.
 *
 * where ctx is the pointer passed back from krb5_init_context
 * where realm is the realm name that is matched for any keytab entries
 * to be removed
 *
 * Note: if there are no entries matching realm then 0 (success) is returned
 */
krb5_error_code
k5_kt_remove_by_realm(krb5_context ctx, char *realm)
{

    return (k5_kt_remove_by_key(ctx, realm, REALM));
}

/*
 * krb5_error_code k5_kt_remove_by_svcprinc(krb5_context ctx, char *sprinc_str)
 *
 * Removes all key entries in the keytab file that match the exact service
 * principal name specified.
 *
 * where ctx is the pointer passed back from krb5_init_context
 * where sprinc_str is the service principal name that is matched for any
 * keytab entries to be removed
 *
 * Note: if there are no entries matching sprinc_str then 0 (success) is
 * returned
 */
krb5_error_code
k5_kt_remove_by_svcprinc(krb5_context ctx, char *sprinc_str)
{

    return (k5_kt_remove_by_key(ctx, sprinc_str, PRINCIPAL));
}

/*
 * krb5_error_code k5_kt_validate(krb5_context ctx, char *sprinc_str,
 * uint_t flags, boolean_t *valid)
 *
 * The validate function determines that the service principal exists and that
 * it has a valid set of encryption types for said principal.
 *
 * where ctx is the pointer passed back from krb5_init_context
 * where sprinc_str is the principal to be validated in the keytab file
 * where flags is the set of conditions that affects the key table entries
 * that the function considers valid
 *  current set of defined flags:
 *
 *  encryption type
 *  ---------------
 *  0x00000001 K5_KT_FLAG_AES_SUPPORT (core set + AES-256-128 keys are
 *      valid)
 *
 * where valid is a boolean that is set if the sprinc_str is correctly
 * populated in the keytab file based on the flags set else valid is unset.
 *
 * Note: The validate function assumes that only one set of keys exists for
 * a corresponding service principal, of key version number (kvno) n.  It would
 * consider more than one kvno set as invalid.  This is from the fact that AD
 * clients will attempt to refresh credential caches if KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED
 * is returned by the acceptor when the requested kvno is not found within the
 * keytab file.
 */
krb5_error_code
k5_kt_ad_validate(krb5_context ctx, char *sprinc_str, uint_t flags,
    boolean_t *valid)
{
    krb5_error_code     code;
    krb5_kt_cursor      cursor;
    krb5_keytab_entry   entry;
    krb5_keytab     kt = NULL;
    krb5_principal      svc_princ = NULL;
    krb5_enctype        *enctypes = NULL, *tenctype, penctype = 0;
    boolean_t       ck_aes = FALSE;
    uint_t          aes_count = 0, kt_entries = 0;
    krb5_boolean        similar;

    assert(ctx != NULL && sprinc_str != NULL && valid != NULL);

    *valid = FALSE;
    ck_aes = flags & K5_KT_FLAG_AES_SUPPORT;

    if ((code = krb5_parse_name(ctx, sprinc_str, &svc_princ)) != 0)
        goto cleanup;

    if ((code = k5_kt_open(ctx, &kt)) != 0)
        goto cleanup;

    code = krb5_get_permitted_enctypes(ctx, &enctypes);
    if (code != 0 || *enctypes == NULL)
        goto cleanup;

    if ((code = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(ctx, kt, &cursor)) != 0)
        goto cleanup;

    while ((code = krb5_kt_next_entry(ctx, kt, &entry, &cursor)) == 0) {
        if (krb5_principal_compare(ctx, svc_princ, entry.principal)) {

            for (tenctype = enctypes; *tenctype; tenctype++) {
                if (penctype) {
                    code = krb5_c_enctype_compare(ctx,
                        *tenctype, penctype, &similar);
                    if (code != 0) {
                        krb5_kt_free_entry(ctx, &entry);
                        goto cleanup;
                    } else if (similar)
                        continue;
                }

                if ((*tenctype != DES3) &&
                    (entry.key.enctype == *tenctype)) {
                    kt_entries++;
                }

                penctype = *tenctype;
            }

            if ((entry.key.enctype == AES128) ||
                (entry.key.enctype == AES256)) {
                aes_count++;
            }
        }

        krb5_kt_free_entry(ctx, &entry);
    }

    if (code && code != KRB5_KT_END)
        goto cleanup;

    if ((code = krb5_kt_end_seq_get(ctx, kt, &cursor)))
        goto cleanup;

    if (ck_aes == TRUE) {
        if ((kt_entries != SVC_ENTRIES) || (aes_count != AES_ENTRIES))
            goto cleanup;
    } else if (kt_entries != (SVC_ENTRIES - AES_ENTRIES))
        goto cleanup;

    *valid = TRUE;

cleanup:

    if (svc_princ != NULL)
        krb5_free_principal(ctx, svc_princ);
    if (kt != NULL)
        (void) krb5_kt_close(ctx, kt);
    if (enctypes != NULL)
        krb5_free_enctypes(ctx, enctypes);

    return (code);
}