This patch was re-made from a commit on cgit.cyrus.foundation at this

URL:

Probably not needed for Solaris but it's better to just have the fix.

"Handle NULL returns from glibc 2.17+ crypt()

Starting with glibc 2.17 (eglibc 2.17), crypt() fails with EINVAL

(w/ NULL return) if the salt violates specifications. Additionally,

on FIPS-140 enabled Linux systems, DES/MD5-encrypted passwords

passed to crypt() fail with EPERM (w/ NULL return).

When using glibc's crypt(), check return value to avoid a possible NULL pointer dereference. Patch by mancha1@hush.com.

"

diff -rupN old/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c new/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c

--- old/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c 2015-04-07 17:03:52.497417754 -0700

+++ new/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c 2013-07-11 07:56:26.000000000 -0700

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ char *userid;

char *password;

{

char* r;

+ char* crpt_passwd;

struct passwd *pwd;

pwd = getpwnam(userid);

@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ char *password;

else if (pwd->pw_passwd[0] == '*') {

r = "Account disabled";

}

- else if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) != 0) {

+ else if (!(crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) || strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, (const char *)crpt_passwd) != 0) {

r = "Incorrect password";

}

else {

diff -rupN old/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c new/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c

--- old/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c 2015-04-07 17:03:52.508074499 -0700

+++ new/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c 2013-07-11 07:56:26.000000000 -0700

@@ -32,13 +32,15 @@ char *userid;

char *password;

{

struct spwd *pwd;

+ char *crpt_passwd;

pwd = getspnam(userid);

if (!pwd) {

return "Userid not found";

}

- if (strcmp(pwd->sp_pwdp, crypt(password, pwd->sp_pwdp)) != 0) {

+ crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pwd->sp_pwdp);

+ if (!crpt_passwd || strcmp(pwd->sp_pwdp, (const char *)crpt_passwd) != 0) {

return "Incorrect password";

}

else {

diff -rupN old/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c new/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c

--- old/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c 2015-04-07 17:04:22.961304455 -0700

+++ new/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c 2013-07-11 07:56:26.000000000 -0700

@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ auth_getpwent (

{

/* VARIABLES */

struct passwd *pw; /* pointer to passwd file entry */

+ char *crpt_passwd; /* encrypted password */

int errnum;

/* END VARIABLES */

@@ -105,7 +106,8 @@ auth_getpwent (

}

}

- if (strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, (const char *)crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd))) {

+ crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd);

+ if (!crpt_passwd || strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, (const char *)crpt_passwd)) {

if (flags & VERBOSE) {

syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "DEBUG: auth_getpwent: %s: invalid password", login);

}

diff -rupN old/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c new/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c

--- old/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c 2015-04-07 17:04:22.968116900 -0700

+++ new/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c 2013-07-11 07:56:26.000000000 -0700

@@ -210,8 +210,8 @@ auth_shadow (

RETURN("NO Insufficient permission to access NIS authentication database (saslauthd)");

}

- cpw = strdup((const char *)crypt(password, sp->sp_pwdp));

- if (strcmp(sp->sp_pwdp, cpw)) {

+ cpw = crypt(password, sp->sp_pwdp);

+ if (!cpw || strcmp(sp->sp_pwdp, (const char *)cpw)) {

if (flags & VERBOSE) {

/*

* This _should_ reveal the SHADOW_PW_LOCKED prefix to an

@@ -221,10 +221,8 @@ auth_shadow (

syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "DEBUG: auth_shadow: pw mismatch: '%s' != '%s'",

sp->sp_pwdp, cpw);

}

- free(cpw);

RETURN("NO Incorrect password");

}

- free(cpw);

/*

* The following fields will be set to -1 if:

@@ -286,7 +284,7 @@ auth_shadow (

RETURN("NO Invalid username");

}

- if (strcmp(upw->upw_passwd, crypt(password, upw->upw_passwd)) != 0) {

+ if (!(cpw = crypt(password, upw->upw_passwd)) || (strcmp(upw->upw_passwd, (const char *)cpw) != 0)) {

if (flags & VERBOSE) {

syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "auth_shadow: pw mismatch: %s != %s",

password, upw->upw_passwd);