/*
* COPYRIGHT (C) 2006,2007
* THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
* ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
*
* Permission is granted to use, copy, create derivative works
* and redistribute this software and such derivative works
* for any purpose, so long as the name of The University of
* Michigan is not used in any advertising or publicity
* pertaining to the use of distribution of this software
* without specific, written prior authorization. If the
* above copyright notice or any other identification of the
* University of Michigan is included in any copy of any
* portion of this software, then the disclaimer below must
* also be included.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT REPRESENTATION
* FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AS TO ITS FITNESS FOR ANY
* PURPOSE, AND WITHOUT WARRANTY BY THE UNIVERSITY OF
* MICHIGAN OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
* WITHOUT LIMITATION THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE
* REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SHALL NOT BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DAMAGES, INCLUDING SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, WITH RESPECT TO ANY CLAIM ARISING
* OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF THE SOFTWARE, EVEN
* IF IT HAS BEEN OR IS HEREAFTER ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGES.
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 2008, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2012, OmniTI Computer Consulting, Inc. All rights reserved.
*/
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <dlfcn.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <dirent.h>
/* Solaris Kerberos */
#include <libintl.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include "k5-int.h"
#include <ctype.h>
/*
* Q: What is this SILLYDECRYPT stuff about?
* A: When using the ActivCard Linux pkcs11 library (v2.0.1),
* the decrypt function fails. By inserting an extra
* function call, which serves nothing but to change the
* stack, we were able to work around the issue. If the
* ActivCard library is fixed in the future, this
* definition and related code can be removed.
*/
#define SILLYDECRYPT
#include "pkinit_crypto_openssl.h"
/*
* Solaris Kerberos:
* Changed to a switch statement so gettext() can be used
* for internationization.
* Use defined constants rather than raw numbers for error codes.
*/
static char *
pkcs11_error_table(short code) {
switch (code) {
case CKR_OK:
return (gettext("ok"));
case CKR_CANCEL:
return (gettext("cancel"));
case CKR_HOST_MEMORY:
return (gettext("host memory"));
case CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID:
return (gettext("slot id invalid"));
case CKR_GENERAL_ERROR:
return (gettext("general error"));
case CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED:
return (gettext("function failed"));
case CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD:
return (gettext("arguments bad"));
case CKR_NO_EVENT:
return (gettext("no event"));
case CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS:
return (gettext("need to create threads"));
case CKR_CANT_LOCK:
return (gettext("cant lock"));
case CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY:
return (gettext("attribute read only"));
case CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE:
return (gettext("attribute sensitive"));
case CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID:
return (gettext("attribute type invalid"));
case CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID:
return (gettext("attribute value invalid"));
case CKR_DATA_INVALID:
return (gettext("data invalid"));
case CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE:
return (gettext("data len range"));
case CKR_DEVICE_ERROR:
return (gettext("device error"));
case CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY:
return (gettext("device memory"));
case CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED:
return (gettext("device removed"));
case CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID:
return (gettext("encrypted data invalid"));
case CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE:
return (gettext("encrypted data len range"));
case CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED:
return (gettext("function canceled"));
case CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL:
return (gettext("function not parallel"));
case CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED:
return (gettext("function not supported"));
case CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID:
return (gettext("key handle invalid"));
case CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE:
return (gettext("key size range"));
case CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT:
return (gettext("key type inconsistent"));
case CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED:
return (gettext("key not needed"));
case CKR_KEY_CHANGED:
return (gettext("key changed"));
case CKR_KEY_NEEDED:
return (gettext("key needed"));
case CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE:
return (gettext("key indigestible"));
case CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED:
return (gettext("key function not permitted"));
case CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE:
return (gettext("key not wrappable"));
case CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE:
return (gettext("key unextractable"));
case CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID:
return (gettext("mechanism invalid"));
case CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID:
return (gettext("mechanism param invalid"));
case CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID:
return (gettext("object handle invalid"));
case CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE:
return (gettext("operation active"));
case CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED:
return (gettext("operation not initialized"));
case CKR_PIN_INCORRECT:
return (gettext("pin incorrect"));
case CKR_PIN_INVALID:
return (gettext("pin invalid"));
case CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE:
return (gettext("pin len range"));
case CKR_PIN_EXPIRED:
return (gettext("pin expired"));
case CKR_PIN_LOCKED:
return (gettext("pin locked"));
case CKR_SESSION_CLOSED:
return (gettext("session closed"));
case CKR_SESSION_COUNT:
return (gettext("session count"));
case CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID:
return (gettext("session handle invalid"));
case CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED:
return (gettext("session parallel not supported"));
case CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY:
return (gettext("session read only"));
case CKR_SESSION_EXISTS:
return (gettext("session exists"));
case CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS:
return (gettext("session read only exists"));
case CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS:
return (gettext("session read write so exists"));
case CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID:
return (gettext("signature invalid"));
case CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE:
return (gettext("signature len range"));
case CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE:
return (gettext("template incomplete"));
case CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT:
return (gettext("template inconsistent"));
case CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT:
return (gettext("token not present"));
case CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED:
return (gettext("token not recognized"));
case CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED:
return (gettext("token write protected"));
case CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID:
return (gettext("unwrapping key handle invalid"));
case CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE:
return (gettext("unwrapping key size range"));
case CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT:
return (gettext("unwrapping key type inconsistent"));
case CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN:
return (gettext("user already logged in"));
case CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN:
return (gettext("user not logged in"));
case CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED:
return (gettext("user pin not initialized"));
case CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID:
return (gettext("user type invalid"));
case CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN:
return (gettext("user another already logged in"));
case CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES:
return (gettext("user too many types"));
case CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID:
return (gettext("wrapped key invalid"));
case CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE:
return (gettext("wrapped key len range"));
case CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID:
return (gettext("wrapping key handle invalid"));
case CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE:
return (gettext("wrapping key size range"));
case CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT:
return (gettext("wrapping key type inconsistent"));
case CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED:
return (gettext("random seed not supported"));
case CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG:
return (gettext("random no rng"));
case CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID:
return (gettext("domain params invalid"));
case CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:
return (gettext("buffer too small"));
case CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID:
return (gettext("saved state invalid"));
case CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE:
return (gettext("information sensitive"));
case CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE:
return (gettext("state unsaveable"));
case CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED:
return (gettext("cryptoki not initialized"));
case CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED:
return (gettext("cryptoki already initialized"));
case CKR_MUTEX_BAD:
return (gettext("mutex bad"));
case CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED:
return (gettext("mutex not locked"));
case CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED:
return (gettext("function rejected"));
default:
return (gettext("unknown error"));
}
}
/* DH parameters */
unsigned char pkinit_1024_dhprime[128] = {
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34,
0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1,
0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74,
0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22,
0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B,
0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37,
0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45,
0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6,
0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B,
0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED,
0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5,
0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6,
0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE6, 0x53, 0x81,
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
};
unsigned char pkinit_2048_dhprime[2048/8] = {
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34,
0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1,
0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74,
0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22,
0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B,
0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37,
0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45,
0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6,
0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B,
0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED,
0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5,
0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6,
0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D,
0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05,
0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A,
0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F,
0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96,
0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB,
0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D,
0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04,
0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C,
0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B,
0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03,
0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F,
0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9,
0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18,
0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5,
0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10,
0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x68,
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
};
unsigned char pkinit_4096_dhprime[4096/8] = {
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34,
0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1,
0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74,
0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22,
0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B,
0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37,
0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45,
0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6,
0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B,
0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED,
0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5,
0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6,
0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D,
0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05,
0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A,
0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F,
0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96,
0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB,
0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D,
0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04,
0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C,
0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B,
0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03,
0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F,
0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9,
0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18,
0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5,
0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10,
0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAA, 0xC4, 0x2D,
0xAD, 0x33, 0x17, 0x0D, 0x04, 0x50, 0x7A, 0x33,
0xA8, 0x55, 0x21, 0xAB, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xBA, 0x64,
0xEC, 0xFB, 0x85, 0x04, 0x58, 0xDB, 0xEF, 0x0A,
0x8A, 0xEA, 0x71, 0x57, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x7D,
0xB3, 0x97, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA6, 0xE1, 0xE4, 0xC7,
0xAB, 0xF5, 0xAE, 0x8C, 0xDB, 0x09, 0x33, 0xD7,
0x1E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0x25, 0x61, 0x9D,
0xCE, 0xE3, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0xEE, 0x6B,
0xF1, 0x2F, 0xFA, 0x06, 0xD9, 0x8A, 0x08, 0x64,
0xD8, 0x76, 0x02, 0x73, 0x3E, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0x64,
0x52, 0x1F, 0x2B, 0x18, 0x17, 0x7B, 0x20, 0x0C,
0xBB, 0xE1, 0x17, 0x57, 0x7A, 0x61, 0x5D, 0x6C,
0x77, 0x09, 0x88, 0xC0, 0xBA, 0xD9, 0x46, 0xE2,
0x08, 0xE2, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x74, 0xE5, 0xAB, 0x31,
0x43, 0xDB, 0x5B, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0xFD, 0x10, 0x8E,
0x4B, 0x82, 0xD1, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x21, 0x08, 0x01,
0x1A, 0x72, 0x3C, 0x12, 0xA7, 0x87, 0xE6, 0xD7,
0x88, 0x71, 0x9A, 0x10, 0xBD, 0xBA, 0x5B, 0x26,
0x99, 0xC3, 0x27, 0x18, 0x6A, 0xF4, 0xE2, 0x3C,
0x1A, 0x94, 0x68, 0x34, 0xB6, 0x15, 0x0B, 0xDA,
0x25, 0x83, 0xE9, 0xCA, 0x2A, 0xD4, 0x4C, 0xE8,
0xDB, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0xDB, 0x04, 0xDE, 0x8E, 0xF9,
0x2E, 0x8E, 0xFC, 0x14, 0x1F, 0xBE, 0xCA, 0xA6,
0x28, 0x7C, 0x59, 0x47, 0x4E, 0x6B, 0xC0, 0x5D,
0x99, 0xB2, 0x96, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x90, 0xC3, 0xA2,
0x23, 0x3B, 0xA1, 0x86, 0x51, 0x5B, 0xE7, 0xED,
0x1F, 0x61, 0x29, 0x70, 0xCE, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0xAF,
0xB8, 0x1B, 0xDD, 0x76, 0x21, 0x70, 0x48, 0x1C,
0xD0, 0x06, 0x91, 0x27, 0xD5, 0xB0, 0x5A, 0xA9,
0x93, 0xB4, 0xEA, 0x98, 0x8D, 0x8F, 0xDD, 0xC1,
0x86, 0xFF, 0xB7, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xA6, 0xC0, 0x8F,
0x4D, 0xF4, 0x35, 0xC9, 0x34, 0x06, 0x31, 0x99,
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
};
/* Solaris Kerberos */
static k5_mutex_t oids_mutex = K5_MUTEX_PARTIAL_INITIALIZER;
static int pkinit_oids_refs = 0;
krb5_error_code
pkinit_init_plg_crypto(pkinit_plg_crypto_context *cryptoctx) {
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
pkinit_plg_crypto_context ctx = NULL;
/* initialize openssl routines */
/* Solaris Kerberos */
retval = openssl_init();
if (retval != 0)
goto out;
ctx = (pkinit_plg_crypto_context)malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
if (ctx == NULL)
goto out;
(void) memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
pkiDebug("%s: initializing openssl crypto context at %p\n",
__FUNCTION__, ctx);
retval = pkinit_init_pkinit_oids(ctx);
if (retval)
goto out;
retval = pkinit_init_dh_params(ctx);
if (retval)
goto out;
*cryptoctx = ctx;
out:
if (retval && ctx != NULL)
pkinit_fini_plg_crypto(ctx);
return retval;
}
void
pkinit_fini_plg_crypto(pkinit_plg_crypto_context cryptoctx)
{
pkiDebug("%s: freeing context at %p\n", __FUNCTION__, cryptoctx);
if (cryptoctx == NULL)
return;
pkinit_fini_pkinit_oids(cryptoctx);
pkinit_fini_dh_params(cryptoctx);
free(cryptoctx);
}
krb5_error_code
pkinit_init_identity_crypto(pkinit_identity_crypto_context *idctx)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx = NULL;
ctx = (pkinit_identity_crypto_context)malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
if (ctx == NULL)
goto out;
(void) memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
retval = pkinit_init_certs(ctx);
if (retval)
goto out;
retval = pkinit_init_pkcs11(ctx);
if (retval)
goto out;
pkiDebug("%s: returning ctx at %p\n", __FUNCTION__, ctx);
*idctx = ctx;
out:
if (retval) {
if (ctx)
pkinit_fini_identity_crypto(ctx);
}
return retval;
}
void
pkinit_fini_identity_crypto(pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx)
{
if (idctx == NULL)
return;
pkiDebug("%s: freeing ctx at %p\n", __FUNCTION__, idctx);
pkinit_fini_certs(idctx);
pkinit_fini_pkcs11(idctx);
free(idctx);
}
krb5_error_code
pkinit_init_req_crypto(pkinit_req_crypto_context *cryptoctx)
{
pkinit_req_crypto_context ctx = NULL;
/* Solaris Kerberos */
if (cryptoctx == NULL)
return EINVAL;
ctx = (pkinit_req_crypto_context)malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
if (ctx == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
(void) memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
ctx->dh = NULL;
ctx->received_cert = NULL;
*cryptoctx = ctx;
pkiDebug("%s: returning ctx at %p\n", __FUNCTION__, ctx);
return 0;
}
void
pkinit_fini_req_crypto(pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx)
{
if (req_cryptoctx == NULL)
return;
pkiDebug("%s: freeing ctx at %p\n", __FUNCTION__, req_cryptoctx);
if (req_cryptoctx->dh != NULL)
DH_free(req_cryptoctx->dh);
if (req_cryptoctx->received_cert != NULL)
X509_free(req_cryptoctx->received_cert);
free(req_cryptoctx);
}
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_init_pkinit_oids(pkinit_plg_crypto_context ctx)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
int nid = 0;
/*
* If OpenSSL already knows about the OID, use the
* existing definition. Otherwise, create an OID object.
*/
#define CREATE_OBJ_IF_NEEDED(oid, vn, sn, ln) \
nid = OBJ_txt2nid(oid); \
if (nid == NID_undef) { \
nid = OBJ_create(oid, sn, ln); \
if (nid == NID_undef) { \
pkiDebug("Error creating oid object for '%s'\n", oid); \
goto out; \
} \
} \
ctx->vn = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
/* Solaris Kerberos */
retval = k5_mutex_lock(&oids_mutex);
if (retval != 0)
goto out;
CREATE_OBJ_IF_NEEDED("1.3.6.1.5.2.2", id_pkinit_san,
"id-pkinit-san", "KRB5PrincipalName");
CREATE_OBJ_IF_NEEDED("1.3.6.1.5.2.3.1", id_pkinit_authData,
"id-pkinit-authdata", "PKINIT signedAuthPack");
CREATE_OBJ_IF_NEEDED("1.3.6.1.5.2.3.2", id_pkinit_DHKeyData,
"id-pkinit-DHKeyData", "PKINIT dhSignedData");
CREATE_OBJ_IF_NEEDED("1.3.6.1.5.2.3.3", id_pkinit_rkeyData,
"id-pkinit-rkeyData", "PKINIT encKeyPack");
CREATE_OBJ_IF_NEEDED("1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4", id_pkinit_KPClientAuth,
"id-pkinit-KPClientAuth", "PKINIT Client EKU");
CREATE_OBJ_IF_NEEDED("1.3.6.1.5.2.3.5", id_pkinit_KPKdc,
"id-pkinit-KPKdc", "KDC EKU");
#if 0
CREATE_OBJ_IF_NEEDED("1.2.840.113549.1.7.1", id_pkinit_authData9,
"id-pkcs7-data", "PKCS7 data");
#else
/* See note in pkinit_pkcs7type2oid() */
ctx->id_pkinit_authData9 = NULL;
#endif
CREATE_OBJ_IF_NEEDED("1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2", id_ms_kp_sc_logon,
"id-ms-kp-sc-logon EKU", "Microsoft SmartCard Login EKU");
CREATE_OBJ_IF_NEEDED("1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.3", id_ms_san_upn,
"id-ms-san-upn", "Microsoft Universal Principal Name");
CREATE_OBJ_IF_NEEDED("1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1", id_kp_serverAuth,
"id-kp-serverAuth EKU", "Server Authentication EKU");
/* Success */
retval = 0;
pkinit_oids_refs++;
/* Solaris Kerberos */
k5_mutex_unlock(&oids_mutex);
out:
return retval;
}
static krb5_error_code
get_cert(char *filename, X509 **retcert)
{
X509 *cert = NULL;
BIO *tmp = NULL;
int code;
krb5_error_code retval;
if (filename == NULL || retcert == NULL)
return EINVAL;
*retcert = NULL;
tmp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (tmp == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
code = BIO_read_filename(tmp, filename);
if (code == 0) {
retval = errno;
goto cleanup;
}
cert = (X509 *) PEM_read_bio_X509(tmp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (cert == NULL) {
retval = EIO;
pkiDebug("failed to read certificate from %s\n", filename);
goto cleanup;
}
*retcert = cert;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (tmp != NULL)
BIO_free(tmp);
return retval;
}
static krb5_error_code
get_key(char *filename, EVP_PKEY **retkey)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
BIO *tmp = NULL;
int code;
krb5_error_code retval;
if (filename == NULL || retkey == NULL)
return EINVAL;
tmp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (tmp == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
code = BIO_read_filename(tmp, filename);
if (code == 0) {
retval = errno;
goto cleanup;
}
pkey = (EVP_PKEY *) PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(tmp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (pkey == NULL) {
retval = EIO;
pkiDebug("failed to read private key from %s\n", filename);
goto cleanup;
}
*retkey = pkey;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (tmp != NULL)
BIO_free(tmp);
return retval;
}
static void
pkinit_fini_pkinit_oids(pkinit_plg_crypto_context ctx)
{
if (ctx == NULL)
return;
/* Only call OBJ_cleanup once! */
/* Solaris Kerberos: locking */
k5_mutex_lock(&oids_mutex);
if (--pkinit_oids_refs == 0)
OBJ_cleanup();
k5_mutex_unlock(&oids_mutex);
}
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_init_dh_params(pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
plgctx->dh_1024 = DH_new();
if (plgctx->dh_1024 == NULL)
goto cleanup;
plgctx->dh_1024->p = BN_bin2bn(pkinit_1024_dhprime,
sizeof(pkinit_1024_dhprime), NULL);
if ((plgctx->dh_1024->g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(plgctx->dh_1024->q = BN_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
BN_set_word(plgctx->dh_1024->g, DH_GENERATOR_2);
BN_rshift1(plgctx->dh_1024->q, plgctx->dh_1024->p);
plgctx->dh_2048 = DH_new();
if (plgctx->dh_2048 == NULL)
goto cleanup;
plgctx->dh_2048->p = BN_bin2bn(pkinit_2048_dhprime,
sizeof(pkinit_2048_dhprime), NULL);
if ((plgctx->dh_2048->g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(plgctx->dh_2048->q = BN_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
BN_set_word(plgctx->dh_2048->g, DH_GENERATOR_2);
BN_rshift1(plgctx->dh_2048->q, plgctx->dh_2048->p);
plgctx->dh_4096 = DH_new();
if (plgctx->dh_4096 == NULL)
goto cleanup;
plgctx->dh_4096->p = BN_bin2bn(pkinit_4096_dhprime,
sizeof(pkinit_4096_dhprime), NULL);
if ((plgctx->dh_4096->g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(plgctx->dh_4096->q = BN_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
BN_set_word(plgctx->dh_4096->g, DH_GENERATOR_2);
BN_rshift1(plgctx->dh_4096->q, plgctx->dh_4096->p);
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (retval)
pkinit_fini_dh_params(plgctx);
return retval;
}
static void
pkinit_fini_dh_params(pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx)
{
if (plgctx->dh_1024 != NULL)
DH_free(plgctx->dh_1024);
if (plgctx->dh_2048 != NULL)
DH_free(plgctx->dh_2048);
if (plgctx->dh_4096 != NULL)
DH_free(plgctx->dh_4096);
plgctx->dh_1024 = plgctx->dh_2048 = plgctx->dh_4096 = NULL;
}
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_init_certs(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx)
{
/* Solaris Kerberos */
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED; i++)
ctx->creds[i] = NULL;
ctx->my_certs = NULL;
ctx->cert_index = 0;
ctx->my_key = NULL;
ctx->trustedCAs = NULL;
ctx->intermediateCAs = NULL;
ctx->revoked = NULL;
return 0;
}
static void
pkinit_fini_certs(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx)
{
if (ctx == NULL)
return;
if (ctx->my_certs != NULL)
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->my_certs, X509_free);
if (ctx->my_key != NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->my_key);
if (ctx->trustedCAs != NULL)
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->trustedCAs, X509_free);
if (ctx->intermediateCAs != NULL)
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->intermediateCAs, X509_free);
if (ctx->revoked != NULL)
sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(ctx->revoked, X509_CRL_free);
}
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_init_pkcs11(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx)
{
/* Solaris Kerberos */
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
ctx->p11_module_name = strdup(PKCS11_MODNAME);
if (ctx->p11_module_name == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
ctx->p11_module = NULL;
ctx->slotid = PK_NOSLOT;
ctx->token_label = NULL;
ctx->cert_label = NULL;
ctx->PIN = NULL;
ctx->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
ctx->p11 = NULL;
ctx->p11flags = 0; /* Solaris Kerberos */
#endif
ctx->pkcs11_method = 0;
(void) memset(ctx->creds, 0, sizeof(ctx->creds));
return 0;
}
static void
pkinit_fini_pkcs11(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx)
{
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
if (ctx == NULL)
return;
if (ctx->p11 != NULL) {
if (ctx->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
ctx->p11->C_CloseSession(ctx->session);
ctx->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
}
/*
* Solaris Kerberos:
* Only call C_Finalize if the process was not already using pkcs11.
*/
if (ctx->finalize_pkcs11 == TRUE)
ctx->p11->C_Finalize(NULL_PTR);
ctx->p11 = NULL;
}
if (ctx->p11_module != NULL) {
pkinit_C_UnloadModule(ctx->p11_module);
ctx->p11_module = NULL;
}
if (ctx->p11_module_name != NULL)
free(ctx->p11_module_name);
if (ctx->token_label != NULL)
free(ctx->token_label);
if (ctx->cert_id != NULL)
free(ctx->cert_id);
if (ctx->cert_label != NULL)
free(ctx->cert_label);
if (ctx->PIN != NULL) {
(void) memset(ctx->PIN, 0, strlen(ctx->PIN));
free(ctx->PIN);
}
#endif
}
krb5_error_code
pkinit_identity_set_prompter(pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_prompter_fct prompter,
void *prompter_data)
{
id_cryptoctx->prompter = prompter;
id_cryptoctx->prompter_data = prompter_data;
return 0;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
krb5_error_code
cms_signeddata_create(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int cms_msg_type,
int include_certchain,
unsigned char *data,
unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **signed_data,
unsigned int *signed_data_len)
{
/* Solaris Kerberos */
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
PKCS7 *p7 = NULL, *inner_p7 = NULL;
PKCS7_SIGNED *p7s = NULL;
PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si = NULL;
unsigned char *p;
ASN1_TYPE *pkinit_data = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) * cert_stack = NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest_attr = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx2;
const EVP_MD *md_tmp = NULL;
unsigned char md_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], md_data2[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *digestInfo_buf = NULL, *abuf = NULL;
unsigned int md_len, md_len2, alen, digestInfo_len;
STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) * sk;
unsigned char *sig = NULL;
unsigned int sig_len = 0;
X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest = NULL;
unsigned int alg_len = 0, digest_len = 0;
unsigned char *y = NULL, *alg_buf = NULL, *digest_buf = NULL;
X509 *cert = NULL;
ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL;
/* Solaris Kerberos */
if (signed_data == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if (signed_data_len == NULL)
return EINVAL;
/* start creating PKCS7 data */
if ((p7 = PKCS7_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
p7->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed);
if ((p7s = PKCS7_SIGNED_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
p7->d.sign = p7s;
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7s->version, 3))
goto cleanup;
/* create a cert chain that has at least the signer's certificate */
if ((cert_stack = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->cert_index);
if (!include_certchain) {
pkiDebug("only including signer's certificate\n");
sk_X509_push(cert_stack, X509_dup(cert));
} else {
/* create a cert chain */
X509_STORE *certstore = NULL;
X509_STORE_CTX certctx;
STACK_OF(X509) *certstack = NULL;
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
int i = 0, size = 0;
if ((certstore = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
pkiDebug("building certificate chain\n");
X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(certstore, openssl_callback);
X509_STORE_CTX_init(&certctx, certstore, cert,
id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs);
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&certctx, id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs);
/* Solaris Kerberos */
if (X509_verify_cert(&certctx) <= 0) {
pkiDebug("failed to create a certificate chain: %s\n",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&certctx)));
if (!sk_X509_num(id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs))
pkiDebug("No trusted CAs found. Check your X509_anchors\n");
goto cleanup;
}
certstack = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&certctx);
size = sk_X509_num(certstack);
pkiDebug("size of certificate chain = %d\n", size);
for(i = 0; i < size - 1; i++) {
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certstack, i);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", i, buf);
sk_X509_push(cert_stack, X509_dup(x));
}
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&certctx);
X509_STORE_free(certstore);
sk_X509_pop_free(certstack, X509_free);
}
p7s->cert = cert_stack;
/* fill-in PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO */
if ((p7si = PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7si->version, 1))
goto cleanup;
if (!X509_NAME_set(&p7si->issuer_and_serial->issuer,
X509_get_issuer_name(cert)))
goto cleanup;
/* because ASN1_INTEGER_set is used to set a 'long' we will do
* things the ugly way. */
M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(p7si->issuer_and_serial->serial);
if (!(p7si->issuer_and_serial->serial =
M_ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(cert))))
goto cleanup;
/* will not fill-out EVP_PKEY because it's on the smartcard */
/* Set digest algs */
p7si->digest_alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha1);
if (p7si->digest_alg->parameter != NULL)
ASN1_TYPE_free(p7si->digest_alg->parameter);
if ((p7si->digest_alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
p7si->digest_alg->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL;
/* Set sig algs */
if (p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter != NULL)
ASN1_TYPE_free(p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter);
p7si->digest_enc_alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption);
if (!(p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()))
goto cleanup;
p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL;
/* pick the correct oid for the eContentInfo */
oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plg_cryptoctx, cms_msg_type);
if (oid == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9) {
/* don't include signed attributes for pa-type 15 request */
abuf = data;
alen = data_len;
} else {
/* add signed attributes */
/* compute sha1 digest over the EncapsulatedContentInfo */
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, data, data_len);
md_tmp = EVP_MD_CTX_md(&ctx);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, md_data, &md_len);
/* create a message digest attr */
digest_attr = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(digest_attr, md_data, (int)md_len);
PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(p7si, NID_pkcs9_messageDigest,
V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, (char *) digest_attr);
/* create a content-type attr */
PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(p7si, NID_pkcs9_contentType,
V_ASN1_OBJECT, oid);
/* create the signature over signed attributes. get DER encoded value */
/* This is the place where smartcard signature needs to be calculated */
sk = p7si->auth_attr;
alen = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *) sk, &abuf,
ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN));
if (abuf == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
}
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
/* Some tokens can only do RSAEncryption without sha1 hash */
/* to compute sha1WithRSAEncryption, encode the algorithm ID for the hash
* function and the hash value into an ASN.1 value of type DigestInfo
* DigestInfo::=SEQUENCE {
* digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
* digest OCTET STRING }
*/
if (id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method == 1 &&
id_cryptoctx->mech == CKM_RSA_PKCS) {
pkiDebug("mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS\n");
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx2);
/* if this is not draft9 request, include digest signed attribute */
if (cms_msg_type != CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9)
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx2, md_tmp, NULL);
else
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx2, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx2, abuf, alen);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx2, md_data2, &md_len2);
alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
if (alg == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha1);
alg->parameter = NULL;
alg_len = i2d_X509_ALGOR(alg, NULL);
alg_buf = (unsigned char *)malloc(alg_len);
if (alg_buf == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
digest = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
if (digest == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(digest, md_data2, (int)md_len2);
digest_len = i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(digest, NULL);
digest_buf = (unsigned char *)malloc(digest_len);
if (digest_buf == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
digestInfo_len = ASN1_object_size(1, (int)(alg_len + digest_len),
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
y = digestInfo_buf = (unsigned char *)malloc(digestInfo_len);
if (digestInfo_buf == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
ASN1_put_object(&y, 1, (int)(alg_len + digest_len), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,
V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
i2d_X509_ALGOR(alg, &y);
i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(digest, &y);
#ifdef DEBUG_SIG
pkiDebug("signing buffer\n");
print_buffer(digestInfo_buf, digestInfo_len);
print_buffer_bin(digestInfo_buf, digestInfo_len, "/tmp/pkcs7_tosign");
#endif
retval = pkinit_sign_data(context, id_cryptoctx, digestInfo_buf,
digestInfo_len, &sig, &sig_len);
} else
#endif
{
pkiDebug("mech = %s\n",
id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method == 1 ? "CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS" : "FS");
retval = pkinit_sign_data(context, id_cryptoctx, abuf, alen,
&sig, &sig_len);
}
#ifdef DEBUG_SIG
print_buffer(sig, sig_len);
#endif
if (cms_msg_type != CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9)
free(abuf);
if (retval)
goto cleanup2;
/* Add signature */
if (!ASN1_STRING_set(p7si->enc_digest, (unsigned char *) sig,
(int)sig_len)) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("failed to add a signed digest attribute\n");
goto cleanup2;
}
/* adder signer_info to pkcs7 signed */
if (!PKCS7_add_signer(p7, p7si))
goto cleanup2;
/* start on adding data to the pkcs7 signed */
if ((inner_p7 = PKCS7_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
if ((pkinit_data = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
pkinit_data->type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
if ((pkinit_data->value.octet_string = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(pkinit_data->value.octet_string, data,
(int)data_len)) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("failed to add pkcs7 data\n");
goto cleanup2;
}
if (!PKCS7_set0_type_other(inner_p7, OBJ_obj2nid(oid), pkinit_data))
goto cleanup2;
if (p7s->contents != NULL)
PKCS7_free(p7s->contents);
p7s->contents = inner_p7;
*signed_data_len = i2d_PKCS7(p7, NULL);
if (!(*signed_data_len)) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("failed to der encode pkcs7\n");
goto cleanup2;
}
if ((p = *signed_data =
(unsigned char *) malloc((size_t)*signed_data_len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
/* DER encode PKCS7 data */
retval = i2d_PKCS7(p7, &p);
if (!retval) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("failed to der encode pkcs7\n");
goto cleanup2;
}
retval = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_CLIENT) {
print_buffer_bin(*signed_data, *signed_data_len,
"/tmp/client_pkcs7_signeddata");
} else {
if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_SERVER) {
print_buffer_bin(*signed_data, *signed_data_len,
"/tmp/kdc_pkcs7_signeddata");
} else {
print_buffer_bin(*signed_data, *signed_data_len,
"/tmp/draft9_pkcs7_signeddata");
}
}
#endif
cleanup2:
if (cms_msg_type != CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9)
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
if (id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method == 1 &&
id_cryptoctx->mech == CKM_RSA_PKCS) {
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx2);
if (digest_buf != NULL)
free(digest_buf);
if (digestInfo_buf != NULL)
free(digestInfo_buf);
if (alg_buf != NULL)
free(alg_buf);
if (digest != NULL)
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(digest);
}
#endif
if (alg != NULL)
X509_ALGOR_free(alg);
cleanup:
if (p7 != NULL)
PKCS7_free(p7);
if (sig != NULL)
free(sig);
return retval;
}
krb5_error_code
cms_signeddata_verify(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx,
int cms_msg_type,
int require_crl_checking,
unsigned char *signed_data,
unsigned int signed_data_len,
unsigned char **data,
unsigned int *data_len,
unsigned char **authz_data,
unsigned int *authz_data_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
BIO *out = NULL;
int flags = PKCS7_NOVERIFY, i = 0;
unsigned int vflags = 0, size = 0;
const unsigned char *p = signed_data;
STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *si_sk = NULL;
PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si = NULL;
X509 *x = NULL;
X509_STORE *store = NULL;
X509_STORE_CTX cert_ctx;
STACK_OF(X509) *intermediateCAs = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *revoked = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *verified_chain = NULL;
ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL;
krb5_external_principal_identifier **krb5_verified_chain = NULL;
krb5_data *authz = NULL;
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(signed_data, signed_data_len,
"/tmp/client_received_pkcs7_signeddata");
#endif
/* Do this early enough to create the shadow OID for pkcs7-data if needed */
oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plgctx, cms_msg_type);
if (oid == NULL)
goto cleanup;
/* decode received PKCS7 message */
if ((p7 = d2i_PKCS7(NULL, &p, (int)signed_data_len)) == NULL) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("%s: failed to decode message: %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
goto cleanup;
}
/* verify that the received message is PKCS7 SignedData message */
if (OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type) != NID_pkcs7_signed) {
pkiDebug("Expected id-signedData PKCS7 msg (received type = %d)\n",
OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type));
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "wrong oid\n");
goto cleanup;
}
/* setup to verify X509 certificate used to sign PKCS7 message */
if (!(store = X509_STORE_new()))
goto cleanup;
/* check if we are inforcing CRL checking */
vflags = X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL;
if (require_crl_checking)
X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(store, openssl_callback);
else
X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(store, openssl_callback_ignore_crls);
X509_STORE_set_flags(store, vflags);
/* get the signer's information from the PKCS7 message */
if ((si_sk = PKCS7_get_signer_info(p7)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((si = sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_value(si_sk, 0)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((x = PKCS7_cert_from_signer_info(p7, si)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
/* create available CRL information (get local CRLs and include CRLs
* received in the PKCS7 message
*/
if (idctx->revoked == NULL)
revoked = p7->d.sign->crl;
else if (p7->d.sign->crl == NULL)
revoked = idctx->revoked;
else {
size = sk_X509_CRL_num(idctx->revoked);
revoked = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
sk_X509_CRL_push(revoked, sk_X509_CRL_value(idctx->revoked, i));
size = sk_X509_CRL_num(p7->d.sign->crl);
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
sk_X509_CRL_push(revoked, sk_X509_CRL_value(p7->d.sign->crl, i));
}
/* create available intermediate CAs chains (get local intermediateCAs and
* include the CA chain received in the PKCS7 message
*/
if (idctx->intermediateCAs == NULL)
intermediateCAs = p7->d.sign->cert;
else if (p7->d.sign->cert == NULL)
intermediateCAs = idctx->intermediateCAs;
else {
size = sk_X509_num(idctx->intermediateCAs);
intermediateCAs = sk_X509_new_null();
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
sk_X509_push(intermediateCAs,
sk_X509_value(idctx->intermediateCAs, i));
}
size = sk_X509_num(p7->d.sign->cert);
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
sk_X509_push(intermediateCAs, sk_X509_value(p7->d.sign->cert, i));
}
}
/* initialize x509 context with the received certificate and
* trusted and intermediate CA chains and CRLs
*/
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_ctx, store, x, intermediateCAs))
goto cleanup;
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(&cert_ctx, revoked);
/* add trusted CAs certificates for cert verification */
if (idctx->trustedCAs != NULL)
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&cert_ctx, idctx->trustedCAs);
else {
pkiDebug("unable to find any trusted CAs\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_CERTCHAIN
if (intermediateCAs != NULL) {
size = sk_X509_num(intermediateCAs);
pkiDebug("untrusted cert chain of size %d\n", size);
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(
sk_X509_value(intermediateCAs, i)), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", i, buf);
}
}
if (idctx->trustedCAs != NULL) {
size = sk_X509_num(idctx->trustedCAs);
pkiDebug("trusted cert chain of size %d\n", size);
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(
sk_X509_value(idctx->trustedCAs, i)), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", i, buf);
}
}
if (revoked != NULL) {
size = sk_X509_CRL_num(revoked);
pkiDebug("CRL chain of size %d\n", size);
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
X509_CRL *crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(revoked, i);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("crls by CA #%d: %s\n", i , buf);
}
}
#endif
i = X509_verify_cert(&cert_ctx);
if (i <= 0) {
int j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&cert_ctx);
reqctx->received_cert = X509_dup(cert_ctx.current_cert);
switch(j) {
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE;
break;
default:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE;
}
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(
reqctx->received_cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("problem with cert DN = %s (error=%d) %s\n", buf, j,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
#ifdef DEBUG_CERTCHAIN
size = sk_X509_num(p7->d.sign->cert);
pkiDebug("received cert chain of size %d\n", size);
for (j = 0; j < size; j++) {
X509 *tmp_cert = sk_X509_value(p7->d.sign->cert, j);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(tmp_cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", j, buf);
}
#endif
} else {
/* retrieve verified certificate chain */
if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_CLIENT || cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9)
verified_chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&cert_ctx);
}
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&cert_ctx);
if (i <= 0)
goto cleanup;
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9)
flags |= PKCS7_NOATTR;
if (PKCS7_verify(p7, NULL, store, NULL, out, flags)) {
int valid_oid = 0;
if (!OBJ_cmp(p7->d.sign->contents->type, oid))
valid_oid = 1;
else if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9) {
/*
* Various implementations of the pa-type 15 request use
* different OIDS. We check that the returned object
* has any of the acceptable OIDs
*/
ASN1_OBJECT *client_oid = NULL, *server_oid = NULL, *rsa_oid = NULL;
client_oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plgctx, CMS_SIGN_CLIENT);
server_oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plgctx, CMS_SIGN_SERVER);
rsa_oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plgctx, CMS_ENVEL_SERVER);
if (!OBJ_cmp(p7->d.sign->contents->type, client_oid) ||
!OBJ_cmp(p7->d.sign->contents->type, server_oid) ||
!OBJ_cmp(p7->d.sign->contents->type, rsa_oid))
valid_oid = 1;
}
if (valid_oid)
pkiDebug("PKCS7 Verification successful\n");
else {
pkiDebug("wrong oid in eContentType\n");
print_buffer((unsigned char *)p7->d.sign->contents->type->data,
(unsigned int)p7->d.sign->contents->type->length);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "wrong oid\n");
goto cleanup;
}
}
else {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
switch(ERR_GET_REASON(err)) {
case PKCS7_R_DIGEST_FAILURE:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_DIGEST_IN_SIGNED_DATA_NOT_ACCEPTED;
break;
case PKCS7_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
default:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_INVALID_SIG;
}
pkiDebug("PKCS7 Verification failure\n");
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
goto cleanup;
}
/* transfer the data from PKCS7 message into return buffer */
for (size = 0;;) {
if ((*data = realloc(*data, size + 1024 * 10)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
i = BIO_read(out, &((*data)[size]), 1024 * 10);
if (i <= 0)
break;
else
size += i;
}
*data_len = size;
reqctx->received_cert = X509_dup(x);
/* generate authorization data */
if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_CLIENT || cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9) {
if (authz_data == NULL || authz_data_len == NULL)
goto out;
*authz_data = NULL;
retval = create_identifiers_from_stack(verified_chain,
&krb5_verified_chain);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("create_identifiers_from_stack failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
retval = k5int_encode_krb5_td_trusted_certifiers((const krb5_external_principal_identifier **)krb5_verified_chain, &authz);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("encode_krb5_td_trusted_certifiers failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)authz->data, authz->length,
"/tmp/kdc_ad_initial_verified_cas");
#endif
*authz_data = (unsigned char *)malloc(authz->length);
if (*authz_data == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
(void) memcpy(*authz_data, authz->data, authz->length);
*authz_data_len = authz->length;
}
out:
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (out != NULL)
BIO_free(out);
if (store != NULL)
X509_STORE_free(store);
if (p7 != NULL) {
if (idctx->intermediateCAs != NULL && p7->d.sign->cert)
sk_X509_free(intermediateCAs);
if (idctx->revoked != NULL && p7->d.sign->crl)
sk_X509_CRL_free(revoked);
PKCS7_free(p7);
}
if (verified_chain != NULL)
sk_X509_pop_free(verified_chain, X509_free);
if (krb5_verified_chain != NULL)
free_krb5_external_principal_identifier(&krb5_verified_chain);
if (authz != NULL)
krb5_free_data(context, authz);
return retval;
}
krb5_error_code
cms_envelopeddata_create(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx,
krb5_preauthtype pa_type,
int include_certchain,
unsigned char *key_pack,
unsigned int key_pack_len,
unsigned char **out,
unsigned int *out_len)
{
/* Solaris Kerberos */
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
BIO *in = NULL;
unsigned char *p = NULL, *signed_data = NULL, *enc_data = NULL;
int signed_data_len = 0, enc_data_len = 0, flags = PKCS7_BINARY;
STACK_OF(X509) *encerts = NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
int cms_msg_type;
/* create the PKCS7 SignedData portion of the PKCS7 EnvelopedData */
switch ((int)pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
cms_msg_type = CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9;
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
cms_msg_type = CMS_ENVEL_SERVER;
break;
default:
/* Solaris Kerberos */
retval = EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = cms_signeddata_create(context, plgctx, reqctx, idctx,
cms_msg_type, include_certchain, key_pack, key_pack_len,
&signed_data, (unsigned int *)&signed_data_len);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to create pkcs7 signed data\n");
goto cleanup;
}
/* check we have client's certificate */
if (reqctx->received_cert == NULL) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
encerts = sk_X509_new_null();
sk_X509_push(encerts, reqctx->received_cert);
cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
in = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
switch (pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
prepare_enc_data(signed_data, signed_data_len, &enc_data,
&enc_data_len);
retval = BIO_write(in, enc_data, enc_data_len);
if (retval != enc_data_len) {
pkiDebug("BIO_write only wrote %d\n", retval);
goto cleanup;
}
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
retval = BIO_write(in, signed_data, signed_data_len);
if (retval != signed_data_len) {
pkiDebug("BIO_write only wrote %d\n", retval);
/* Solaris Kerberos */
retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
goto cleanup;
}
break;
default:
retval = -1;
goto cleanup;
}
p7 = PKCS7_encrypt(encerts, in, cipher, flags);
if (p7 == NULL) {
pkiDebug("failed to encrypt PKCS7 object\n");
retval = -1;
goto cleanup;
}
switch (pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->content_type =
OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed);
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->content_type =
OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data);
break;
}
*out_len = i2d_PKCS7(p7, NULL);
if (!*out_len || (p = *out = (unsigned char *)malloc(*out_len)) == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = i2d_PKCS7(p7, &p);
if (!retval) {
pkiDebug("unable to write pkcs7 object\n");
goto cleanup;
}
retval = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(*out, *out_len, "/tmp/kdc_enveloped_data");
#endif
cleanup:
if (p7 != NULL)
PKCS7_free(p7);
if (in != NULL)
BIO_free(in);
if (signed_data != NULL)
free(signed_data);
if (enc_data != NULL)
free(enc_data);
if (encerts != NULL)
sk_X509_free(encerts);
return retval;
}
krb5_error_code
cms_envelopeddata_verify(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_preauthtype pa_type,
int require_crl_checking,
unsigned char *enveloped_data,
unsigned int enveloped_data_len,
unsigned char **data,
unsigned int *data_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
BIO *out = NULL;
int i = 0;
unsigned int size = 0;
const unsigned char *p = enveloped_data;
unsigned int tmp_buf_len = 0, tmp_buf2_len = 0, vfy_buf_len = 0;
unsigned char *tmp_buf = NULL, *tmp_buf2 = NULL, *vfy_buf = NULL;
int msg_type = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(enveloped_data, enveloped_data_len,
"/tmp/client_envelopeddata");
#endif
/* decode received PKCS7 message */
if ((p7 = d2i_PKCS7(NULL, &p, (int)enveloped_data_len)) == NULL) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
pkiDebug("failed to decode pkcs7\n");
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
goto cleanup;
}
/* verify that the received message is PKCS7 EnvelopedData message */
if (OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type) != NID_pkcs7_enveloped) {
pkiDebug("Expected id-enveloped PKCS7 msg (received type = %d)\n",
OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type));
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "wrong oid\n");
goto cleanup;
}
/* decrypt received PKCS7 message */
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (pkcs7_decrypt(context, id_cryptoctx, p7, out)) {
pkiDebug("PKCS7 decryption successful\n");
} else {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
if (err != 0)
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("PKCS7 decryption failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
/* transfer the decoded PKCS7 SignedData message into a separate buffer */
for (;;) {
if ((tmp_buf = realloc(tmp_buf, size + 1024 * 10)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
i = BIO_read(out, &(tmp_buf[size]), 1024 * 10);
if (i <= 0)
break;
else
size += i;
}
tmp_buf_len = size;
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len, "/tmp/client_enc_keypack");
#endif
/* verify PKCS7 SignedData message */
switch (pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP:
msg_type = CMS_ENVEL_SERVER;
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
msg_type = CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9;
break;
default:
pkiDebug("%s: unrecognized pa_type = %d\n", __FUNCTION__, pa_type);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* If this is the RFC style, wrap the signed data to make
* decoding easier in the verify routine.
* For draft9-compatible, we don't do anything because it
* is already wrapped.
*/
#ifdef LONGHORN_BETA_COMPAT
/*
* The Longhorn server returns the expected RFC-style data, but
* it is missing the sequence tag and length, so it requires
* special processing when wrapping.
* This will hopefully be fixed before the final release and
* this can all be removed.
*/
if (msg_type == CMS_ENVEL_SERVER || longhorn == 1) {
retval = wrap_signeddata(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len,
&tmp_buf2, &tmp_buf2_len, longhorn);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to encode signeddata\n");
goto cleanup;
}
vfy_buf = tmp_buf2;
vfy_buf_len = tmp_buf2_len;
} else {
vfy_buf = tmp_buf;
vfy_buf_len = tmp_buf_len;
}
#else
if (msg_type == CMS_ENVEL_SERVER) {
retval = wrap_signeddata(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len,
&tmp_buf2, &tmp_buf2_len);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to encode signeddata\n");
goto cleanup;
}
vfy_buf = tmp_buf2;
vfy_buf_len = tmp_buf2_len;
} else {
vfy_buf = tmp_buf;
vfy_buf_len = tmp_buf_len;
}
#endif
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(vfy_buf, vfy_buf_len, "/tmp/client_enc_keypack2");
#endif
retval = cms_signeddata_verify(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx, msg_type,
require_crl_checking,
vfy_buf, vfy_buf_len,
data, data_len, NULL, NULL);
if (!retval)
pkiDebug("PKCS7 Verification Success\n");
else {
pkiDebug("PKCS7 Verification Failure\n");
goto cleanup;
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (p7 != NULL)
PKCS7_free(p7);
if (out != NULL)
BIO_free(out);
if (tmp_buf != NULL)
free(tmp_buf);
if (tmp_buf2 != NULL)
free(tmp_buf2);
return retval;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static krb5_error_code
crypto_retrieve_X509_sans(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx,
X509 *cert,
krb5_principal **princs_ret,
krb5_principal **upn_ret,
unsigned char ***dns_ret)
{
krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL;
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
int p = 0, u = 0, d = 0;
krb5_principal *princs = NULL;
krb5_principal *upns = NULL;
unsigned char **dnss = NULL;
int i, num_found = 0;
if (princs_ret == NULL && upn_ret == NULL && dns_ret == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: nowhere to return any values!\n", __FUNCTION__);
return retval;
}
if (cert == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: no certificate!\n", __FUNCTION__);
return retval;
}
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert),
buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("%s: looking for SANs in cert = %s\n", __FUNCTION__, buf);
if ((i = X509_get_ext_by_NID(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, -1)) >= 0) {
X509_EXTENSION *ext = NULL;
GENERAL_NAMES *ialt = NULL;
GENERAL_NAME *gen = NULL;
int ret = 0;
unsigned int num_sans = 0;
if (!(ext = X509_get_ext(cert, i)) || !(ialt = X509V3_EXT_d2i(ext))) {
pkiDebug("%s: found no subject alt name extensions\n",
__FUNCTION__);
goto cleanup;
}
num_sans = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(ialt);
pkiDebug("%s: found %d subject alt name extension(s)\n",
__FUNCTION__, num_sans);
/* OK, we're likely returning something. Allocate return values */
if (princs_ret != NULL) {
princs = calloc(num_sans + 1, sizeof(krb5_principal));
if (princs == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (upn_ret != NULL) {
upns = calloc(num_sans + 1, sizeof(krb5_principal));
if (upns == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (dns_ret != NULL) {
dnss = calloc(num_sans + 1, sizeof(*dnss));
if (dnss == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < num_sans; i++) {
krb5_data name = { 0, 0, NULL };
gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(ialt, i);
switch (gen->type) {
case GEN_OTHERNAME:
name.length = gen->d.otherName->value->value.sequence->length;
name.data = (char *)gen->d.otherName->value->value.sequence->data;
if (princs != NULL
&& OBJ_cmp(plgctx->id_pkinit_san,
gen->d.otherName->type_id) == 0) {
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)name.data, name.length,
"/tmp/pkinit_san");
#endif
ret = k5int_decode_krb5_principal_name(&name, &princs[p]);
if (ret) {
pkiDebug("%s: failed decoding pkinit san value\n",
__FUNCTION__);
} else {
p++;
num_found++;
}
} else if (upns != NULL
&& OBJ_cmp(plgctx->id_ms_san_upn,
gen->d.otherName->type_id) == 0) {
ret = krb5_parse_name(context, name.data, &upns[u]);
if (ret) {
pkiDebug("%s: failed parsing ms-upn san value\n",
__FUNCTION__);
} else {
u++;
num_found++;
}
} else {
pkiDebug("%s: unrecognized othername oid in SAN\n",
__FUNCTION__);
continue;
}
break;
case GEN_DNS:
if (dnss != NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: found dns name = %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, gen->d.dNSName->data);
dnss[d] = (unsigned char *)
strdup((char *)gen->d.dNSName->data);
if (dnss[d] == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: failed to duplicate dns name\n",
__FUNCTION__);
} else {
d++;
num_found++;
}
}
break;
default:
pkiDebug("%s: SAN type = %d expecting %d\n",
__FUNCTION__, gen->type, GEN_OTHERNAME);
}
}
sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(ialt, GENERAL_NAME_free);
}
retval = 0;
if (princs)
*princs_ret = princs;
if (upns)
*upn_ret = upns;
if (dnss)
*dns_ret = dnss;
cleanup:
if (retval) {
if (princs != NULL) {
for (i = 0; princs[i] != NULL; i++)
krb5_free_principal(context, princs[i]);
free(princs);
}
if (upns != NULL) {
for (i = 0; upns[i] != NULL; i++)
krb5_free_principal(context, upns[i]);
free(upns);
}
if (dnss != NULL) {
for (i = 0; dnss[i] != NULL; i++)
free(dnss[i]);
free(dnss);
}
}
return retval;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
krb5_error_code
crypto_retrieve_cert_sans(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx,
krb5_principal **princs_ret,
krb5_principal **upn_ret,
unsigned char ***dns_ret)
{
krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL;
if (reqctx->received_cert == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: No certificate!\n", __FUNCTION__);
return retval;
}
return crypto_retrieve_X509_sans(context, plgctx, reqctx,
reqctx->received_cert, princs_ret,
upn_ret, dns_ret);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
krb5_error_code
crypto_check_cert_eku(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx,
int checking_kdc_cert,
int allow_secondary_usage,
int *valid_eku)
{
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
int found_eku = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL;
int i;
/* Solaris Kerberos */
if (valid_eku == NULL)
return retval;
*valid_eku = 0;
if (reqctx->received_cert == NULL)
goto cleanup;
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(reqctx->received_cert),
buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("%s: looking for EKUs in cert = %s\n", __FUNCTION__, buf);
if ((i = X509_get_ext_by_NID(reqctx->received_cert,
NID_ext_key_usage, -1)) >= 0) {
EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(reqctx->received_cert, NID_ext_key_usage,
NULL, NULL);
if (extusage) {
pkiDebug("%s: found eku info in the cert\n", __FUNCTION__);
for (i = 0; found_eku == 0 && i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
ASN1_OBJECT *tmp_oid;
tmp_oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i);
pkiDebug("%s: checking eku %d of %d, allow_secondary = %d\n",
__FUNCTION__, i+1, sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage),
allow_secondary_usage);
if (checking_kdc_cert) {
if ((OBJ_cmp(tmp_oid, plgctx->id_pkinit_KPKdc) == 0)
|| (allow_secondary_usage
&& OBJ_cmp(tmp_oid, plgctx->id_kp_serverAuth) == 0))
found_eku = 1;
} else {
if ((OBJ_cmp(tmp_oid, plgctx->id_pkinit_KPClientAuth) == 0)
|| (allow_secondary_usage
&& OBJ_cmp(tmp_oid, plgctx->id_ms_kp_sc_logon) == 0))
found_eku = 1;
}
}
}
EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_free(extusage);
if (found_eku) {
ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage = NULL;
pkiDebug("%s: found acceptable EKU, checking for digitalSignature\n", __FUNCTION__);
/* check that digitalSignature KeyUsage is present */
if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(reqctx->received_cert,
NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
if (!ku_reject(reqctx->received_cert,
X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) {
pkiDebug("%s: found digitalSignature KU\n",
__FUNCTION__);
*valid_eku = 1;
} else
pkiDebug("%s: didn't find digitalSignature KU\n",
__FUNCTION__);
}
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
}
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
pkiDebug("%s: returning retval %d, valid_eku %d\n",
__FUNCTION__, retval, *valid_eku);
return retval;
}
krb5_error_code
pkinit_octetstring2key(krb5_context context,
krb5_enctype etype,
unsigned char *key,
unsigned int dh_key_len,
krb5_keyblock * key_block)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char counter;
size_t keybytes, keylength, offset;
krb5_data random_data;
if ((buf = (unsigned char *) malloc(dh_key_len)) == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
(void) memset(buf, 0, dh_key_len);
counter = 0;
offset = 0;
do {
SHA_CTX c;
SHA1_Init(&c);
SHA1_Update(&c, &counter, 1);
SHA1_Update(&c, key, dh_key_len);
SHA1_Final(md, &c);
if (dh_key_len - offset < sizeof(md))
(void) memcpy(buf + offset, md, dh_key_len - offset);
else
(void) memcpy(buf + offset, md, sizeof(md));
offset += sizeof(md);
counter++;
} while (offset < dh_key_len);
/* Solaris Kerberos */
key_block->magic = KV5M_KEYBLOCK;
key_block->enctype = etype;
retval = krb5_c_keylengths(context, etype, &keybytes, &keylength);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
key_block->length = keylength;
key_block->contents = calloc(keylength, sizeof(unsigned char *));
if (key_block->contents == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
random_data.length = keybytes;
random_data.data = (char *)buf;
retval = krb5_c_random_to_key(context, etype, &random_data, key_block);
cleanup:
if (buf != NULL)
free(buf);
if (retval && key_block->contents != NULL && key_block->length != 0) {
(void) memset(key_block->contents, 0, key_block->length);
key_block->length = 0;
}
return retval;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
krb5_error_code
client_create_dh(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int dh_size,
unsigned char **dh_params,
unsigned int *dh_params_len,
unsigned char **dh_pubkey,
unsigned int *dh_pubkey_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
int dh_err = 0;
ASN1_INTEGER *pub_key = NULL;
if (cryptoctx->dh == NULL) {
if ((cryptoctx->dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((cryptoctx->dh->g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(cryptoctx->dh->q = BN_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
switch(dh_size) {
case 1024:
pkiDebug("client uses 1024 DH keys\n");
cryptoctx->dh->p = get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
break;
case 2048:
pkiDebug("client uses 2048 DH keys\n");
cryptoctx->dh->p = BN_bin2bn(pkinit_2048_dhprime,
sizeof(pkinit_2048_dhprime), NULL);
break;
case 4096:
pkiDebug("client uses 4096 DH keys\n");
cryptoctx->dh->p = BN_bin2bn(pkinit_4096_dhprime,
sizeof(pkinit_4096_dhprime), NULL);
break;
default:
goto cleanup;
}
BN_set_word((cryptoctx->dh->g), DH_GENERATOR_2);
BN_rshift1(cryptoctx->dh->q, cryptoctx->dh->p);
}
DH_generate_key(cryptoctx->dh);
/* Solaris Kerberos */
#ifdef DEBUG
DH_check(cryptoctx->dh, &dh_err);
if (dh_err != 0) {
pkiDebug("Warning: dh_check failed with %d\n", dh_err);
if (dh_err & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
pkiDebug("p value is not prime\n");
if (dh_err & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME)
pkiDebug("p value is not a safe prime\n");
if (dh_err & DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR)
pkiDebug("unable to check the generator value\n");
if (dh_err & DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR)
pkiDebug("the g value is not a generator\n");
}
#endif
#ifdef DEBUG_DH
print_dh(cryptoctx->dh, "client's DH params\n");
print_pubkey(cryptoctx->dh->pub_key, "client's pub_key=");
#endif
DH_check_pub_key(cryptoctx->dh, cryptoctx->dh->pub_key, &dh_err);
if (dh_err != 0) {
pkiDebug("dh_check_pub_key failed with %d\n", dh_err);
goto cleanup;
}
/* pack DHparams */
/* aglo: usually we could just call i2d_DHparams to encode DH params
* however, PKINIT requires RFC3279 encoding and openssl does pkcs#3.
*/
retval = pkinit_encode_dh_params(cryptoctx->dh->p, cryptoctx->dh->g,
cryptoctx->dh->q, dh_params, dh_params_len);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
/* pack DH public key */
/* Diffie-Hellman public key must be ASN1 encoded as an INTEGER; this
* encoding shall be used as the contents (the value) of the
* subjectPublicKey component (a BIT STRING) of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo
* data element
*/
if ((pub_key = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(cryptoctx->dh->pub_key, NULL)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
*dh_pubkey_len = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pub_key, NULL);
if ((buf = *dh_pubkey = (unsigned char *)
malloc((size_t) *dh_pubkey_len)) == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pub_key, &buf);
if (pub_key != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key);
retval = 0;
return retval;
cleanup:
if (cryptoctx->dh != NULL)
DH_free(cryptoctx->dh);
cryptoctx->dh = NULL;
if (*dh_params != NULL)
free(*dh_params);
*dh_params = NULL;
if (*dh_pubkey != NULL)
free(*dh_pubkey);
*dh_pubkey = NULL;
if (pub_key != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key);
return retval;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
krb5_error_code
client_process_dh(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *subjectPublicKey_data,
unsigned int subjectPublicKey_length,
unsigned char **client_key,
unsigned int *client_key_len)
{
/* Solaris Kerberos */
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED;
BIGNUM *server_pub_key = NULL;
ASN1_INTEGER *pub_key = NULL;
const unsigned char *p = NULL;
unsigned char *data = NULL;
long data_len;
/* decode subjectPublicKey (retrieve INTEGER from OCTET_STRING) */
if (der_decode_data(subjectPublicKey_data, (long)subjectPublicKey_length,
&data, &data_len) != 0) {
pkiDebug("failed to decode subjectPublicKey\n");
/* Solaris Kerberos */
retval = KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
*client_key_len = DH_size(cryptoctx->dh);
if ((*client_key = (unsigned char *)
malloc((size_t) *client_key_len)) == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
p = data;
if ((pub_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, data_len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((server_pub_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(pub_key, NULL)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
DH_compute_key(*client_key, server_pub_key, cryptoctx->dh);
#ifdef DEBUG_DH
print_pubkey(server_pub_key, "server's pub_key=");
pkiDebug("client secret key (%d)= ", *client_key_len);
print_buffer(*client_key, *client_key_len);
#endif
retval = 0;
if (server_pub_key != NULL)
BN_free(server_pub_key);
if (pub_key != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key);
if (data != NULL)
free (data);
return retval;
cleanup:
if (*client_key != NULL)
free(*client_key);
*client_key = NULL;
if (pub_key != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key);
if (data != NULL)
free (data);
return retval;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
krb5_error_code
server_check_dh(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_octet_data *dh_params,
int minbits)
{
DH *dh = NULL;
unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
int dh_prime_bits;
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_DH_KEY_PARAMETERS_NOT_ACCEPTED;
tmp = dh_params->data;
dh = DH_new();
dh = pkinit_decode_dh_params(&dh, &tmp, dh_params->length);
if (dh == NULL) {
pkiDebug("failed to decode dhparams\n");
goto cleanup;
}
/* KDC SHOULD check to see if the key parameters satisfy its policy */
dh_prime_bits = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
if (minbits && dh_prime_bits < minbits) {
pkiDebug("client sent dh params with %d bits, we require %d\n",
dh_prime_bits, minbits);
goto cleanup;
}
/* check dhparams is group 2 */
if (pkinit_check_dh_params(cryptoctx->dh_1024->p,
dh->p, dh->g, dh->q) == 0) {
retval = 0;
goto cleanup;
}
/* check dhparams is group 14 */
if (pkinit_check_dh_params(cryptoctx->dh_2048->p,
dh->p, dh->g, dh->q) == 0) {
retval = 0;
goto cleanup;
}
/* check dhparams is group 16 */
if (pkinit_check_dh_params(cryptoctx->dh_4096->p,
dh->p, dh->g, dh->q) == 0) {
retval = 0;
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
if (retval == 0)
req_cryptoctx->dh = dh;
else
DH_free(dh);
return retval;
}
/* kdc's dh function */
/* ARGSUSED */
krb5_error_code
server_process_dh(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *data,
unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **dh_pubkey,
unsigned int *dh_pubkey_len,
unsigned char **server_key,
unsigned int *server_key_len)
{
/* Solaris Kerberos */
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
DH *dh = NULL, *dh_server = NULL;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
ASN1_INTEGER *pub_key = NULL;
/* get client's received DH parameters that we saved in server_check_dh */
dh = cryptoctx->dh;
dh_server = DH_new();
if (dh_server == NULL)
goto cleanup;
dh_server->p = BN_dup(dh->p);
dh_server->g = BN_dup(dh->g);
dh_server->q = BN_dup(dh->q);
/* decode client's public key */
p = data;
pub_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&p, (int)data_len);
if (pub_key == NULL)
goto cleanup;
dh->pub_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(pub_key, NULL);
if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
goto cleanup;
ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key);
if (!DH_generate_key(dh_server))
goto cleanup;
/* generate DH session key */
*server_key_len = DH_size(dh_server);
if ((*server_key = (unsigned char *) malloc((size_t)*server_key_len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
DH_compute_key(*server_key, dh->pub_key, dh_server);
#ifdef DEBUG_DH
print_dh(dh_server, "client&server's DH params\n");
print_pubkey(dh->pub_key, "client's pub_key=");
print_pubkey(dh_server->pub_key, "server's pub_key=");
pkiDebug("server secret key=");
print_buffer(*server_key, *server_key_len);
#endif
/* KDC reply */
/* pack DH public key */
/* Diffie-Hellman public key must be ASN1 encoded as an INTEGER; this
* encoding shall be used as the contents (the value) of the
* subjectPublicKey component (a BIT STRING) of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo
* data element
*/
if ((pub_key = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(dh_server->pub_key, NULL)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
*dh_pubkey_len = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pub_key, NULL);
if ((p = *dh_pubkey = (unsigned char *) malloc((size_t)*dh_pubkey_len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pub_key, &p);
if (pub_key != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key);
retval = 0;
if (dh_server != NULL)
DH_free(dh_server);
return retval;
cleanup:
if (dh_server != NULL)
DH_free(dh_server);
if (*dh_pubkey != NULL)
free(*dh_pubkey);
if (*server_key != NULL)
free(*server_key);
return retval;
}
/*
* Solaris Kerberos:
* Add locking around did_init to make it MT-safe.
*/
static krb5_error_code
openssl_init()
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
static int did_init = 0;
static k5_mutex_t init_mutex = K5_MUTEX_PARTIAL_INITIALIZER;
ret = k5_mutex_lock(&init_mutex);
if (ret == 0) {
if (!did_init) {
/* initialize openssl routines */
CRYPTO_malloc_init();
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
did_init++;
}
k5_mutex_unlock(&init_mutex);
}
return (ret);
}
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_encode_dh_params(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *g, BIGNUM *q,
unsigned char **buf, unsigned int *buf_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
int bufsize = 0, r = 0;
unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
ASN1_INTEGER *ap = NULL, *ag = NULL, *aq = NULL;
if ((ap = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(p, NULL)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((ag = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(g, NULL)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((aq = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(q, NULL)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
bufsize = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(ap, NULL);
bufsize += i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(ag, NULL);
bufsize += i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(aq, NULL);
r = ASN1_object_size(1, bufsize, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
tmp = *buf = (unsigned char *)malloc((size_t) r);
if (tmp == NULL)
goto cleanup;
ASN1_put_object(&tmp, 1, bufsize, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(ap, &tmp);
i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(ag, &tmp);
i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(aq, &tmp);
*buf_len = r;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (ap != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(ap);
if (ag != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(ag);
if (aq != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(aq);
return retval;
}
static DH *
pkinit_decode_dh_params(DH ** a, unsigned char **pp, unsigned int len)
{
ASN1_INTEGER ai, *aip = NULL;
long length = (long) len;
M_ASN1_D2I_vars(a, DH *, DH_new);
M_ASN1_D2I_Init();
M_ASN1_D2I_start_sequence();
aip = &ai;
ai.data = NULL;
ai.length = 0;
M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_INTEGER, aip, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER);
if (aip == NULL)
return NULL;
else {
(*a)->p = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(aip, NULL);
if ((*a)->p == NULL)
return NULL;
if (ai.data != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(ai.data);
ai.data = NULL;
ai.length = 0;
}
}
M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_INTEGER, aip, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER);
if (aip == NULL)
return NULL;
else {
(*a)->g = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(aip, NULL);
if ((*a)->g == NULL)
return NULL;
if (ai.data != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(ai.data);
ai.data = NULL;
ai.length = 0;
}
}
M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_INTEGER, aip, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER);
if (aip == NULL)
return NULL;
else {
(*a)->q = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(aip, NULL);
if ((*a)->q == NULL)
return NULL;
if (ai.data != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(ai.data);
ai.data = NULL;
ai.length = 0;
}
}
M_ASN1_D2I_end_sequence();
M_ASN1_D2I_Finish(a, DH_free, 0);
}
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_create_sequence_of_principal_identifiers(
krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int type,
krb5_data **out_data)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
krb5_external_principal_identifier **krb5_trusted_certifiers = NULL;
krb5_data *td_certifiers = NULL, *data = NULL;
krb5_typed_data **typed_data = NULL;
switch(type) {
case TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS:
retval = create_krb5_trustedCertifiers(context, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, id_cryptoctx, &krb5_trusted_certifiers);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("create_krb5_trustedCertifiers failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
break;
case TD_INVALID_CERTIFICATES:
retval = create_krb5_invalidCertificates(context, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, id_cryptoctx, &krb5_trusted_certifiers);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("create_krb5_invalidCertificates failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
break;
default:
retval = -1;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = k5int_encode_krb5_td_trusted_certifiers((const krb5_external_principal_identifier **)krb5_trusted_certifiers, &td_certifiers);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("encode_krb5_td_trusted_certifiers failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)td_certifiers->data,
td_certifiers->length, "/tmp/kdc_td_certifiers");
#endif
typed_data = malloc (2 * sizeof(krb5_typed_data *));
if (typed_data == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
typed_data[1] = NULL;
init_krb5_typed_data(&typed_data[0]);
if (typed_data[0] == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
typed_data[0]->type = type;
typed_data[0]->length = td_certifiers->length;
typed_data[0]->data = (unsigned char *)td_certifiers->data;
retval = k5int_encode_krb5_typed_data((const krb5_typed_data **)typed_data,
&data);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("encode_krb5_typed_data failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)data->data, data->length,
"/tmp/kdc_edata");
#endif
*out_data = (krb5_data *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_data));
(*out_data)->length = data->length;
(*out_data)->data = (char *)malloc(data->length);
(void) memcpy((*out_data)->data, data->data, data->length);
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (krb5_trusted_certifiers != NULL)
free_krb5_external_principal_identifier(&krb5_trusted_certifiers);
if (data != NULL) {
if (data->data != NULL)
free(data->data);
free(data);
}
if (td_certifiers != NULL)
free(td_certifiers);
if (typed_data != NULL)
free_krb5_typed_data(&typed_data);
return retval;
}
krb5_error_code
pkinit_create_td_trusted_certifiers(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_data **out_data)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
retval = pkinit_create_sequence_of_principal_identifiers(context,
plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx, id_cryptoctx,
TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS, out_data);
return retval;
}
krb5_error_code
pkinit_create_td_invalid_certificate(
krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_data **out_data)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
retval = pkinit_create_sequence_of_principal_identifiers(context,
plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx, id_cryptoctx,
TD_INVALID_CERTIFICATES, out_data);
return retval;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
krb5_error_code
pkinit_create_td_dh_parameters(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
pkinit_plg_opts *opts,
krb5_data **out_data)
{
/* Solaris Kerberos */
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
unsigned int buf1_len = 0, buf2_len = 0, buf3_len = 0, i = 0;
unsigned char *buf1 = NULL, *buf2 = NULL, *buf3 = NULL;
krb5_typed_data **typed_data = NULL;
krb5_data *data = NULL, *encoded_algId = NULL;
krb5_algorithm_identifier **algId = NULL;
/* Solaris Kerberos */
if (opts->dh_min_bits > 4096) {
retval = EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
if (opts->dh_min_bits <= 1024) {
retval = pkinit_encode_dh_params(plg_cryptoctx->dh_1024->p,
plg_cryptoctx->dh_1024->g, plg_cryptoctx->dh_1024->q,
&buf1, &buf1_len);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
}
if (opts->dh_min_bits <= 2048) {
retval = pkinit_encode_dh_params(plg_cryptoctx->dh_2048->p,
plg_cryptoctx->dh_2048->g, plg_cryptoctx->dh_2048->q,
&buf2, &buf2_len);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
}
retval = pkinit_encode_dh_params(plg_cryptoctx->dh_4096->p,
plg_cryptoctx->dh_4096->g, plg_cryptoctx->dh_4096->q,
&buf3, &buf3_len);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
if (opts->dh_min_bits <= 1024) {
algId = malloc(4 * sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier *));
if (algId == NULL)
goto cleanup;
algId[3] = NULL;
algId[0] = (krb5_algorithm_identifier *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier));
if (algId[0] == NULL)
goto cleanup;
algId[0]->parameters.data = (unsigned char *)malloc(buf2_len);
if (algId[0]->parameters.data == NULL)
goto cleanup;
(void) memcpy(algId[0]->parameters.data, buf2, buf2_len);
algId[0]->parameters.length = buf2_len;
algId[0]->algorithm = dh_oid;
algId[1] = (krb5_algorithm_identifier *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier));
if (algId[1] == NULL)
goto cleanup;
algId[1]->parameters.data = (unsigned char *)malloc(buf3_len);
if (algId[1]->parameters.data == NULL)
goto cleanup;
(void) memcpy(algId[1]->parameters.data, buf3, buf3_len);
algId[1]->parameters.length = buf3_len;
algId[1]->algorithm = dh_oid;
algId[2] = (krb5_algorithm_identifier *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier));
if (algId[2] == NULL)
goto cleanup;
algId[2]->parameters.data = (unsigned char *)malloc(buf1_len);
if (algId[2]->parameters.data == NULL)
goto cleanup;
(void) memcpy(algId[2]->parameters.data, buf1, buf1_len);
algId[2]->parameters.length = buf1_len;
algId[2]->algorithm = dh_oid;
} else if (opts->dh_min_bits <= 2048) {
algId = malloc(3 * sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier *));
if (algId == NULL)
goto cleanup;
algId[2] = NULL;
algId[0] = (krb5_algorithm_identifier *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier));
if (algId[0] == NULL)
goto cleanup;
algId[0]->parameters.data = (unsigned char *)malloc(buf2_len);
if (algId[0]->parameters.data == NULL)
goto cleanup;
(void) memcpy(algId[0]->parameters.data, buf2, buf2_len);
algId[0]->parameters.length = buf2_len;
algId[0]->algorithm = dh_oid;
algId[1] = (krb5_algorithm_identifier *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier));
if (algId[1] == NULL)
goto cleanup;
algId[1]->parameters.data = (unsigned char *)malloc(buf3_len);
if (algId[1]->parameters.data == NULL)
goto cleanup;
(void) memcpy(algId[1]->parameters.data, buf3, buf3_len);
algId[1]->parameters.length = buf3_len;
algId[1]->algorithm = dh_oid;
} else if (opts->dh_min_bits <= 4096) {
algId = malloc(2 * sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier *));
if (algId == NULL)
goto cleanup;
algId[1] = NULL;
algId[0] = (krb5_algorithm_identifier *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier));
if (algId[0] == NULL)
goto cleanup;
algId[0]->parameters.data = (unsigned char *)malloc(buf3_len);
if (algId[0]->parameters.data == NULL)
goto cleanup;
(void) memcpy(algId[0]->parameters.data, buf3, buf3_len);
algId[0]->parameters.length = buf3_len;
algId[0]->algorithm = dh_oid;
}
retval = k5int_encode_krb5_td_dh_parameters((const krb5_algorithm_identifier **)algId, &encoded_algId);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)encoded_algId->data,
encoded_algId->length, "/tmp/kdc_td_dh_params");
#endif
typed_data = malloc (2 * sizeof(krb5_typed_data *));
if (typed_data == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
typed_data[1] = NULL;
init_krb5_typed_data(&typed_data[0]);
if (typed_data == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
typed_data[0]->type = TD_DH_PARAMETERS;
typed_data[0]->length = encoded_algId->length;
typed_data[0]->data = (unsigned char *)encoded_algId->data;
retval = k5int_encode_krb5_typed_data((const krb5_typed_data**)typed_data,
&data);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("encode_krb5_typed_data failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)data->data, data->length,
"/tmp/kdc_edata");
#endif
*out_data = (krb5_data *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_data));
if (*out_data == NULL)
goto cleanup;
(*out_data)->length = data->length;
(*out_data)->data = (char *)malloc(data->length);
if ((*out_data)->data == NULL) {
free(*out_data);
*out_data = NULL;
goto cleanup;
}
(void) memcpy((*out_data)->data, data->data, data->length);
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (buf1 != NULL)
free(buf1);
if (buf2 != NULL)
free(buf2);
if (buf3 != NULL)
free(buf3);
if (data != NULL) {
if (data->data != NULL)
free(data->data);
free(data);
}
if (typed_data != NULL)
free_krb5_typed_data(&typed_data);
if (encoded_algId != NULL)
free(encoded_algId);
if (algId != NULL) {
while(algId[i] != NULL) {
if (algId[i]->parameters.data != NULL)
free(algId[i]->parameters.data);
free(algId[i]);
i++;
}
free(algId);
}
return retval;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
krb5_error_code
pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *pdid_buf,
unsigned int pkid_len,
int *valid_kdcPkId)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL;
const unsigned char *p = pdid_buf;
int status = 1;
X509 *kdc_cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->cert_index);
*valid_kdcPkId = 0;
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
goto cleanup;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
status = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(kdc_cert), is->serial);
if (!status)
*valid_kdcPkId = 1;
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is);
return retval;
}
static int
pkinit_check_dh_params(BIGNUM * p1, BIGNUM * p2, BIGNUM * g1, BIGNUM * q1)
{
BIGNUM *g2 = NULL, *q2 = NULL;
/* Solaris Kerberos */
int retval = EINVAL;
if (!BN_cmp(p1, p2)) {
g2 = BN_new();
BN_set_word(g2, DH_GENERATOR_2);
if (!BN_cmp(g1, g2)) {
q2 = BN_new();
BN_rshift1(q2, p1);
if (!BN_cmp(q1, q2)) {
pkiDebug("good %d dhparams\n", BN_num_bits(p1));
retval = 0;
} else
pkiDebug("bad group 2 q dhparameter\n");
BN_free(q2);
} else
pkiDebug("bad g dhparameter\n");
BN_free(g2);
} else
pkiDebug("p is not well-known group 2 dhparameter\n");
return retval;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
krb5_error_code
pkinit_process_td_dh_params(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_algorithm_identifier **algId,
int *new_dh_size)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_DH_KEY_PARAMETERS_NOT_ACCEPTED;
int i = 0, use_sent_dh = 0, ok = 0;
pkiDebug("dh parameters\n");
while (algId[i] != NULL) {
DH *dh = NULL;
unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
int dh_prime_bits = 0;
if (algId[i]->algorithm.length != dh_oid.length ||
memcmp(algId[i]->algorithm.data, dh_oid.data, dh_oid.length))
goto cleanup;
tmp = algId[i]->parameters.data;
dh = DH_new();
dh = pkinit_decode_dh_params(&dh, &tmp, algId[i]->parameters.length);
dh_prime_bits = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
pkiDebug("client sent %d DH bits server prefers %d DH bits\n",
*new_dh_size, dh_prime_bits);
switch(dh_prime_bits) {
case 1024:
if (pkinit_check_dh_params(cryptoctx->dh_1024->p, dh->p,
dh->g, dh->q) == 0) {
*new_dh_size = 1024;
ok = 1;
}
break;
case 2048:
if (pkinit_check_dh_params(cryptoctx->dh_2048->p, dh->p,
dh->g, dh->q) == 0) {
*new_dh_size = 2048;
ok = 1;
}
break;
case 4096:
if (pkinit_check_dh_params(cryptoctx->dh_4096->p, dh->p,
dh->g, dh->q) == 0) {
*new_dh_size = 4096;
ok = 1;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
if (!ok) {
DH_check(dh, &retval);
if (retval != 0) {
pkiDebug("DH parameters provided by server are unacceptable\n");
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_DH_KEY_PARAMETERS_NOT_ACCEPTED;
}
else {
use_sent_dh = 1;
ok = 1;
}
}
if (!use_sent_dh)
DH_free(dh);
if (ok) {
if (req_cryptoctx->dh != NULL) {
DH_free(req_cryptoctx->dh);
req_cryptoctx->dh = NULL;
}
if (use_sent_dh)
req_cryptoctx->dh = dh;
break;
}
i++;
}
if (ok)
retval = 0;
cleanup:
return retval;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
openssl_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)
{
#ifdef DEBUG
if (!ok) {
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ctx->current_cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("cert = %s\n", buf);
pkiDebug("callback function: %d (%s)\n", ctx->error,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx->error));
}
#endif
return ok;
}
static int
openssl_callback_ignore_crls(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)
{
if (!ok) {
switch (ctx->error) {
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
return ok;
}
static ASN1_OBJECT *
pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(pkinit_plg_crypto_context cryptoctx, int pkcs7_type)
{
int nid;
switch (pkcs7_type) {
case CMS_SIGN_CLIENT:
return cryptoctx->id_pkinit_authData;
case CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9:
/*
* Delay creating this OID until we know we need it.
* It shadows an existing OpenSSL oid. If it
* is created too early, it breaks things like
* the use of pkcs12 (which uses pkcs7 structures).
* We need this shadow version because our code
* depends on the "other" type to be unknown to the
* OpenSSL code.
*/
if (cryptoctx->id_pkinit_authData9 == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: Creating shadow instance of pkcs7-data oid\n",
__FUNCTION__);
nid = OBJ_create("1.2.840.113549.1.7.1", "id-pkcs7-data",
"PKCS7 data");
if (nid == NID_undef)
return NULL;
cryptoctx->id_pkinit_authData9 = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
}
return cryptoctx->id_pkinit_authData9;
case CMS_SIGN_SERVER:
return cryptoctx->id_pkinit_DHKeyData;
case CMS_ENVEL_SERVER:
return cryptoctx->id_pkinit_rkeyData;
default:
return NULL;
}
}
#ifdef LONGHORN_BETA_COMPAT
#if 0
/*
* This is a version that worked with Longhorn Beta 3.
*/
static int
wrap_signeddata(unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **out, unsigned int *out_len,
int is_longhorn_server)
{
unsigned int orig_len = 0, oid_len = 0, tot_len = 0;
ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
pkiDebug("%s: This is the Longhorn version and is_longhorn_server = %d\n",
__FUNCTION__, is_longhorn_server);
/* Get length to wrap the original data with SEQUENCE tag */
tot_len = orig_len = ASN1_object_size(1, (int)data_len, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
if (is_longhorn_server == 0) {
/* Add the signedData OID and adjust lengths */
oid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed);
oid_len = i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(oid, NULL);
tot_len = ASN1_object_size(1, (int)(orig_len+oid_len), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
}
p = *out = (unsigned char *)malloc(tot_len);
if (p == NULL) return -1;
if (is_longhorn_server == 0) {
ASN1_put_object(&p, 1, (int)(orig_len+oid_len),
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(oid, &p);
ASN1_put_object(&p, 1, (int)data_len, 0, V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC);
} else {
ASN1_put_object(&p, 1, (int)data_len, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
}
memcpy(p, data, data_len);
*out_len = tot_len;
return 0;
}
#else
/*
* This is a version that works with a patched Longhorn KDC.
* (Which should match SP1 ??).
*/
static int
wrap_signeddata(unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **out, unsigned int *out_len,
int is_longhorn_server)
{
unsigned int oid_len = 0, tot_len = 0, wrap_len = 0, tag_len = 0;
ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
pkiDebug("%s: This is the Longhorn version and is_longhorn_server = %d\n",
__FUNCTION__, is_longhorn_server);
/* New longhorn is missing another sequence */
if (is_longhorn_server == 1)
wrap_len = ASN1_object_size(1, (int)(data_len), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
else
wrap_len = data_len;
/* Get length to wrap the original data with SEQUENCE tag */
tag_len = ASN1_object_size(1, (int)wrap_len, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
/* Always add oid */
oid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed);
oid_len = i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(oid, NULL);
oid_len += tag_len;
tot_len = ASN1_object_size(1, (int)(oid_len), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
p = *out = (unsigned char *)malloc(tot_len);
if (p == NULL)
return -1;
ASN1_put_object(&p, 1, (int)(oid_len),
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(oid, &p);
ASN1_put_object(&p, 1, (int)wrap_len, 0, V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC);
/* Wrap in extra seq tag */
if (is_longhorn_server == 1) {
ASN1_put_object(&p, 1, (int)data_len, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
}
(void) memcpy(p, data, data_len);
*out_len = tot_len;
return 0;
}
#endif
#else
static int
wrap_signeddata(unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **out, unsigned int *out_len)
{
unsigned int orig_len = 0, oid_len = 0, tot_len = 0;
ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
/* Get length to wrap the original data with SEQUENCE tag */
tot_len = orig_len = ASN1_object_size(1, (int)data_len, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
/* Add the signedData OID and adjust lengths */
oid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed);
oid_len = i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(oid, NULL);
tot_len = ASN1_object_size(1, (int)(orig_len+oid_len), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
p = *out = (unsigned char *)malloc(tot_len);
if (p == NULL) return -1;
ASN1_put_object(&p, 1, (int)(orig_len+oid_len),
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(oid, &p);
ASN1_put_object(&p, 1, (int)data_len, 0, V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC);
(void) memcpy(p, data, data_len);
*out_len = tot_len;
return 0;
}
#endif
static int
prepare_enc_data(unsigned char *indata,
int indata_len,
unsigned char **outdata,
int *outdata_len)
{
/* Solaris Kerberos */
ASN1_const_CTX c;
long length = indata_len;
int Ttag, Tclass;
long Tlen;
c.pp = (const unsigned char **)&indata;
c.q = *(const unsigned char **)&indata;
c.error = ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR;
c.p= *(const unsigned char **)&indata;
c.max = (length == 0)?0:(c.p+length);
asn1_GetSequence(&c,&length);
ASN1_get_object(&c.p,&Tlen,&Ttag,&Tclass,c.slen);
c.p += Tlen;
ASN1_get_object(&c.p,&Tlen,&Ttag,&Tclass,c.slen);
asn1_const_Finish(&c);
*outdata = (unsigned char *)malloc((size_t)Tlen);
/* Solaris Kerberos */
if (outdata == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
(void) memcpy(*outdata, c.p, (size_t)Tlen);
*outdata_len = Tlen;
return 0;
}
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
static void *
pkinit_C_LoadModule(const char *modname, CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR p11p)
{
void *handle;
CK_RV (*getflist)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR);
pkiDebug("loading module \"%s\"... ", modname);
/* Solaris Kerberos */
handle = dlopen(modname, RTLD_NOW | RTLD_GROUP);
if (handle == NULL) {
pkiDebug("not found\n");
return NULL;
}
getflist = (CK_RV (*)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR)) dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList");
if (getflist == NULL || (*getflist)(p11p) != CKR_OK) {
(void) dlclose(handle);
pkiDebug("failed\n");
return NULL;
}
pkiDebug("ok\n");
return handle;
}
static CK_RV
pkinit_C_UnloadModule(void *handle)
{
/* Solaris Kerberos */
if (dlclose(handle) != 0)
return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
return CKR_OK;
}
/*
* Solaris Kerberos: this is a new function that does not exist yet in the MIT
* code.
*
* labelstr will be C string containing token label with trailing white space
* removed.
*/
static void
trim_token_label(CK_TOKEN_INFO *tinfo, char *labelstr, unsigned int labelstr_len)
{
int i;
assert(labelstr_len > sizeof (tinfo->label));
/*
* \0 terminate labelstr in case the last char in the token label is
* non-whitespace
*/
labelstr[sizeof (tinfo->label)] = '\0';
(void) memcpy(labelstr, (char *) tinfo->label, sizeof (tinfo->label));
/* init i so terminating \0 is skipped */
for (i = sizeof (tinfo->label) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
if (labelstr[i] == ' ')
labelstr[i] = '\0';
else
break;
}
}
/*
* Solaris Kerberos: this is a new function that does not exist yet in the MIT
* code.
*/
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_prompt_user(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context cctx,
krb5_data *reply,
char *prompt,
int hidden)
{
krb5_error_code r;
krb5_prompt kprompt;
krb5_prompt_type prompt_type;
if (cctx->prompter == NULL)
return (EINVAL);
kprompt.prompt = prompt;
kprompt.hidden = hidden;
kprompt.reply = reply;
/*
* Note, assuming this type for now, may need to be passed in in the future.
*/
prompt_type = KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_PREAUTH;
/* PROMPTER_INVOCATION */
k5int_set_prompt_types(context, &prompt_type);
r = (*cctx->prompter)(context, cctx->prompter_data,
NULL, NULL, 1, &kprompt);
k5int_set_prompt_types(context, NULL);
return (r);
}
/*
* Solaris Kerberos: this function was changed to support a PIN being passed
* in. If that is the case the user will not be prompted for their PIN.
*/
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_login(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
CK_TOKEN_INFO *tip)
{
krb5_data rdat;
char *prompt;
int prompt_len;
int r = 0;
if (tip->flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) {
rdat.data = NULL;
rdat.length = 0;
} else if (id_cryptoctx->PIN != NULL) {
if ((rdat.data = strdup(id_cryptoctx->PIN)) == NULL)
return (ENOMEM);
/*
* Don't include NULL string terminator in length calculation as this
* PIN is passed to the C_Login function and only the text chars should
* be considered to be the PIN.
*/
rdat.length = strlen(id_cryptoctx->PIN);
} else {
/* Solaris Kerberos - trim token label */
char tmplabel[sizeof (tip->label) + 1];
if (!id_cryptoctx->prompter) {
pkiDebug("pkinit_login: id_cryptoctx->prompter is NULL\n");
/* Solaris Kerberos: Improved error messages */
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
gettext("Failed to log into token: prompter function is NULL"));
return (KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED);
}
/* Solaris Kerberos - Changes for gettext() */
prompt_len = sizeof (tip->label) + 256;
if ((prompt = (char *) malloc(prompt_len)) == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
/* Solaris Kerberos - trim token label which can be padded with space */
trim_token_label(tip, tmplabel, sizeof (tmplabel));
(void) snprintf(prompt, prompt_len, gettext("%s PIN"), tmplabel);
/* Solaris Kerberos */
if (tip->flags & CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED)
(void) strlcat(prompt, gettext(" (Warning: PIN locked)"), prompt_len);
else if (tip->flags & CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY)
(void) strlcat(prompt, gettext(" (Warning: PIN final try)"), prompt_len);
else if (tip->flags & CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW)
(void) strlcat(prompt, gettext(" (Warning: PIN count low)"), prompt_len);
rdat.data = malloc(tip->ulMaxPinLen + 2);
rdat.length = tip->ulMaxPinLen + 1;
/*
* Note that the prompter function will set rdat.length such that the
* NULL terminator is not included
*/
/* PROMPTER_INVOCATION */
r = pkinit_prompt_user(context, id_cryptoctx, &rdat, prompt, 1);
free(prompt);
}
if (r == 0) {
r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_Login(id_cryptoctx->session, CKU_USER,
(u_char *) rdat.data, rdat.length);
if (r != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("C_Login: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
/* Solaris Kerberos: Improved error messages */
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
gettext("Failed to log into token: %s"),
pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
} else {
/* Solaris Kerberos: only need to login once */
id_cryptoctx->p11flags |= C_LOGIN_DONE;
}
}
if (rdat.data) {
(void) memset(rdat.data, 0, rdat.length);
free(rdat.data);
}
return (r);
}
/*
* Solaris Kerberos: added these structs in support of prompting user for
* missing token.
*/
struct _token_entry {
CK_SLOT_ID slotID;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
};
struct _token_choices {
unsigned int numtokens;
struct _token_entry *token_array;
};
/*
* Solaris Kerberos: this is a new function that does not exist yet in the MIT
* code.
*/
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_prompt_token(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context cctx)
{
char tmpbuf[4];
krb5_data reply;
char *token_prompt = gettext("If you have a smartcard insert it now. "
"Press enter to continue");
reply.data = tmpbuf;
reply.length = sizeof(tmpbuf);
/* note, don't care about the reply */
return (pkinit_prompt_user(context, cctx, &reply, token_prompt, 0));
}
/*
* Solaris Kerberos: new defines for prompting support.
*/
#define CHOOSE_THIS_TOKEN 0
#define CHOOSE_RESCAN 1
#define CHOOSE_SKIP 2
#define CHOOSE_SEE_NEXT 3
#define RESCAN_TOKENS -1
#define SKIP_TOKENS -2
/*
* Solaris Kerberos: this is a new function that does not exist yet in the MIT
* code.
*
* This prompts to user for various choices regarding a token to use. Note
* that if there is no error, choice will be set to one of:
* - the token_choices->token_array entry
* - RESCAN_TOKENS
* - SKIP_TOKENS
*/
static int
pkinit_choose_tokens(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context cctx,
struct _token_choices *token_choices,
int *choice)
{
krb5_error_code r;
/*
* Assuming that PAM_MAX_MSG_SIZE is a reasonable restriction. Note that -
* 2 is to account for the fact that a krb prompter to PAM conv bridge will
* add ": ".
*/
char prompt[PAM_MAX_MSG_SIZE - 2];
char tmpbuf[4];
char tmplabel[sizeof (token_choices->token_array->token_info.label) + 1];
krb5_data reply;
int i, num_used, tmpchoice;
assert(token_choices != NULL);
assert(choice != NULL);
/* Create the menu prompt */
/* only need to do this once before the for loop */
reply.data = tmpbuf;
for (i = 0; i < token_choices->numtokens; i++) {
trim_token_label(&token_choices->token_array[i].token_info, tmplabel,
sizeof (tmplabel));
if (i == (token_choices->numtokens - 1)) {
/* no more smartcards/tokens */
if ((num_used = snprintf(prompt, sizeof (prompt),
"%s\n%d: %s \"%s\" %s %d\n%d: %s\n%d: %s\n",
/*
* TRANSLATION_NOTE: Translations of the
* following 5 strings must not exceed 450
* bytes total.
*/
gettext("Select one of the following and press enter:"),
CHOOSE_THIS_TOKEN, gettext("Use smartcard"), tmplabel,
gettext("in slot"), token_choices->token_array[i].slotID,
CHOOSE_RESCAN, gettext("Rescan for newly inserted smartcard"),
CHOOSE_SKIP, gettext("Skip smartcard authentication")))
>= sizeof (prompt)) {
pkiDebug("pkinit_choose_tokens: buffer overflow num_used: %d,"
" sizeof prompt: %d\n", num_used, sizeof (prompt));
krb5_set_error_message(context, EINVAL,
gettext("In pkinit_choose_tokens: prompt size"
" %d exceeds prompt buffer size %d"),
num_used, sizeof(prompt));
(void) snprintf(prompt, sizeof (prompt), "%s",
gettext("Error: PKINIT prompt message is too large for buffer, "
"please alert the system administrator. Press enter to "
"continue"));
reply.length = sizeof(tmpbuf);
if ((r = pkinit_prompt_user(context, cctx, &reply, prompt, 0)) != 0 )
return (r);
return (EINVAL);
}
} else {
if ((num_used = snprintf(prompt, sizeof (prompt),
"%s\n%d: %s \"%s\" %s %d\n%d: %s\n%d: %s\n%d: %s\n",
/*
* TRANSLATION_NOTE: Translations of the
* following 6 strings must not exceed 445
* bytes total.
*/
gettext("Select one of the following and press enter:"),
CHOOSE_THIS_TOKEN, gettext("Use smartcard"), tmplabel,
gettext("in slot"), token_choices->token_array[i].slotID,
CHOOSE_RESCAN, gettext("Rescan for newly inserted smartcard"),
CHOOSE_SKIP, gettext("Skip smartcard authentication"),
CHOOSE_SEE_NEXT, gettext("See next smartcard")))
>= sizeof (prompt)) {
pkiDebug("pkinit_choose_tokens: buffer overflow num_used: %d,"
" sizeof prompt: %d\n", num_used, sizeof (prompt));
krb5_set_error_message(context, EINVAL,
gettext("In pkinit_choose_tokens: prompt size"
" %d exceeds prompt buffer size %d"),
num_used, sizeof(prompt));
(void) snprintf(prompt, sizeof (prompt), "%s",
gettext("Error: PKINIT prompt message is too large for buffer, "
"please alert the system administrator. Press enter to "
"continue"));
reply.length = sizeof(tmpbuf);
if ((r = pkinit_prompt_user(context, cctx, &reply, prompt, 0)) != 0 )
return (r);
return (EINVAL);
}
}
/*
* reply.length needs to be reset to length of tmpbuf before calling
* prompter
*/
reply.length = sizeof(tmpbuf);
if ((r = pkinit_prompt_user(context, cctx, &reply, prompt, 0)) != 0 )
return (r);
if (reply.length == 0) {
return (EINVAL);
} else {
char *cp = reply.data;
/* reply better be digits */
while (*cp != NULL) {
if (!isdigit(*cp++))
return (EINVAL);
}
errno = 0;
tmpchoice = (int) strtol(reply.data, (char **)NULL, 10);
if (errno != 0)
return (errno);
}
switch (tmpchoice) {
case CHOOSE_THIS_TOKEN:
*choice = i; /* chosen entry of token_choices->token_array */
return (0);
case CHOOSE_RESCAN:
*choice = RESCAN_TOKENS; /* rescan for new smartcard */
return (0);
case CHOOSE_SKIP:
*choice = SKIP_TOKENS; /* skip smartcard auth */
return (0);
case CHOOSE_SEE_NEXT: /* see next smartcard */
continue;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
}
return (0);
}
/*
* Solaris Kerberos: this is a new function that does not exist yet in the MIT
* code.
*
* Note, this isn't the best solution to providing a function to check the
* certs in a token however I wanted to avoid rewriting a bunch of code so I
* settled for some duplication of processing.
*/
static krb5_error_code
check_load_certs(krb5_context context,
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_principal princ,
int do_matching,
int load_cert)
{
CK_OBJECT_CLASS cls;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[4];
CK_ULONG count;
CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE certtype;
CK_BYTE_PTR cert = NULL, cert_id = NULL;
const unsigned char *cp;
int i, r;
unsigned int nattrs;
X509 *x = NULL;
cls = CKO_CERTIFICATE;
attrs[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
attrs[0].pValue = &cls;
attrs[0].ulValueLen = sizeof cls;
certtype = CKC_X_509;
attrs[1].type = CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE;
attrs[1].pValue = &certtype;
attrs[1].ulValueLen = sizeof certtype;
nattrs = 2;
/* If a cert id and/or label were given, use them too */
if (id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len > 0) {
attrs[nattrs].type = CKA_ID;
attrs[nattrs].pValue = id_cryptoctx->cert_id;
attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len;
nattrs++;
}
if (id_cryptoctx->cert_label != NULL) {
attrs[nattrs].type = CKA_LABEL;
attrs[nattrs].pValue = id_cryptoctx->cert_label;
attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = strlen(id_cryptoctx->cert_label);
nattrs++;
}
r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attrs, nattrs);
if (r != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("C_FindObjectsInit: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
krb5_set_error_message(context, EINVAL,
gettext("PKCS11 error from C_FindObjectsInit: %s"),
pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
r = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; ; i++) {
if (i >= MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED) {
r = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* Look for x.509 cert */
/* Solaris Kerberos */
if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &count))
!= CKR_OK || count == 0) {
id_cryptoctx->creds[i] = NULL;
break;
}
/* Get cert and id len */
attrs[0].type = CKA_VALUE;
attrs[0].pValue = NULL;
attrs[0].ulValueLen = 0;
attrs[1].type = CKA_ID;
attrs[1].pValue = NULL;
attrs[1].ulValueLen = 0;
if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_GetAttributeValue(session,
obj,
attrs,
2)) != CKR_OK &&
r != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
pkiDebug("C_GetAttributeValue: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
krb5_set_error_message(context, EINVAL,
gettext("Error from PKCS11 C_GetAttributeValue: %s"),
pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
r = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
cert = malloc((size_t) attrs[0].ulValueLen + 1);
if (cert == NULL) {
r = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
cert_id = malloc((size_t) attrs[1].ulValueLen + 1);
if (cert_id == NULL) {
r = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
/* Read the cert and id off the card */
attrs[0].type = CKA_VALUE;
attrs[0].pValue = cert;
attrs[1].type = CKA_ID;
attrs[1].pValue = cert_id;
if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_GetAttributeValue(session,
obj, attrs, 2)) != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("C_GetAttributeValue: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
krb5_set_error_message(context, EINVAL,
gettext("Error from PKCS11 C_GetAttributeValue: %s"),
pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
r = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
pkiDebug("cert %d size %d id %d idlen %d\n", i,
(int) attrs[0].ulValueLen, (int) cert_id[0],
(int) attrs[1].ulValueLen);
cp = (unsigned char *) cert;
x = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, (int) attrs[0].ulValueLen);
if (x == NULL) {
r = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
id_cryptoctx->creds[i] = malloc(sizeof(struct _pkinit_cred_info));
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[i] == NULL) {
r = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
id_cryptoctx->creds[i]->cert = x;
id_cryptoctx->creds[i]->key = NULL;
id_cryptoctx->creds[i]->cert_id = cert_id;
cert_id = NULL;
id_cryptoctx->creds[i]->cert_id_len = attrs[1].ulValueLen;
free(cert);
cert = NULL;
}
id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[0] == NULL || id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert == NULL) {
r = ENOENT;
} else if (do_matching){
/*
* Do not let pkinit_cert_matching set the primary cert in id_cryptoctx
* as this will be done later.
*/
r = pkinit_cert_matching(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx, princ, FALSE);
}
out:
if ((r != 0 || !load_cert) &&
id_cryptoctx->creds[0] != NULL &&
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert != NULL) {
/*
* If there's an error or load_cert isn't 1 free all the certs loaded
* onto id_cryptoctx.
*/
(void) crypto_free_cert_info(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx);
}
if (cert)
free(cert);
if (cert_id)
free(cert_id);
return (r);
}
/*
* Solaris Kerberos: this function has been significantly modified to prompt
* the user in certain cases so defer to this version when resyncing MIT code.
*
* pkinit_open_session now does several things including prompting the user if
* do_matching is set which indicates the code is executing in a client
* context. This function fills out a pkinit_identity_crypto_context with a
* set of certs and a open session if a token can be found that matches all
* supplied criteria. If no token is found then the user is prompted one time
* to insert their token. If there is more than one token that matches all
* client criteria the user is prompted to make a choice if in client context.
* If do_matching is false (KDC context) then the first token matching all
* server criteria is chosen.
*/
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_open_session(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context cctx,
krb5_principal princ,
int do_matching)
{
int i, r;
CK_ULONG count = 0;
CK_SLOT_ID_PTR slotlist = NULL, tmpslotlist = NULL;
CK_TOKEN_INFO tinfo;
krb5_boolean tokenmatch = FALSE;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE tmpsession = NULL;
struct _token_choices token_choices;
int choice = 0;
if (cctx->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
return 0; /* session already open */
/* Load module */
if (cctx->p11_module == NULL) {
cctx->p11_module =
pkinit_C_LoadModule(cctx->p11_module_name, &cctx->p11);
if (cctx->p11_module == NULL)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
/* Init */
/* Solaris Kerberos: Don't fail if cryptoki is already initialized */
r = cctx->p11->C_Initialize(NULL);
if (r != CKR_OK && r != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED) {
pkiDebug("C_Initialize: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
gettext("Error from PKCS11 C_Initialize: %s"),
pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
(void) memset(&token_choices, 0, sizeof(token_choices));
/*
* Solaris Kerberos:
* If C_Initialize was already called by the process before the pkinit
* module was loaded then record that fact.
* "finalize_pkcs11" is used by pkinit_fini_pkcs11 to determine whether
* or not C_Finalize() should be called.
*/
cctx->finalize_pkcs11 =
(r == CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED ? FALSE : TRUE);
/*
* First make sure that is an applicable slot otherwise fail.
*
* Start by getting a count of all slots with or without tokens.
*/
if ((r = cctx->p11->C_GetSlotList(FALSE, NULL, &count)) != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("C_GetSlotList: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
gettext("Error trying to get PKCS11 slot list: %s"),
pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto out;
}
if (count == 0) {
/* There are no slots so bail */
r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, r,
gettext("No PKCS11 slots found"));
pkiDebug("pkinit_open_session: no slots, count: %d\n", count);
goto out;
} else if (cctx->slotid != PK_NOSLOT) {
/* See if any of the slots match the specified slotID */
tmpslotlist = malloc(count * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
if (tmpslotlist == NULL) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOMEM,
gettext("Memory allocation error:"));
r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto out;
}
if ((r = cctx->p11->C_GetSlotList(FALSE, tmpslotlist, &count)) != CKR_OK) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
gettext("Error trying to get PKCS11 slot list: %s"),
pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
pkiDebug("C_GetSlotList: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < count && cctx->slotid != tmpslotlist[i]; i++)
continue;
if (i >= count) {
/* no slots match */
r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, r,
gettext("Requested PKCS11 slot ID %d not found"),
cctx->slotid);
pkiDebug("open_session: no matching slot found for slotID %d\n",
cctx->slotid);
goto out;
}
}
tryagain:
/* get count of slots that have tokens */
if ((r = cctx->p11->C_GetSlotList(TRUE, NULL, &count)) != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("C_GetSlotList: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
gettext("Error trying to get PKCS11 slot list: %s"),
pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto out;
}
if (count == 0) {
/*
* Note, never prompt if !do_matching as this implies KDC side
* processing
*/
if (!(cctx->p11flags & C_PROMPTED_USER) && do_matching) {
/* found slot(s) but no token so prompt and try again */
if ((r = pkinit_prompt_token(context, cctx)) == 0) {
cctx->p11flags |= C_PROMPTED_USER;
goto tryagain;
} else {
pkiDebug("open_session: prompt for token/smart card failed\n");
krb5_set_error_message(context, r,
gettext("Prompt for token/smart card failed"));
r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto out;
}
} else {
/* already prompted once so bailing */
r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, r,
gettext("No smart card tokens found"));
pkiDebug("pkinit_open_session: no token, already prompted\n");
goto out;
}
}
if (slotlist != NULL)
free(slotlist);
slotlist = malloc(count * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
if (slotlist == NULL) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
gettext("Memory allocation error"));
r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto out;
}
/*
* Solaris Kerberos: get list of PKCS11 slotid's that have tokens.
*/
if (cctx->p11->C_GetSlotList(TRUE, slotlist, &count) != CKR_OK) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
gettext("Error trying to get PKCS11 slot list: %s"),
pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
pkiDebug("C_GetSlotList: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto out;
}
token_choices.numtokens = 0;
token_choices.token_array = malloc(count * sizeof (*token_choices.token_array));
if (token_choices.token_array == NULL) {
r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, r,
gettext("Memory allocation error"));
goto out;
}
/* examine all the tokens */
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
/*
* Solaris Kerberos: if a slotid was specified skip slots that don't
* match.
*/
if (cctx->slotid != PK_NOSLOT && cctx->slotid != slotlist[i])
continue;
/* Open session */
if ((r = cctx->p11->C_OpenSession(slotlist[i], CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
NULL, NULL, &tmpsession)) != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("C_OpenSession: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
gettext("Error trying to open PKCS11 session: %s"),
pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto out;
}
/* Get token info */
if ((r = cctx->p11->C_GetTokenInfo(slotlist[i], &tinfo)) != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("C_GetTokenInfo: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
gettext("Error trying to read PKCS11 token: %s"),
pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
cctx->p11->C_CloseSession(tmpsession);
goto out;
}
if (cctx->token_label == NULL) {
/*
* If the token doesn't require login to examine the certs then
* let's check the certs out to see if any match the criteria if
* any.
*/
if (!(tinfo.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED)) {
/*
* It's okay to check the certs if we don't have to login but
* don't load the certs onto cctx at this point, this will be
* done later in this function for the chosen token.
*/
if ((r = check_load_certs(context, tmpsession, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, cctx, princ,
do_matching, 0)) == 0) {
tokenmatch = TRUE;
} else if (r != ENOENT){
r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
cctx->p11->C_CloseSession(tmpsession);
goto out;
} else {
/* ignore ENOENT here */
r = 0;
}
} else {
tokenmatch = TRUE;
}
} else {
/* + 1 so tokenlabelstr can be \0 terminated */
char tokenlabelstr[sizeof (tinfo.label) + 1];
/*
* Convert token label into C string with trailing white space
* trimmed.
*/
trim_token_label(&tinfo, tokenlabelstr, sizeof (tokenlabelstr));
pkiDebug("open_session: slotid %d token found: \"%s\", "
"cctx->token_label: \"%s\"\n",
slotlist[i], tokenlabelstr, (char *) cctx->token_label);
if (!strcmp(cctx->token_label, tokenlabelstr)) {
if (!(tinfo.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED)) {
/*
* It's okay to check the certs if we don't have to login but
* don't load the certs onto cctx at this point, this will be
* done later in this function for the chosen token.
*/
if ((r = check_load_certs(context, tmpsession, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, cctx, princ,
do_matching, 0)) == 0) {
tokenmatch = TRUE;
} else if (r != ENOENT){
r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
cctx->p11->C_CloseSession(tmpsession);
goto out;
} else {
/* ignore ENOENT here */
r = 0;
}
} else {
tokenmatch = TRUE;
}
}
}
if (tokenmatch == TRUE) {
/* add the token to token_choices.token_array */
token_choices.token_array[token_choices.numtokens].slotID = slotlist[i];
token_choices.token_array[token_choices.numtokens].session = tmpsession;
token_choices.token_array[token_choices.numtokens].token_info = tinfo;
token_choices.numtokens++;
/* !do_matching implies we take the first matching token */
if (!do_matching)
break;
else
tokenmatch = FALSE;
} else {
cctx->p11->C_CloseSession(tmpsession);
}
}
if (token_choices.numtokens == 0) {
/*
* Solaris Kerberos: prompt for token one time if there was no token
* and do_matching is 1 (see earlier comment about do_matching).
*/
if (!(cctx->p11flags & C_PROMPTED_USER) && do_matching) {
if ((r = pkinit_prompt_token(context, cctx)) == 0) {
cctx->p11flags |= C_PROMPTED_USER;
goto tryagain;
} else {
pkiDebug("open_session: prompt for token/smart card failed\n");
krb5_set_error_message(context, r,
gettext("Prompt for token/smart card failed"));
r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto out;
}
} else {
r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, r,
gettext("No smart card tokens found"));
pkiDebug("open_session: no matching token found\n");
goto out;
}
} else if (token_choices.numtokens == 1) {
if ((token_choices.token_array[0].token_info.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) &&
!(cctx->p11flags & C_PROMPTED_USER) &&
do_matching) {
if ((r = pkinit_choose_tokens(context, cctx, &token_choices, &choice)) != 0) {
pkiDebug("pkinit_open_session: pkinit_choose_tokens failed: %d\n", r);
r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, r,
gettext("Prompt for token/smart card failed"));
goto out;
}
if (choice == RESCAN_TOKENS) {
/* rescan for new smartcard/token */
for (i = 0; i < token_choices.numtokens; i++) {
/* close all sessions */
cctx->p11->C_CloseSession(token_choices.token_array[i].session);
}
free(token_choices.token_array);
token_choices.token_array = NULL;
token_choices.numtokens = 0;
goto tryagain;
} else if (choice == SKIP_TOKENS) {
/* do not use smartcard/token for auth */
cctx->p11flags |= (C_PROMPTED_USER|C_SKIP_PKCS11_AUTH);
r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto out;
} else {
cctx->p11flags |= C_PROMPTED_USER;
}
} else {
choice = 0; /* really the only choice is the first token_array entry */
}
} else if (!(cctx->p11flags & C_PROMPTED_USER) && do_matching) {
/* > 1 token so present menu of token choices, let the user decide. */
if ((r = pkinit_choose_tokens(context, cctx, &token_choices, &choice)) != 0) {
pkiDebug("pkinit_open_session: pkinit_choose_tokens failed: %d\n", r);
r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, r,
gettext("Prompt for token/smart card failed"));
goto out;
}
if (choice == RESCAN_TOKENS) {
/* rescan for new smartcard/token */
for (i = 0; i < token_choices.numtokens; i++) {
/* close all sessions */
cctx->p11->C_CloseSession(token_choices.token_array[i].session);
}
free(token_choices.token_array);
token_choices.token_array = NULL;
token_choices.numtokens = 0;
goto tryagain;
} else if (choice == SKIP_TOKENS) {
/* do not use smartcard/token for auth */
cctx->p11flags |= (C_PROMPTED_USER|C_SKIP_PKCS11_AUTH);
r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto out;
} else {
cctx->p11flags |= C_PROMPTED_USER;
}
} else {
r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto out;
}
cctx->slotid = token_choices.token_array[choice].slotID;
cctx->session = token_choices.token_array[choice].session;
pkiDebug("open_session: slotid %d (%d of %d)\n", (int) cctx->slotid,
i + 1, (int) count);
/* Login if needed */
/* Solaris Kerberos: added cctx->p11flags check */
if ((token_choices.token_array[choice].token_info.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) &&
!(cctx->p11flags & C_LOGIN_DONE)) {
r = pkinit_login(context, cctx, &token_choices.token_array[choice].token_info);
}
if (r == 0) {
/* Doing this again to load the certs into cctx. */
r = check_load_certs(context, cctx->session, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, cctx, princ, do_matching, 1);
}
out:
if (slotlist != NULL)
free(slotlist);
if (tmpslotlist != NULL)
free(tmpslotlist);
if (token_choices.token_array != NULL) {
if (r != 0) {
/* close all sessions if there's an error */
for (i = 0; i < token_choices.numtokens; i++) {
cctx->p11->C_CloseSession(token_choices.token_array[i].session);
}
cctx->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
} else {
/* close sessions not chosen */
for (i = 0; i < token_choices.numtokens; i++) {
if (i != choice) {
cctx->p11->C_CloseSession(token_choices.token_array[i].session);
}
}
}
free(token_choices.token_array);
}
return (r);
}
/*
* Look for a key that's:
* 1. private
* 2. capable of the specified operation (usually signing or decrypting)
* 3. RSA (this may be wrong but it's all we can do for now)
* 4. matches the id of the cert we chose
*
* You must call pkinit_get_certs before calling pkinit_find_private_key
* (that's because we need the ID of the private key)
*
* pkcs11 says the id of the key doesn't have to match that of the cert, but
* I can't figure out any other way to decide which key to use.
*
* We should only find one key that fits all the requirements.
* If there are more than one, we just take the first one.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
krb5_error_code
pkinit_find_private_key(pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE usage,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *objp)
{
CK_OBJECT_CLASS cls;
CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[4];
CK_ULONG count;
CK_KEY_TYPE keytype;
unsigned int nattrs = 0;
int r;
#ifdef PKINIT_USE_KEY_USAGE
CK_BBOOL true_false;
#endif
cls = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
attrs[nattrs].type = CKA_CLASS;
attrs[nattrs].pValue = &cls;
attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = sizeof cls;
nattrs++;
#ifdef PKINIT_USE_KEY_USAGE
/*
* Some cards get confused if you try to specify a key usage,
* so don't, and hope for the best. This will fail if you have
* several keys with the same id and different usages but I have
* not seen this on real cards.
*/
true_false = TRUE;
attrs[nattrs].type = usage;
attrs[nattrs].pValue = &true_false;
attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = sizeof true_false;
nattrs++;
#endif
keytype = CKK_RSA;
attrs[nattrs].type = CKA_KEY_TYPE;
attrs[nattrs].pValue = &keytype;
attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = sizeof keytype;
nattrs++;
attrs[nattrs].type = CKA_ID;
attrs[nattrs].pValue = id_cryptoctx->cert_id;
attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len;
nattrs++;
r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsInit(id_cryptoctx->session, attrs, nattrs);
if (r != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("krb5_pkinit_sign_data: C_FindObjectsInit: %s\n",
pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjects(id_cryptoctx->session, objp, 1, &count);
id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsFinal(id_cryptoctx->session);
pkiDebug("found %d private keys (%s)\n", (int) count, pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
/*
* Solaris Kerberos:
* The CKA_ID may not be correctly set for the private key. For e.g. when
* storing a private key in softtoken pktool(1) doesn't generate or store
* a CKA_ID for the private key. Another way to identify the private key is
* to look for a private key with the same RSA modulus as the public key
* in the certificate.
*/
if (r == CKR_OK && count != 1) {
EVP_PKEY *priv;
X509 *cert;
unsigned int n_len;
unsigned char *n_bytes;
cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, 0);
priv = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
if (priv == NULL) {
pkiDebug("Failed to extract pub key from cert\n");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
nattrs = 0;
cls = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
attrs[nattrs].type = CKA_CLASS;
attrs[nattrs].pValue = &cls;
attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = sizeof cls;
nattrs++;
#ifdef PKINIT_USE_KEY_USAGE
true_false = TRUE;
attrs[nattrs].type = usage;
attrs[nattrs].pValue = &true_false;
attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = sizeof true_false;
nattrs++;
#endif
keytype = CKK_RSA;
attrs[nattrs].type = CKA_KEY_TYPE;
attrs[nattrs].pValue = &keytype;
attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = sizeof keytype;
nattrs++;
n_len = BN_num_bytes(priv->pkey.rsa->n);
n_bytes = (unsigned char *) malloc((size_t) n_len);
if (n_bytes == NULL) {
return (ENOMEM);
}
if (BN_bn2bin(priv->pkey.rsa->n, n_bytes) == 0) {
free (n_bytes);
pkiDebug("zero-byte key modulus\n");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
attrs[nattrs].type = CKA_MODULUS;
attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = n_len;
attrs[nattrs].pValue = n_bytes;
nattrs++;
r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsInit(id_cryptoctx->session, attrs, nattrs);
free (n_bytes);
if (r != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("krb5_pkinit_sign_data: C_FindObjectsInit: %s\n",
pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjects(id_cryptoctx->session, objp, 1, &count);
id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsFinal(id_cryptoctx->session);
pkiDebug("found %d private keys (%s)\n", (int) count, pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
}
if (r != CKR_OK || count < 1)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
return 0;
}
#endif
/* ARGSUSED */
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_decode_data_fs(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *data,
unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **decoded_data,
unsigned int *decoded_data_len)
{
if (decode_data(decoded_data, decoded_data_len, data, data_len,
id_cryptoctx->my_key, sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs,
id_cryptoctx->cert_index)) <= 0) {
pkiDebug("failed to decode data\n");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
return 0;
}
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
#ifdef SILLYDECRYPT
CK_RV
pkinit_C_Decrypt(pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,
CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,
CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
{
CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
rv = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_Decrypt(id_cryptoctx->session, pEncryptedData,
ulEncryptedDataLen, pData, pulDataLen);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("pData %x *pulDataLen %d\n", (int) pData, (int) *pulDataLen);
}
return rv;
}
#endif
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_decode_data_pkcs11(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *data,
unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **decoded_data,
unsigned int *decoded_data_len)
{
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
CK_ULONG len;
CK_MECHANISM mech;
unsigned char *cp;
int r;
/*
* Solaris Kerberos: assume session is open and libpkcs11 funcs have been
* loaded.
*/
assert(id_cryptoctx->p11 != NULL);
/* Solaris Kerberos: Login, if needed, to access private object */
if (!(id_cryptoctx->p11flags & C_LOGIN_DONE)) {
CK_TOKEN_INFO tinfo;
r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_GetTokenInfo(id_cryptoctx->slotid, &tinfo);
if (r != 0)
return r;
r = pkinit_login(context, id_cryptoctx, &tinfo);
if (r != 0)
return r;
}
r = pkinit_find_private_key(id_cryptoctx, CKA_DECRYPT, &obj);
if (r != 0)
return r;
mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
mech.pParameter = NULL;
mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_DecryptInit(id_cryptoctx->session, &mech,
obj)) != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("C_DecryptInit: 0x%x\n", (int) r);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
pkiDebug("data_len = %d\n", data_len);
cp = (unsigned char *)malloc((size_t) data_len);
if (cp == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
len = data_len;
#ifdef SILLYDECRYPT
pkiDebug("session %x edata %x edata_len %d data %x datalen @%x %d\n",
(int) id_cryptoctx->session, (int) data, (int) data_len, (int) cp,
(int) &len, (int) len);
if ((r = pkinit_C_Decrypt(id_cryptoctx, data, (CK_ULONG) data_len,
cp, &len)) != CKR_OK) {
#else
if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_Decrypt(id_cryptoctx->session, data,
(CK_ULONG) data_len, cp, &len)) != CKR_OK) {
#endif
pkiDebug("C_Decrypt: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
if (r == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)
pkiDebug("decrypt %d needs %d\n", (int) data_len, (int) len);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
pkiDebug("decrypt %d -> %d\n", (int) data_len, (int) len);
*decoded_data_len = len;
*decoded_data = cp;
return 0;
}
#endif
krb5_error_code
pkinit_decode_data(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *data,
unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **decoded_data,
unsigned int *decoded_data_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
if (id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method != 1)
retval = pkinit_decode_data_fs(context, id_cryptoctx, data, data_len,
decoded_data, decoded_data_len);
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
else
retval = pkinit_decode_data_pkcs11(context, id_cryptoctx, data,
data_len, decoded_data, decoded_data_len);
#endif
return retval;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_sign_data_fs(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *data,
unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **sig,
unsigned int *sig_len)
{
if (create_signature(sig, sig_len, data, data_len,
id_cryptoctx->my_key) != 0) {
pkiDebug("failed to create the signature\n");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
return 0;
}
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_sign_data_pkcs11(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *data,
unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **sig,
unsigned int *sig_len)
{
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
CK_ULONG len;
CK_MECHANISM mech;
unsigned char *cp;
int r;
/*
* Solaris Kerberos: assume session is open and libpkcs11 funcs have been
* loaded.
*/
assert(id_cryptoctx->p11 != NULL);
/* Solaris Kerberos: Login, if needed, to access private object */
if (!(id_cryptoctx->p11flags & C_LOGIN_DONE)) {
CK_TOKEN_INFO tinfo;
r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_GetTokenInfo(id_cryptoctx->slotid, &tinfo);
if (r != 0)
return r;
r = pkinit_login(context, id_cryptoctx, &tinfo);
if (r != 0)
return r;
}
r = pkinit_find_private_key(id_cryptoctx, CKA_SIGN, &obj);
if (r != 0 )
return r;
mech.mechanism = id_cryptoctx->mech;
mech.pParameter = NULL;
mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_SignInit(id_cryptoctx->session, &mech,
obj)) != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("C_SignInit: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
/*
* Key len would give an upper bound on sig size, but there's no way to
* get that. So guess, and if it's too small, re-malloc.
*/
len = PK_SIGLEN_GUESS;
cp = (unsigned char *)malloc((size_t) len);
if (cp == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_Sign(id_cryptoctx->session, data,
(CK_ULONG) data_len, cp, &len);
if (r == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL || (r == CKR_OK && len >= PK_SIGLEN_GUESS)) {
free(cp);
pkiDebug("C_Sign realloc %d\n", (int) len);
cp = (unsigned char *)malloc((size_t) len);
r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_Sign(id_cryptoctx->session, data,
(CK_ULONG) data_len, cp, &len);
}
if (r != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("C_Sign: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
pkiDebug("sign %d -> %d\n", (int) data_len, (int) len);
*sig_len = len;
*sig = cp;
return 0;
}
#endif
krb5_error_code
pkinit_sign_data(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *data,
unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **sig,
unsigned int *sig_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
if (id_cryptoctx == NULL || id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method != 1)
retval = pkinit_sign_data_fs(context, id_cryptoctx, data, data_len,
sig, sig_len);
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
else
retval = pkinit_sign_data_pkcs11(context, id_cryptoctx, data, data_len,
sig, sig_len);
#endif
return retval;
}
static krb5_error_code
decode_data(unsigned char **out_data, unsigned int *out_data_len,
unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len,
EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert)
{
/* Solaris Kerberos */
int len;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
int buf_len = 0;
/* Solaris Kerberos */
if (out_data == NULL || out_data_len == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if (cert && !X509_check_private_key(cert, pkey)) {
pkiDebug("private key does not match certificate\n");
/* Solaris Kerberos */
return EINVAL;
}
buf_len = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
buf = (unsigned char *)malloc((size_t) buf_len + 10);
if (buf == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
len = EVP_PKEY_decrypt(buf, data, (int)data_len, pkey);
#else
len = EVP_PKEY_decrypt_old(buf, data, (int)data_len, pkey);
#endif
if (len <= 0) {
pkiDebug("unable to decrypt received data (len=%d)\n", data_len);
/* Solaris Kerberos */
free(buf);
return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
}
*out_data = buf;
*out_data_len = len;
return 0;
}
static krb5_error_code
create_signature(unsigned char **sig, unsigned int *sig_len,
unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
if (pkey == NULL)
/* Solaris Kerberos */
return EINVAL;
EVP_VerifyInit(&md_ctx, EVP_sha1());
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, data, data_len);
*sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
if ((*sig = (unsigned char *) malloc((size_t) *sig_len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, *sig, sig_len, pkey);
retval = 0;
cleanup:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return retval;
}
/*
* Note:
* This is not the routine the KDC uses to get its certificate.
* This routine is intended to be called by the client
* to obtain the KDC's certificate from some local storage
* to be sent as a hint in its request to the KDC.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
krb5_error_code
pkinit_get_kdc_cert(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_principal princ)
{
/* Solaris Kerberos */
if (req_cryptoctx == NULL)
return EINVAL;
req_cryptoctx->received_cert = NULL;
return 0;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_get_certs_pkcs12(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_opts *idopts,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_principal princ)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
X509 *x = NULL;
PKCS12 *p12 = NULL;
int ret;
FILE *fp;
EVP_PKEY *y = NULL;
if (idopts->cert_filename == NULL) {
/* Solaris Kerberos: Improved error messages */
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
gettext("Failed to get certificate location"));
pkiDebug("%s: failed to get user's cert location\n", __FUNCTION__);
goto cleanup;
}
if (idopts->key_filename == NULL) {
/* Solaris Kerberos: Improved error messages */
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
gettext("Failed to get private key location"));
pkiDebug("%s: failed to get user's private key location\n", __FUNCTION__);
goto cleanup;
}
fp = fopen(idopts->cert_filename, "rb");
if (fp == NULL) {
/* Solaris Kerberos: Improved error messages */
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
gettext("Failed to open PKCS12 file '%s': %s"),
idopts->cert_filename, error_message(errno));
pkiDebug("Failed to open PKCS12 file '%s', error %d\n",
idopts->cert_filename, errno);
goto cleanup;
}
p12 = d2i_PKCS12_fp(fp, NULL);
(void) fclose(fp);
if (p12 == NULL) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
gettext("Failed to decode PKCS12 file '%s' contents"),
idopts->cert_filename);
pkiDebug("Failed to decode PKCS12 file '%s' contents\n",
idopts->cert_filename);
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Try parsing with no pass phrase first. If that fails,
* prompt for the pass phrase and try again.
*/
ret = PKCS12_parse(p12, NULL, &y, &x, NULL);
if (ret == 0) {
krb5_data rdat;
krb5_prompt kprompt;
krb5_prompt_type prompt_type;
int r = 0;
char prompt_string[128];
char prompt_reply[128];
/* Solaris Kerberos */
char *prompt_prefix = gettext("Pass phrase for");
pkiDebug("Initial PKCS12_parse with no password failed\n");
if (id_cryptoctx->PIN != NULL) {
/* Solaris Kerberos: use PIN if set */
rdat.data = id_cryptoctx->PIN;
/* note rdat.length isn't needed in this case */
} else {
(void) memset(prompt_reply, '\0', sizeof(prompt_reply));
rdat.data = prompt_reply;
rdat.length = sizeof(prompt_reply);
r = snprintf(prompt_string, sizeof(prompt_string), "%s %s",
prompt_prefix, idopts->cert_filename);
if (r >= sizeof(prompt_string)) {
pkiDebug("Prompt string, '%s %s', is too long!\n",
prompt_prefix, idopts->cert_filename);
goto cleanup;
}
kprompt.prompt = prompt_string;
kprompt.hidden = 1;
kprompt.reply = &rdat;
prompt_type = KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_PREAUTH;
/* PROMPTER_INVOCATION */
k5int_set_prompt_types(context, &prompt_type);
r = (*id_cryptoctx->prompter)(context, id_cryptoctx->prompter_data,
NULL, NULL, 1, &kprompt);
k5int_set_prompt_types(context, NULL);
}
ret = PKCS12_parse(p12, rdat.data, &y, &x, NULL);
if (ret == 0) {
/* Solaris Kerberos: Improved error messages */
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
gettext("Failed to parse PKCS12 file '%s' with password"),
idopts->cert_filename);
pkiDebug("Seconde PKCS12_parse with password failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
}
id_cryptoctx->creds[0] = malloc(sizeof(struct _pkinit_cred_info));
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[0] == NULL)
goto cleanup;
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert = x;
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id = NULL;
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id_len = 0;
#endif
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->key = y;
id_cryptoctx->creds[1] = NULL;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (p12)
PKCS12_free(p12);
if (retval) {
if (x != NULL)
X509_free(x);
if (y != NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(y);
}
return retval;
}
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_load_fs_cert_and_key(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
char *certname,
char *keyname,
int cindex)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
X509 *x = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *y = NULL;
/* load the certificate */
retval = get_cert(certname, &x);
if (retval != 0 || x == NULL) {
/* Solaris Kerberos: Improved error messages */
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
gettext("Failed to load user's certificate from %s: %s"),
certname, error_message(retval));
pkiDebug("failed to load user's certificate from '%s'\n", certname);
goto cleanup;
}
retval = get_key(keyname, &y);
if (retval != 0 || y == NULL) {
/* Solaris Kerberos: Improved error messages */
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
gettext("Failed to load user's private key from %s: %s"),
keyname, error_message(retval));
pkiDebug("failed to load user's private key from '%s'\n", keyname);
goto cleanup;
}
id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex] = malloc(sizeof(struct _pkinit_cred_info));
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex] == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex]->cert = x;
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex]->cert_id = NULL;
id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex]->cert_id_len = 0;
#endif
id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex]->key = y;
id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex+1] = NULL;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (retval) {
if (x != NULL)
X509_free(x);
if (y != NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(y);
}
return retval;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_get_certs_fs(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_opts *idopts,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_principal princ)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
if (idopts->cert_filename == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: failed to get user's cert location\n", __FUNCTION__);
goto cleanup;
}
if (idopts->key_filename == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: failed to get user's private key location\n",
__FUNCTION__);
goto cleanup;
}
retval = pkinit_load_fs_cert_and_key(context, id_cryptoctx,
idopts->cert_filename,
idopts->key_filename, 0);
cleanup:
return retval;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_get_certs_dir(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_opts *idopts,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_principal princ)
{
/* Solaris Kerberos */
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
DIR *d = NULL;
struct dirent *dentry = NULL;
char certname[1024];
char keyname[1024];
int i = 0, len;
char *dirname, *suf;
/* Solaris Kerberos */
if (idopts == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if (idopts->cert_filename == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: failed to get user's certificate directory location\n",
__FUNCTION__);
return ENOENT;
}
dirname = idopts->cert_filename;
d = opendir(dirname);
if (d == NULL) {
/* Solaris Kerberos: Improved error messages */
krb5_set_error_message(context, errno,
gettext("Failed to open directory \"%s\": %s"),
dirname, error_message(errno));
return errno;
}
/*
* We'll assume that certs are named XXX.crt and the corresponding
* key is named XXX.key
*/
while ((i < MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED) && (dentry = readdir(d)) != NULL) {
/* Ignore subdirectories and anything starting with a dot */
#ifdef DT_DIR
if (dentry->d_type == DT_DIR)
continue;
#endif
if (dentry->d_name[0] == '.')
continue;
len = strlen(dentry->d_name);
if (len < 5)
continue;
suf = dentry->d_name + (len - 4);
if (strncmp(suf, ".crt", 4) != 0)
continue;
/* Checked length */
if (strlen(dirname) + strlen(dentry->d_name) + 2 > sizeof(certname)) {
pkiDebug("%s: Path too long -- directory '%s' and file '%s'\n",
__FUNCTION__, dirname, dentry->d_name);
continue;
}
(void) snprintf(certname, sizeof(certname), "%s/%s", dirname, dentry->d_name);
(void) snprintf(keyname, sizeof(keyname), "%s/%s", dirname, dentry->d_name);
len = strlen(keyname);
keyname[len - 3] = 'k';
keyname[len - 2] = 'e';
keyname[len - 1] = 'y';
retval = pkinit_load_fs_cert_and_key(context, id_cryptoctx,
certname, keyname, i);
if (retval == 0) {
pkiDebug("%s: Successfully loaded cert (and key) for %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, dentry->d_name);
i++;
}
else
continue;
}
if (i == 0) {
/* Solaris Kerberos: Improved error messages */
krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOENT,
gettext("No suitable cert/key pairs found in directory '%s'"),
idopts->cert_filename);
pkiDebug("%s: No cert/key pairs found in directory '%s'\n",
__FUNCTION__, idopts->cert_filename);
retval = ENOENT;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (d)
(void) closedir(d);
return retval;
}
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
/* ARGSUSED */
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_get_certs_pkcs11(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_opts *idopts,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_principal princ,
int do_matching)
{
#ifdef PKINIT_USE_MECH_LIST
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR mechp = NULL;
CK_MECHANISM_INFO info;
#endif
if (id_cryptoctx->p11flags & C_SKIP_PKCS11_AUTH)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
/* Copy stuff from idopts -> id_cryptoctx */
if (idopts->p11_module_name != NULL) {
id_cryptoctx->p11_module_name = strdup(idopts->p11_module_name);
if (id_cryptoctx->p11_module_name == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
}
if (idopts->token_label != NULL) {
id_cryptoctx->token_label = strdup(idopts->token_label);
if (id_cryptoctx->token_label == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
}
if (idopts->cert_label != NULL) {
id_cryptoctx->cert_label = strdup(idopts->cert_label);
if (id_cryptoctx->cert_label == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
}
if (idopts->PIN != NULL) {
id_cryptoctx->PIN = strdup(idopts->PIN);
if (id_cryptoctx->PIN == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
}
/* Convert the ascii cert_id string into a binary blob */
/*
* Solaris Kerberos:
* If the cert_id_string is empty then behave in a similar way to how
* an empty certlabel is treated - i.e. don't fail now but rather continue
* as though the certid wasn't specified.
*/
if (idopts->cert_id_string != NULL && strlen(idopts->cert_id_string) != 0) {
BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
BN_hex2bn(&bn, idopts->cert_id_string);
if (bn == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
id_cryptoctx->cert_id = malloc((size_t) id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len);
if (id_cryptoctx->cert_id == NULL) {
BN_free(bn);
return ENOMEM;
}
BN_bn2bin(bn, id_cryptoctx->cert_id);
BN_free(bn);
}
id_cryptoctx->slotid = idopts->slotid;
id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method = 1;
#ifndef PKINIT_USE_MECH_LIST
/*
* We'd like to use CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS for signing if it's available, but
* many cards seems to be confused about whether they are capable of
* this or not. The safe thing seems to be to ignore the mechanism list,
* always use CKM_RSA_PKCS and calculate the sha1 digest ourselves.
*/
id_cryptoctx->mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
#else
if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_GetMechanismList(id_cryptoctx->slotid, NULL,
&count)) != CKR_OK || count <= 0) {
pkiDebug("C_GetMechanismList: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
mechp = (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR) malloc(count * sizeof (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
if (mechp == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_GetMechanismList(id_cryptoctx->slotid,
mechp, &count)) != CKR_OK) {
free(mechp);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_GetMechanismInfo(id_cryptoctx->slotid,
mechp[i], &info)) != CKR_OK) {
free(mechp);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_MECHINFO
pkiDebug("mech %x flags %x\n", (int) mechp[i], (int) info.flags);
if ((info.flags & (CKF_SIGN|CKF_DECRYPT)) == (CKF_SIGN|CKF_DECRYPT))
pkiDebug(" this mech is good for sign & decrypt\n");
#endif
if (mechp[i] == CKM_RSA_PKCS) {
/* This seems backwards... */
id_cryptoctx->mech =
(info.flags & CKF_SIGN) ? CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS : CKM_RSA_PKCS;
}
}
free(mechp);
pkiDebug("got %d mechs from card\n", (int) count);
#endif
return (pkinit_open_session(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx, princ, do_matching));
}
#endif
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
free_cred_info(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
struct _pkinit_cred_info *cred)
{
if (cred != NULL) {
if (cred->cert != NULL)
X509_free(cred->cert);
if (cred->key != NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(cred->key);
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
if (cred->cert_id != NULL)
free(cred->cert_id);
#endif
free(cred);
}
}
/* ARGSUSED */
krb5_error_code
crypto_free_cert_info(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx)
{
int i;
if (id_cryptoctx == NULL)
return EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED; i++) {
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[i] != NULL) {
free_cred_info(context, id_cryptoctx, id_cryptoctx->creds[i]);
id_cryptoctx->creds[i] = NULL;
}
}
return 0;
}
krb5_error_code
crypto_load_certs(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_opts *idopts,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_principal princ,
int do_matching)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
switch(idopts->idtype) {
case IDTYPE_FILE:
retval = pkinit_get_certs_fs(context, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, idopts,
id_cryptoctx, princ);
break;
case IDTYPE_DIR:
retval = pkinit_get_certs_dir(context, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, idopts,
id_cryptoctx, princ);
break;
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
case IDTYPE_PKCS11:
retval = pkinit_get_certs_pkcs11(context, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, idopts,
id_cryptoctx, princ, do_matching);
break;
#endif
case IDTYPE_PKCS12:
retval = pkinit_get_certs_pkcs12(context, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, idopts,
id_cryptoctx, princ);
break;
default:
retval = EINVAL;
}
/* Solaris Kerberos */
return retval;
}
/*
* Get number of certificates available after crypto_load_certs()
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
krb5_error_code
crypto_cert_get_count(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int *cert_count)
{
int count;
if (id_cryptoctx == NULL || id_cryptoctx->creds[0] == NULL)
return EINVAL;
for (count = 0;
count <= MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED && id_cryptoctx->creds[count] != NULL;
count++);
*cert_count = count;
return 0;
}
/*
* Begin iteration over the certs loaded in crypto_load_certs()
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
krb5_error_code
crypto_cert_iteration_begin(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
pkinit_cert_iter_handle *ih_ret)
{
struct _pkinit_cert_iter_data *id;
if (id_cryptoctx == NULL || ih_ret == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[0] == NULL) /* No cred info available */
return ENOENT;
id = calloc(1, sizeof(*id));
if (id == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
id->magic = ITER_MAGIC;
id->plgctx = plg_cryptoctx,
id->reqctx = req_cryptoctx,
id->idctx = id_cryptoctx;
id->index = 0;
*ih_ret = (pkinit_cert_iter_handle) id;
return 0;
}
/*
* End iteration over the certs loaded in crypto_load_certs()
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
krb5_error_code
crypto_cert_iteration_end(krb5_context context,
pkinit_cert_iter_handle ih)
{
struct _pkinit_cert_iter_data *id = (struct _pkinit_cert_iter_data *)ih;
if (id == NULL || id->magic != ITER_MAGIC)
return EINVAL;
free(ih);
return 0;
}
/*
* Get next certificate handle
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
krb5_error_code
crypto_cert_iteration_next(krb5_context context,
pkinit_cert_iter_handle ih,
pkinit_cert_handle *ch_ret)
{
struct _pkinit_cert_iter_data *id = (struct _pkinit_cert_iter_data *)ih;
struct _pkinit_cert_data *cd;
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx;
if (id == NULL || id->magic != ITER_MAGIC)
return EINVAL;
if (ch_ret == NULL)
return EINVAL;
id_cryptoctx = id->idctx;
if (id_cryptoctx == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[id->index] == NULL)
return PKINIT_ITER_NO_MORE;
cd = calloc(1, sizeof(*cd));
if (cd == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
cd->magic = CERT_MAGIC;
cd->plgctx = id->plgctx;
cd->reqctx = id->reqctx;
cd->idctx = id->idctx;
cd->index = id->index;
cd->cred = id_cryptoctx->creds[id->index++];
*ch_ret = (pkinit_cert_handle)cd;
return 0;
}
/*
* Release cert handle
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
krb5_error_code
crypto_cert_release(krb5_context context,
pkinit_cert_handle ch)
{
struct _pkinit_cert_data *cd = (struct _pkinit_cert_data *)ch;
if (cd == NULL || cd->magic != CERT_MAGIC)
return EINVAL;
free(cd);
return 0;
}
/*
* Get certificate Key Usage and Extended Key Usage
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
static krb5_error_code
crypto_retieve_X509_key_usage(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgcctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqcctx,
X509 *x,
unsigned int *ret_ku_bits,
unsigned int *ret_eku_bits)
{
/* Solaris Kerberos */
int i;
unsigned int eku_bits = 0, ku_bits = 0;
ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage = NULL;
if (ret_ku_bits == NULL && ret_eku_bits == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if (ret_eku_bits)
*ret_eku_bits = 0;
else {
pkiDebug("%s: EKUs not requested, not checking\n", __FUNCTION__);
goto check_kus;
}
/* Start with Extended Key usage */
i = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1);
if (i >= 0) {
EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *eku;
eku = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL);
if (eku) {
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(eku); i++) {
ASN1_OBJECT *certoid;
certoid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(eku, i);
if ((OBJ_cmp(certoid, plgcctx->id_pkinit_KPClientAuth)) == 0)
eku_bits |= PKINIT_EKU_PKINIT;
else if ((OBJ_cmp(certoid, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_ms_smartcard_login))) == 0)
eku_bits |= PKINIT_EKU_MSSCLOGIN;
else if ((OBJ_cmp(certoid, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_client_auth))) == 0)
eku_bits |= PKINIT_EKU_CLIENTAUTH;
else if ((OBJ_cmp(certoid, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_email_protect))) == 0)
eku_bits |= PKINIT_EKU_EMAILPROTECTION;
}
EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_free(eku);
}
}
pkiDebug("%s: returning eku 0x%08x\n", __FUNCTION__, eku_bits);
*ret_eku_bits = eku_bits;
check_kus:
/* Now the Key Usage bits */
if (ret_ku_bits)
*ret_ku_bits = 0;
else {
pkiDebug("%s: KUs not requested, not checking\n", __FUNCTION__);
goto out;
}
/* Make sure usage exists before checking bits */
usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL);
if (usage) {
if (!ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
ku_bits |= PKINIT_KU_DIGITALSIGNATURE;
if (!ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
ku_bits |= PKINIT_KU_KEYENCIPHERMENT;
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
}
pkiDebug("%s: returning ku 0x%08x\n", __FUNCTION__, ku_bits);
*ret_ku_bits = ku_bits;
out:
return 0;
}
/*
* Return a string format of an X509_NAME in buf where
* size is an in/out parameter. On input it is the size
* of the buffer, and on output it is the actual length
* of the name.
* If buf is NULL, returns the length req'd to hold name
*/
static char *
X509_NAME_oneline_ex(X509_NAME * a,
char *buf,
unsigned int *size,
unsigned long flag)
{
BIO *out = NULL;
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem ());
if (X509_NAME_print_ex(out, a, 0, flag) > 0) {
if (buf != NULL && *size > (int) BIO_number_written(out)) {
(void) memset(buf, 0, *size);
BIO_read(out, buf, (int) BIO_number_written(out));
}
else {
*size = BIO_number_written(out);
}
}
BIO_free(out);
return (buf);
}
/*
* Get certificate information
*/
krb5_error_code
crypto_cert_get_matching_data(krb5_context context,
pkinit_cert_handle ch,
pkinit_cert_matching_data **ret_md)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
pkinit_cert_matching_data *md;
krb5_principal *pkinit_sans =NULL, *upn_sans = NULL;
struct _pkinit_cert_data *cd = (struct _pkinit_cert_data *)ch;
int i, j;
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
unsigned int bufsize = sizeof(buf);
if (cd == NULL || cd->magic != CERT_MAGIC)
return EINVAL;
if (ret_md == NULL)
return EINVAL;
md = calloc(1, sizeof(*md));
if (md == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
md->ch = ch;
/* get the subject name (in rfc2253 format) */
X509_NAME_oneline_ex(X509_get_subject_name(cd->cred->cert),
buf, &bufsize, XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS);
md->subject_dn = strdup(buf);
if (md->subject_dn == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* get the issuer name (in rfc2253 format) */
X509_NAME_oneline_ex(X509_get_issuer_name(cd->cred->cert),
buf, &bufsize, XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS);
md->issuer_dn = strdup(buf);
if (md->issuer_dn == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* get the san data */
retval = crypto_retrieve_X509_sans(context, cd->plgctx, cd->reqctx,
cd->cred->cert, &pkinit_sans,
&upn_sans, NULL);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
j = 0;
if (pkinit_sans != NULL) {
for (i = 0; pkinit_sans[i] != NULL; i++)
j++;
}
if (upn_sans != NULL) {
for (i = 0; upn_sans[i] != NULL; i++)
j++;
}
if (j != 0) {
md->sans = calloc((size_t)j+1, sizeof(*md->sans));
if (md->sans == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
j = 0;
if (pkinit_sans != NULL) {
for (i = 0; pkinit_sans[i] != NULL; i++)
md->sans[j++] = pkinit_sans[i];
free(pkinit_sans);
}
if (upn_sans != NULL) {
for (i = 0; upn_sans[i] != NULL; i++)
md->sans[j++] = upn_sans[i];
free(upn_sans);
}
md->sans[j] = NULL;
} else
md->sans = NULL;
/* get the KU and EKU data */
retval = crypto_retieve_X509_key_usage(context, cd->plgctx, cd->reqctx,
cd->cred->cert,
&md->ku_bits, &md->eku_bits);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
*ret_md = md;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (retval) {
if (md)
crypto_cert_free_matching_data(context, md);
}
return retval;
}
/*
* Free certificate information
*/
krb5_error_code
crypto_cert_free_matching_data(krb5_context context,
pkinit_cert_matching_data *md)
{
krb5_principal p;
int i;
if (md == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if (md->subject_dn)
free(md->subject_dn);
if (md->issuer_dn)
free(md->issuer_dn);
if (md->sans) {
for (i = 0, p = md->sans[i]; p != NULL; p = md->sans[++i])
krb5_free_principal(context, p);
free(md->sans);
}
free(md);
return 0;
}
/*
* Make this matching certificate "the chosen one"
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
krb5_error_code
crypto_cert_select(krb5_context context,
pkinit_cert_matching_data *md)
{
struct _pkinit_cert_data *cd;
if (md == NULL)
return EINVAL;
cd = (struct _pkinit_cert_data *)md->ch;
if (cd == NULL || cd->magic != CERT_MAGIC)
return EINVAL;
/* copy the selected cert into our id_cryptoctx */
if (cd->idctx->my_certs != NULL) {
sk_X509_pop_free(cd->idctx->my_certs, X509_free);
}
cd->idctx->my_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
sk_X509_push(cd->idctx->my_certs, cd->cred->cert);
cd->idctx->creds[cd->index]->cert = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
cd->idctx->cert_index = 0;
if (cd->idctx->pkcs11_method != 1) {
cd->idctx->my_key = cd->cred->key;
cd->idctx->creds[cd->index]->key = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
}
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
else {
cd->idctx->cert_id = cd->cred->cert_id;
cd->idctx->creds[cd->index]->cert_id = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
cd->idctx->cert_id_len = cd->cred->cert_id_len;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
/*
* Choose the default certificate as "the chosen one"
*/
krb5_error_code
crypto_cert_select_default(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
int cert_count = 0;
retval = crypto_cert_get_count(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx, &cert_count);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("%s: crypto_cert_get_count error %d, %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, retval, error_message(retval));
goto errout;
}
if (cert_count != 1) {
/* Solaris Kerberos: Improved error messages */
retval = EINVAL;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
gettext("Failed to select default certificate: "
"found %d certs to choose from but there must be exactly one"),
cert_count);
pkiDebug("%s: ERROR: There are %d certs to choose from, "
"but there must be exactly one.\n",
__FUNCTION__, cert_count);
goto errout;
}
/* copy the selected cert into our id_cryptoctx */
if (id_cryptoctx->my_certs != NULL) {
sk_X509_pop_free(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, X509_free);
}
id_cryptoctx->my_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
sk_X509_push(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert);
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
id_cryptoctx->cert_index = 0;
if (id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method != 1) {
id_cryptoctx->my_key = id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->key;
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->key = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
}
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
else {
id_cryptoctx->cert_id = id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id;
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len = id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id_len;
}
#endif
retval = 0;
errout:
return retval;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static krb5_error_code
load_cas_and_crls(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int catype,
char *filename)
{
STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *ca_certs = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *ca_crls = NULL;
BIO *in = NULL;
/* Solaris Kerberos */
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
int i = 0;
/* If there isn't already a stack in the context,
* create a temporary one now */
switch(catype) {
case CATYPE_ANCHORS:
if (id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs != NULL)
ca_certs = id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs;
else {
ca_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
if (ca_certs == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
}
break;
case CATYPE_INTERMEDIATES:
if (id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs != NULL)
ca_certs = id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs;
else {
ca_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
if (ca_certs == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
}
break;
case CATYPE_CRLS:
if (id_cryptoctx->revoked != NULL)
ca_crls = id_cryptoctx->revoked;
else {
ca_crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
if (ca_crls == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
}
break;
default:
return ENOTSUP;
}
if (!(in = BIO_new_file(filename, "r"))) {
retval = errno;
pkiDebug("%s: error opening file '%s': %s\n", __FUNCTION__,
filename, error_message(errno));
goto cleanup;
}
/* This loads from a file, a stack of x509/crl/pkey sets */
if ((sk = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(in, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: error reading file '%s'\n", __FUNCTION__, filename);
retval = EIO;
goto cleanup;
}
/* scan over the stack created from loading the file contents,
* weed out duplicates, and push new ones onto the return stack
*/
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_INFO_num(sk); i++) {
X509_INFO *xi = sk_X509_INFO_value(sk, i);
if (xi != NULL && xi->x509 != NULL && catype != CATYPE_CRLS) {
int j = 0, size = sk_X509_num(ca_certs), flag = 0;
if (!size) {
sk_X509_push(ca_certs, xi->x509);
xi->x509 = NULL;
continue;
}
for (j = 0; j < size; j++) {
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ca_certs, j);
flag = X509_cmp(x, xi->x509);
if (flag == 0)
break;
else
continue;
}
if (flag != 0) {
sk_X509_push(ca_certs, X509_dup(xi->x509));
}
} else if (xi != NULL && xi->crl != NULL && catype == CATYPE_CRLS) {
int j = 0, size = sk_X509_CRL_num(ca_crls), flag = 0;
if (!size) {
sk_X509_CRL_push(ca_crls, xi->crl);
xi->crl = NULL;
continue;
}
for (j = 0; j < size; j++) {
X509_CRL *x = sk_X509_CRL_value(ca_crls, j);
flag = X509_CRL_cmp(x, xi->crl);
if (flag == 0)
break;
else
continue;
}
if (flag != 0) {
sk_X509_CRL_push(ca_crls, X509_CRL_dup(xi->crl));
}
}
}
/* If we added something and there wasn't a stack in the
* context before, add the temporary stack to the context.
*/
switch(catype) {
case CATYPE_ANCHORS:
if (sk_X509_num(ca_certs) == 0) {
pkiDebug("no anchors in file, %s\n", filename);
if (id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs == NULL)
sk_X509_free(ca_certs);
} else {
if (id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs == NULL)
id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs = ca_certs;
}
break;
case CATYPE_INTERMEDIATES:
if (sk_X509_num(ca_certs) == 0) {
pkiDebug("no intermediates in file, %s\n", filename);
if (id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs == NULL)
sk_X509_free(ca_certs);
} else {
if (id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs == NULL)
id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs = ca_certs;
}
break;
case CATYPE_CRLS:
if (sk_X509_CRL_num(ca_crls) == 0) {
pkiDebug("no crls in file, %s\n", filename);
if (id_cryptoctx->revoked == NULL)
sk_X509_CRL_free(ca_crls);
} else {
if (id_cryptoctx->revoked == NULL)
id_cryptoctx->revoked = ca_crls;
}
break;
default:
/* Should have been caught above! */
retval = EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
/* Solaris Kerberos: removed "break" as it's never reached */
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (in != NULL)
BIO_free(in);
if (sk != NULL)
sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(sk, X509_INFO_free);
return retval;
}
static krb5_error_code
load_cas_and_crls_dir(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int catype,
char *dirname)
{
krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL;
DIR *d = NULL;
struct dirent *dentry = NULL;
char filename[1024];
if (dirname == NULL)
return EINVAL;
d = opendir(dirname);
if (d == NULL)
return ENOENT;
while ((dentry = readdir(d))) {
if (strlen(dirname) + strlen(dentry->d_name) + 2 > sizeof(filename)) {
pkiDebug("%s: Path too long -- directory '%s' and file '%s'\n",
__FUNCTION__, dirname, dentry->d_name);
goto cleanup;
}
/* Ignore subdirectories and anything starting with a dot */
#ifdef DT_DIR
if (dentry->d_type == DT_DIR)
continue;
#endif
if (dentry->d_name[0] == '.')
continue;
(void) snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s", dirname, dentry->d_name);
retval = load_cas_and_crls(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx, catype, filename);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (d != NULL)
(void) closedir(d);
return retval;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
krb5_error_code
crypto_load_cas_and_crls(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_opts *idopts,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int idtype,
int catype,
char *id)
{
pkiDebug("%s: called with idtype %s and catype %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, idtype2string(idtype), catype2string(catype));
/* Solaris Kerberos: Removed "break"'s as they are never reached */
switch (idtype) {
case IDTYPE_FILE:
return load_cas_and_crls(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx, catype, id);
case IDTYPE_DIR:
return load_cas_and_crls_dir(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx, catype, id);
default:
return ENOTSUP;
}
}
static krb5_error_code
create_identifiers_from_stack(STACK_OF(X509) *sk,
krb5_external_principal_identifier *** ids)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
int i = 0, sk_size = sk_X509_num(sk);
krb5_external_principal_identifier **krb5_cas = NULL;
X509 *x = NULL;
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
int len = 0;
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL;
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
*ids = NULL;
krb5_cas =
malloc((sk_size + 1) * sizeof(krb5_external_principal_identifier *));
if (krb5_cas == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
krb5_cas[sk_size] = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_size; i++) {
krb5_cas[i] = (krb5_external_principal_identifier *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_external_principal_identifier));
x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("#%d cert= %s\n", i, buf);
/* fill-in subjectName */
krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.magic = 0;
krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.length = 0;
krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.data = NULL;
xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
len = i2d_X509_NAME(xn, NULL);
if ((p = krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.data = (unsigned char *)malloc((size_t) len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
i2d_X509_NAME(xn, &p);
krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.length = len;
/* fill-in issuerAndSerialNumber */
krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.length = 0;
krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.magic = 0;
krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.data = NULL;
#ifdef LONGHORN_BETA_COMPAT
if (longhorn == 0) { /* XXX Longhorn doesn't like this */
#endif
is = PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_new();
X509_NAME_set(&is->issuer, X509_get_issuer_name(x));
M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
is->serial = M_ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(x));
len = i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(is, NULL);
if ((p = krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.data =
(unsigned char *)malloc((size_t) len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(is, &p);
krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.length = len;
#ifdef LONGHORN_BETA_COMPAT
}
#endif
/* fill-in subjectKeyIdentifier */
krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.length = 0;
krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.magic = 0;
krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.data = NULL;
#ifdef LONGHORN_BETA_COMPAT
if (longhorn == 0) { /* XXX Longhorn doesn't like this */
#endif
if (X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, -1) >= 0) {
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ikeyid = NULL;
if ((ikeyid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL,
NULL))) {
len = i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(ikeyid, NULL);
if ((p = krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.data =
(unsigned char *)malloc((size_t) len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(ikeyid, &p);
krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.length = len;
}
if (ikeyid != NULL)
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ikeyid);
}
#ifdef LONGHORN_BETA_COMPAT
}
#endif
if (is != NULL) {
if (is->issuer != NULL)
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
if (is->serial != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is);
}
}
*ids = krb5_cas;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (retval)
free_krb5_external_principal_identifier(&krb5_cas);
return retval;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static krb5_error_code
create_krb5_invalidCertificates(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_external_principal_identifier *** ids)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
*ids = NULL;
if (req_cryptoctx->received_cert == NULL)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
sk = sk_X509_new_null();
if (sk == NULL)
goto cleanup;
sk_X509_push(sk, req_cryptoctx->received_cert);
retval = create_identifiers_from_stack(sk, ids);
sk_X509_free(sk);
cleanup:
return retval;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
krb5_error_code
create_krb5_supportedCMSTypes(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_algorithm_identifier ***oids)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
krb5_algorithm_identifier **loids = NULL;
krb5_octet_data des3oid = {0, 8, (unsigned char *)"\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x03\x07" };
*oids = NULL;
loids = malloc(2 * sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier *));
if (loids == NULL)
goto cleanup;
loids[1] = NULL;
loids[0] = (krb5_algorithm_identifier *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier));
if (loids[0] == NULL) {
free(loids);
goto cleanup;
}
retval = pkinit_copy_krb5_octet_data(&loids[0]->algorithm, &des3oid);
if (retval) {
free(loids[0]);
free(loids);
goto cleanup;
}
loids[0]->parameters.length = 0;
loids[0]->parameters.data = NULL;
*oids = loids;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
return retval;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
krb5_error_code
create_krb5_trustedCertifiers(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_external_principal_identifier *** ids)
{
/* Solaris Kerberos */
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs;
*ids = NULL;
if (id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs == NULL)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
return create_identifiers_from_stack(sk, ids);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
krb5_error_code
create_krb5_trustedCas(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int flag,
krb5_trusted_ca *** ids)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs;
int i = 0, len = 0, sk_size = sk_X509_num(sk);
krb5_trusted_ca **krb5_cas = NULL;
X509 *x = NULL;
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL;
*ids = NULL;
if (id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs == NULL)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_cas = malloc((sk_size + 1) * sizeof(krb5_trusted_ca *));
if (krb5_cas == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
krb5_cas[sk_size] = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_size; i++) {
krb5_cas[i] = (krb5_trusted_ca *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_trusted_ca));
if (krb5_cas[i] == NULL)
goto cleanup;
x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("#%d cert= %s\n", i, buf);
switch (flag) {
case choice_trusted_cas_principalName:
krb5_cas[i]->choice = choice_trusted_cas_principalName;
break;
case choice_trusted_cas_caName:
krb5_cas[i]->choice = choice_trusted_cas_caName;
krb5_cas[i]->u.caName.data = NULL;
krb5_cas[i]->u.caName.length = 0;
xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
len = i2d_X509_NAME(xn, NULL);
if ((p = krb5_cas[i]->u.caName.data =
(unsigned char *)malloc((size_t) len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
i2d_X509_NAME(xn, &p);
krb5_cas[i]->u.caName.length = len;
break;
case choice_trusted_cas_issuerAndSerial:
krb5_cas[i]->choice = choice_trusted_cas_issuerAndSerial;
krb5_cas[i]->u.issuerAndSerial.data = NULL;
krb5_cas[i]->u.issuerAndSerial.length = 0;
is = PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_new();
X509_NAME_set(&is->issuer, X509_get_issuer_name(x));
M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
is->serial = M_ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(x));
len = i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(is, NULL);
if ((p = krb5_cas[i]->u.issuerAndSerial.data =
(unsigned char *)malloc((size_t) len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(is, &p);
krb5_cas[i]->u.issuerAndSerial.length = len;
if (is != NULL) {
if (is->issuer != NULL)
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
if (is->serial != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is);
}
break;
default: break;
}
}
retval = 0;
*ids = krb5_cas;
cleanup:
if (retval)
free_krb5_trusted_ca(&krb5_cas);
return retval;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
krb5_error_code
create_issuerAndSerial(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char **out,
unsigned int *out_len)
{
unsigned char *p = NULL;
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL;
int len = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
X509 *cert = req_cryptoctx->received_cert;
*out = NULL;
*out_len = 0;
if (req_cryptoctx->received_cert == NULL)
return 0;
is = PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_new();
X509_NAME_set(&is->issuer, X509_get_issuer_name(cert));
M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
is->serial = M_ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(cert));
len = i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(is, NULL);
if ((p = *out = (unsigned char *)malloc((size_t) len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(is, &p);
*out_len = len;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is);
return retval;
}
static int
pkcs7_decrypt(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
PKCS7 *p7,
BIO *data)
{
BIO *tmpmem = NULL;
/* Solaris Kerberos */
int i = 0;
char buf[4096];
if(p7 == NULL)
return 0;
if(!PKCS7_type_is_enveloped(p7)) {
pkiDebug("wrong pkcs7 content type\n");
return 0;
}
if(!(tmpmem = pkcs7_dataDecode(context, id_cryptoctx, p7))) {
pkiDebug("unable to decrypt pkcs7 object\n");
return 0;
}
/* Solaris Kerberos: Suppress sun studio compiler warning */
#pragma error_messages (off, E_END_OF_LOOP_CODE_NOT_REACHED)
for(;;) {
i = BIO_read(tmpmem, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (i <= 0) break;
BIO_write(data, buf, i);
BIO_free_all(tmpmem);
return 1;
}
#pragma error_messages (default, E_END_OF_LOOP_CODE_NOT_REACHED)
return 0;
}
krb5_error_code
pkinit_process_td_trusted_certifiers(
krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_external_principal_identifier **krb5_trusted_certifiers,
int td_type)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk_xn = NULL;
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *id = NULL;
const unsigned char *p = NULL;
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
int i = 0;
if (td_type == TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS)
pkiDebug("received trusted certifiers\n");
else
pkiDebug("received invalid certificate\n");
sk_xn = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
while(krb5_trusted_certifiers[i] != NULL) {
if (krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->subjectName.data != NULL) {
p = krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->subjectName.data;
xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &p,
(int)krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->subjectName.length);
if (xn == NULL)
goto cleanup;
X509_NAME_oneline(xn, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (td_type == TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS)
pkiDebug("#%d cert = %s is trusted by kdc\n", i, buf);
else
pkiDebug("#%d cert = %s is invalid\n", i, buf);
sk_X509_NAME_push(sk_xn, xn);
}
if (krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.data != NULL) {
p = krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.data;
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p,
(int)krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.length);
if (is == NULL)
goto cleanup;
X509_NAME_oneline(is->issuer, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (td_type == TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS)
pkiDebug("#%d issuer = %s serial = %ld is trusted bu kdc\n", i,
buf, ASN1_INTEGER_get(is->serial));
else
pkiDebug("#%d issuer = %s serial = %ld is invalid\n", i, buf,
ASN1_INTEGER_get(is->serial));
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_free(is);
}
if (krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.data != NULL) {
p = krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.data;
id = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &p,
(int)krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.length);
if (id == NULL)
goto cleanup;
/* XXX */
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(id);
}
i++;
}
/* XXX Since we not doing anything with received trusted certifiers
* return an error. this is the place where we can pick a different
* client certificate based on the information in td_trusted_certifiers
*/
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
cleanup:
if (sk_xn != NULL)
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(sk_xn, X509_NAME_free);
return retval;
}
static BIO *
pkcs7_dataDecode(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
PKCS7 *p7)
{
int i = 0;
unsigned int jj = 0, tmp_len = 0;
BIO *out=NULL,*etmp=NULL,*bio=NULL;
unsigned char *tmp=NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data_body=NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher=NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx=NULL;
X509_ALGOR *enc_alg=NULL;
STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk=NULL;
/* Solaris Kerberos: Not used */
#if 0
X509_ALGOR *xalg=NULL;
#endif
PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri=NULL;
X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs,
id_cryptoctx->cert_index);
p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER;
rsk=p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
enc_alg=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
data_body=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
evp_cipher=EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_TYPE);
goto cleanup;
}
/* Solaris Kerberos: Not used */
#if 0
xalg=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
#endif
if ((etmp=BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
goto cleanup;
}
/* It was encrypted, we need to decrypt the secret key
* with the private key */
/* Find the recipientInfo which matches the passed certificate
* (if any)
*/
if (cert) {
for (i=0; i<sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) {
int tmp_ret = 0;
ri=sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk,i);
tmp_ret = X509_NAME_cmp(ri->issuer_and_serial->issuer,
cert->cert_info->issuer);
if (!tmp_ret) {
tmp_ret = M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(cert->cert_info->serialNumber,
ri->issuer_and_serial->serial);
if (!tmp_ret)
break;
}
ri=NULL;
}
if (ri == NULL) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_CERTIFICATE);
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* If we haven't got a certificate try each ri in turn */
if (cert == NULL) {
for (i=0; i<sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) {
ri=sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk,i);
jj = pkinit_decode_data(context, id_cryptoctx,
M_ASN1_STRING_data(ri->enc_key),
(unsigned int) M_ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key),
&tmp, &tmp_len);
if (jj) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto cleanup;
}
if (!jj && tmp_len > 0) {
jj = tmp_len;
break;
}
ERR_clear_error();
ri = NULL;
}
if (ri == NULL) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_KEY);
goto cleanup;
}
}
else {
jj = pkinit_decode_data(context, id_cryptoctx,
M_ASN1_STRING_data(ri->enc_key),
(unsigned int) M_ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key),
&tmp, &tmp_len);
/* Solaris Kerberos: tmp_len is unsigned. Cannot be < 0 */
if (jj || tmp_len == 0) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto cleanup;
}
jj = tmp_len;
}
evp_ctx=NULL;
BIO_get_cipher_ctx(etmp,&evp_ctx);
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx,evp_cipher,NULL,NULL,NULL,0) <= 0)
goto cleanup;
if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx,enc_alg->parameter) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (jj != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx)) {
/* Some S/MIME clients don't use the same key
* and effective key length. The key length is
* determined by the size of the decrypted RSA key.
*/
if(!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(evp_ctx, (int)jj)) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
PKCS7_R_DECRYPTED_KEY_IS_WRONG_LENGTH);
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx,NULL,NULL,tmp,NULL,0) <= 0)
goto cleanup;
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp,jj);
if (out == NULL)
out=etmp;
else
BIO_push(out,etmp);
etmp=NULL;
if (data_body->length > 0)
bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(data_body->data, data_body->length);
else {
bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio,0);
}
BIO_push(out,bio);
bio=NULL;
/* Solaris Kerberos */
goto out;
cleanup:
if (out != NULL) BIO_free_all(out);
if (etmp != NULL) BIO_free_all(etmp);
if (bio != NULL) BIO_free_all(bio);
out=NULL;
out:
if (tmp != NULL)
free(tmp);
return(out);
}
static krb5_error_code
der_decode_data(unsigned char *data, long data_len,
unsigned char **out, long *out_len)
{
/* Solaris Kerberos */
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *s = NULL;
const unsigned char *p = data;
if ((s = d2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(NULL, &p, data_len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
*out_len = s->length;
if ((*out = (unsigned char *) malloc((size_t) *out_len + 1)) == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
(void) memcpy(*out, s->data, (size_t) s->length);
(*out)[s->length] = '\0';
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (s != NULL)
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(s);
return retval;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_DH
static void
print_dh(DH * dh, char *msg)
{
BIO *bio_err = NULL;
bio_err = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
BIO_set_fp(bio_err, stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
if (msg)
BIO_puts(bio_err, (const char *)msg);
if (dh)
DHparams_print(bio_err, dh);
BN_print(bio_err, dh->q);
BIO_puts(bio_err, (const char *)"\n");
BIO_free(bio_err);
}
static void
print_pubkey(BIGNUM * key, char *msg)
{
BIO *bio_err = NULL;
bio_err = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
BIO_set_fp(bio_err, stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
if (msg)
BIO_puts(bio_err, (const char *)msg);
if (key)
BN_print(bio_err, key);
BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
BIO_free(bio_err);
}
#endif
/*
* Solaris Kerberos:
* Error message generation has changed so gettext() can be used
*/
#if 0
static char *
pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(int err)
{
int i;
static char uc[64];
for (i = 0; pkcs11_errstrings[i].text != NULL; i++)
if (pkcs11_errstrings[i].code == err)
break;
if (pkcs11_errstrings[i].text != NULL)
return (pkcs11_errstrings[i].text);
snprintf(uc, 64, gettext("unknown code 0x%x"), err);
return (uc);
}
#endif
static char *
pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(int err) {
return pkcs11_error_table(err);
}