Network Working Group R. Austein
draft-ietf-dnsind-sigalgopt-00.txt On Sabbatical
P. Vixie
Internet Software Consortium
October 1999
DNS SIGALGOPT
Status of this document
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026.
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Abstract
This document describes a mechanism for conserving packet space in a
DNS response message in the presence of multiple DNSSEC signature
algorithms.
Motivation and Scope
DNSSEC [DNSSEC] specifies a general framework for attaching
cryptographic signatures to DNS resource records. The framework
includes provisions for multiple signature protocols, possibly even
on a per-name basis. While this open-ended framework is good and
useful, it poses a problem when multiple signature protocols are in
use and DNS message sizes are limited by the underlying UDP transport
packet size. EDNS0 [EDNS0] provides a way to specify a larger
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payload size, but this still does not entirely solve the problem for
large RRsets. Worse, in cases where multiple signature algorithms
generate a response packet so large that it must be truncated, the
signatures that fit into the truncated response will be useless if
the resolver doesn't know how to verify signatures generated with
that algorithm.
This note proposes a way for a resolver to indicate which signature
algorithms it understands to a name server in the form of an ordered
list. When this mechanism is in use, the name server can conserve
packet space by (a) not sending signatures with algorithms that the
resolver will not understand, and (b) not sending multiple signatures
for the same resource records.
Mechanism
[DNSSEC] SIG RRs include a one-octet code indicating the algorithm
associated with a particular signature. The SIGALGOPT option defined
below allows the resolver to specify an ordered list of signature
algorithms using the same one-octet codes that DNSSEC uses.
SIGALGOPT is encoded n the variable RDATA part of the OPT pseudo-RR
in the DNS request (see [EDNS0]).
The OPTION-CODE for SIGALGOPT is [TBD].
The OPTION-DATA for SIGALGOPT is an ordered list of the one-octet
codes used by DNSSEC.
If the SIGALGOPT option in a query specifies multiple signature
algorithms and signatures using more than one of those algorithms are
available in the zone, the server must respond with the signatures
corresponding to the first algorithm on the SIGALGOPT list that
matches, omitting any signatures corresponding to the remaining
algorithms.
We have deliberately not provided a mechanism to return all the
matching signatures, because the purpose of the SIGALGOPT mechanism
is to minimize packet size. If the resolver wants to see all
available signatures, it should just leave off the SIGALGOPT option
entirely.
Security Considerations
Good question. What horrible things could a bad guy do by
creating/altering/deleting SIGALGOPT? Are any of the possible
attacks more interesting than denial of service?
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IANA Considerations
SIGALGOPT will need an option code.
The signature algorithm codes themselves are borrowed from DNSSEC and
do not create any new issues for IANA.
References
[DNSSEC] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC
2535, March 1999.
[DNS-CONCEPTS] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and
facilities", RFC 1034, November 1987.
[DNS-IMPLEMENTATION] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation
and specification", RFC 1035, November 1987.
[EDNS0] Vixie, P., "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)", RFC 2671,
August 1999.
Author's addresses:
Rob Austein
On Sabbatical
sra@hactrn.net
Paul Vixie
Internet Software Consortium
950 Charter Street
Redwood City, CA 94063
+1 650 779 7001
vixie@isc.org
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