SUPHardenedVerifyImage-win.cpp revision ad8dba2ed364f757ee03a355a1deee56b9f8066e
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * VirtualBox Support Library/Driver - Hardened Image Verification, Windows.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Copyright (C) 2006-2014 Oracle Corporation
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * This file is part of VirtualBox Open Source Edition (OSE), as
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * available from http://www.virtualbox.org. This file is free software;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * General Public License (GPL) as published by the Free Software
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Foundation, in version 2 as it comes in the "COPYING" file of the
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * VirtualBox OSE distribution. VirtualBox OSE is distributed in the
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY of any kind.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * The contents of this file may alternatively be used under the terms
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * of the Common Development and Distribution License Version 1.0
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * (CDDL) only, as it comes in the "COPYING.CDDL" file of the
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * VirtualBox OSE distribution, in which case the provisions of the
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * CDDL are applicable instead of those of the GPL.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * You may elect to license modified versions of this file under the
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * terms and conditions of either the GPL or the CDDL or both.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/*******************************************************************************
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync* Header Files *
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync*******************************************************************************/
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/*******************************************************************************
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync* Defined Constants And Macros *
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync*******************************************************************************/
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** The size of static hash (output) buffers.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Avoids dynamic allocations and cleanups for of small buffers as well as extra
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * calls for getting the appropriate buffer size. The largest digest in regular
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * use by current windows version is SHA-512, we double this and hope it's
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * enough a good while. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync#if defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_MORE)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync# error "VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE without VBOX_PERMIT_MORE!"
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/*******************************************************************************
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync* Structures and Typedefs *
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync*******************************************************************************/
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsynctypedef LONG (WINAPI * PFNWINVERIFYTRUST)(HWND hwnd, GUID const *pgActionID, PVOID pWVTData);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsynctypedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT)(HCATADMIN *phCatAdmin, const GUID *pGuidSubsystem, DWORD dwFlags);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsynctypedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT2)(HCATADMIN *phCatAdmin, const GUID *pGuidSubsystem, PCWSTR pwszHashAlgorithm,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync struct _CERT_STRONG_SIGN_PARA const *pStrongHashPolicy, DWORD dwFlags);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsynctypedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE)(HANDLE hFile, DWORD *pcbHash, BYTE *pbHash, DWORD dwFlags);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsynctypedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE2)(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, HANDLE hFile, DWORD *pcbHash,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsynctypedef HCATINFO (WINAPI *PFNCRYPTCATADMINENUMCATALOGFROMHASH)(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, BYTE *pbHash, DWORD cbHash,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsynctypedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINRELEASECATALOGCONTEXT)(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, HCATINFO hCatInfo, DWORD dwFlags);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsynctypedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATDADMINRELEASECONTEXT)(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, DWORD dwFlags);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsynctypedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATCATALOGINFOFROMCONTEXT)(HCATINFO hCatInfo, CATALOG_INFO *psCatInfo, DWORD dwFlags);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsynctypedef HCERTSTORE (WINAPI *PFNCERTOPENSTORE)(PCSTR pszStoreProvider, DWORD dwEncodingType, HCRYPTPROV_LEGACY hCryptProv,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsynctypedef BOOL (WINAPI *PFNCERTCLOSESTORE)(HCERTSTORE hCertStore, DWORD dwFlags);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsynctypedef PCCERT_CONTEXT (WINAPI *PFNCERTENUMCERTIFICATESINSTORE)(HCERTSTORE hCertStore, PCCERT_CONTEXT pPrevCertContext);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/*******************************************************************************
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync* Global Variables *
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync*******************************************************************************/
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** The build certificate. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** Store for root software publisher certificates. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** Store for root NT kernel certificates. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic RTCRSTORE g_hNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** Store containing SPC, NT kernel signing, and timestamp root certificates. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic RTCRSTORE g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** Store for supplemental certificates for use with
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic RTCRSTORE g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** The full \\SystemRoot\\System32 path. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** The full \\SystemRoot\\WinSxS path. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync#if defined(IN_RING3) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** The full 'Program Files' path. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** The full 'Program Files (x86)' path. */
2f8175b63b0fa558fb56df987387875c2dda6299vboxsync/** The full 'Common Files' path. */
396186df506c303aa6137c1707423855981eb0c2vboxsync/** The full 'Common Files (x86)' path. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync#endif /* IN_RING3 && !VBOX_PERMIT_MORE*/
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic union
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** The TrustedInstaller SID (Vista+). */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** Local system ID (S-1-5-21). */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** Builtin Administrators group alias (S-1-5-32-544). */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** Set after we've retrived other SPC root certificates from the system. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic bool g_fHaveOtherRoots = false;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync#if defined(IN_RING3) && !defined(IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** Combined windows NT version number. See SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_COMBINED and
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** Timestamp hack working around issues with old DLLs that we ship.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * See supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle() for details. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** Pointer to WinVerifyTrust. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminAcquireContext. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncPFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminAcquireContext2 if available. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncPFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT2 g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncPFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncPFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE2 g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncPFNCRYPTCATADMINENUMCATALOGFROMHASH g_pfnCryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncPFNCRYPTCATADMINRELEASECATALOGCONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminReleaseContext. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncPFNCRYPTCATDADMINRELEASECONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseContext;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** Pointer to CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncPFNCRYPTCATCATALOGINFOFROMCONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** Where we store the TLS entry for detecting WinVerifyTrustRecursion. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic uint32_t g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion = UINT32_MAX;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** Fallback WinVerifyTrust recursion protection. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic uint32_t volatile g_idActiveThread = UINT32_MAX;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/*******************************************************************************
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync* Internal Functions *
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync*******************************************************************************/
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnRead */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrRead(PRTLDRREADER pReader, void *pvBuf, size_t cb, RTFOFF off)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * For some reason I'm getting occational read error in an XP VM with
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * STATUS_FAILED_DRIVER_ENTRY. Redoing the call again works in the
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * debugger, so try do that automatically.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync "supHardNtViRdrRead: Only got %#zx bytes when requesting %#zx bytes at %#llx in '%s'.\n",
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Delay a little before we retry?
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync Time.QuadPart = -1000000 / 100; /* 1ms in 100ns units, relative time. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Before we give up, we'll try split up the request in case the
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * kernel is low on memory or similar. For simplicity reasons, we do
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * this in a recursion fashion.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync while (cb > 0)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync int rc = supHardNtViRdrRead(&pNtViRdr->Core, pvBuf, cbThisRead, off);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync supR3HardenedError(VERR_READ_ERROR, false, "supHardNtViRdrRead: Error %#x reading %#zx bytes at %#llx in '%s'.\n",
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnTell */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic DECLCALLBACK(RTFOFF) supHardNtViRdrTell(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnSize */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic DECLCALLBACK(RTFOFF) supHardNtViRdrSize(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnLogName */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic DECLCALLBACK(const char *) supHardNtViRdrLogName(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnMap */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrMap(PRTLDRREADER pReader, const void **ppvBits)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnUnmap */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrUnmap(PRTLDRREADER pReader, const void *pvBits)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnDestroy */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrDestroy(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Creates a loader reader instance for the given NT file handle.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @returns iprt status code.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param hFile Native NT file handle.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pwszName Optional file name.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param ppNtViRdr Where to store the reader instance on success.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncDECLHIDDEN(int) supHardNtViRdrCreate(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PSUPHNTVIRDR *ppNtViRdr)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Try determine the size of the file.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQueryInformationFile(hFile, &Ios, &StdInfo, sizeof(StdInfo), FileStandardInformation);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Calc the file name length and allocate memory for the reader instance.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)RTMemAllocZ(sizeof(*pNtViRdr) + cchFilename);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Initialize the structure.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rc = RTUtf16ToUtf8Ex(pwszName, RTSTR_MAX, &pszName, cchFilename + 1, NULL);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync AssertStmt(RT_SUCCESS(rc), pNtViRdr->szFilename[0] = '\0');
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Checks if the file is owned by TrustedInstaller (Vista+) or similar.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @returns true if owned by TrustedInstaller of pre-Vista, false if not.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param hFile The handle to the file.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pwszName The name of the file.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic bool supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return true;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Get the ownership information.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQuerySecurityObject(hFile, OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION, &uBuf.Abs, sizeof(uBuf), &cbActual);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SUP_DPRINTF(("NtQuerySecurityObject failed with rcNt=%#x on '%ls'\n", rcNt, pwszName));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return false;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Check the owner.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Initially we wished to only allow TrustedInstaller. But a Windows CAPI
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * plugin "Program Files\Tumbleweed\Desktop Validator\tmwdcapiclient.dll"
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * turned up owned by the local system user, and we cannot operate without
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * the plugin loaded once it's installed (WinVerityTrust fails).
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * We'd like to avoid allowing Builtin\Administrators here since it's the
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * default owner of anything an admin user creates (at least when elevated).
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Seems windows update or someone ends up installing or modifying system
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * DLL ownership to this group, so for system32 and winsxs it's unavoidable.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * And, not surprise, a bunch of products, including AV, firewalls and similar
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * ends up with their files installed with this group as owner. For instance
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * if we wish to have NAT continue working, we need to allow this.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Hopefully, we can limit the allowed files to these owners though, so
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * we won't be subject to ordinary (non-admin, or not elevated) users
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * downloading or be tricked into putting evil DLLs around the place...
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync PSID pOwner = uBuf.Rel.Control & SE_SELF_RELATIVE ? &uBuf.abView[uBuf.Rel.Owner] : uBuf.Abs.Owner;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync Assert((uintptr_t)pOwner - (uintptr_t)&uBuf < sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(SID));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return true;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return true;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls: Owner is administrators group.\n", pwszName));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return true;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls: Owner is not trusted installer (%.*Rhxs)\n",
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync pwszName, ((uint8_t *)pOwner)[1] /*SubAuthorityCount*/ * sizeof(ULONG) + 8, pOwner));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return false;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII path compare.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @returns true if equal, false if not.
02a86c3f55161b12d393bdf96b01c0086fd42313vboxsync * @param pawcLeft The UTF-16 path string, not necessarily null
02a86c3f55161b12d393bdf96b01c0086fd42313vboxsync * terminated.
02a86c3f55161b12d393bdf96b01c0086fd42313vboxsync * @param cwcLeft The number of chars in the left string,
02a86c3f55161b12d393bdf96b01c0086fd42313vboxsync * RTSTR_MAX if unknown but terminated.
02a86c3f55161b12d393bdf96b01c0086fd42313vboxsync * @param pszRight The ascii string.
02a86c3f55161b12d393bdf96b01c0086fd42313vboxsyncDECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViUtf16PathIsEqualEx(PCRTUTF16 pawcLeft, size_t cwcLeft, const char *pszRight)
02a86c3f55161b12d393bdf96b01c0086fd42313vboxsync return false;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if (b == '/')
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return false;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return true;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII path compare.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @returns true if equal, false if not.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pwszLeft The UTF-16 path string.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pszRight The ascii string.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic bool supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(PCRTUTF16 pwszLeft, const char *pszRight)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return supHardViUtf16PathIsEqualEx(pwszLeft, RTSTR_MAX, pszRight);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII ends-with path predicate.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @returns true if equal, false if not.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pwsz The UTF-16 path string.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pszSuffix The ascii suffix string.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic bool supHardViUtf16PathEndsWith(PCRTUTF16 pwsz, const char *pszSuffix)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz + cwc - cchSuffix, pszSuffix);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return false;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII starts-with path predicate.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @returns true if starts with given string, false if not.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pwsz The UTF-16 path string.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pszPrefix The ascii prefix string.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic bool supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithAscii(PCRTUTF16 pwszLeft, const char *pszRight)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return true;
02a86c3f55161b12d393bdf96b01c0086fd42313vboxsync return false;
02a86c3f55161b12d393bdf96b01c0086fd42313vboxsync if (b == '/')
76bd4ec6d277af265850cc522ad5c9e89626b259vboxsync return false;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Simple case insensitive UNICODE_STRING starts-with path predicate.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @returns true if starts with given string, false if not.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pwszLeft The path to check.
76bd4ec6d277af265850cc522ad5c9e89626b259vboxsync * @param cwcLeft The length of @a pwszLeft
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pwszRight The starts-with path.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param cwcRight The length of @a pwszRight.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param fCheckSlash Check for a slash following the prefix.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncDECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(PCRTUTF16 pwszLeft, uint32_t cwcLeft,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync PCRTUTF16 pwszRight, uint32_t cwcRight, bool fCheckSlash)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return false;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync /* See if we can get away with a case sensitive compare first. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if (memcmp(pwszLeft, pwszRight, cwcRight * sizeof(RTUTF16)) == 0)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync /* No luck, do a slow case insensitive comapre. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync while (cLeft-- > 0)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync wcLeft = wcLeft < 0x80 ? wcLeft == '/' ? '\\' : RT_C_TO_LOWER(wcLeft) : wcLeft;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync wcRight = wcRight < 0x80 ? wcRight == '/' ? '\\' : RT_C_TO_LOWER(wcRight) : wcRight;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return false;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync /* Check for slash following the prefix, if request. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return true;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return false;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Simple case insensitive UNICODE_STRING starts-with path predicate.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @returns true if starts with given string, false if not.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pUniStrLeft The path to check.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pUniStrRight The starts-with path.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param fCheckSlash Check for a slash following the prefix.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncDECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViUniStrPathStartsWithUniStr(UNICODE_STRING const *pUniStrLeft, UNICODE_STRING const *pUniStrRight,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pUniStrLeft->Buffer, pUniStrLeft->Length / sizeof(WCHAR),
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync pUniStrRight->Buffer, pUniStrRight->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), fCheckSlash);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Counts slashes in the given UTF-8 path string.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @returns Number of slashes.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pwsz The UTF-16 path string.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic uint32_t supHardViUtf16PathCountSlashes(PCRTUTF16 pwsz)
02a86c3f55161b12d393bdf96b01c0086fd42313vboxsync * Checks if the path goes into %windir%\apppatch\.
02a86c3f55161b12d393bdf96b01c0086fd42313vboxsync * @returns true if apppatch, false if not.
02a86c3f55161b12d393bdf96b01c0086fd42313vboxsync * @param pwszPath The path to examine.
02a86c3f55161b12d393bdf96b01c0086fd42313vboxsyncDECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViIsAppPatchDir(PCRTUTF16 pwszPath, uint32_t cwcName)
02a86c3f55161b12d393bdf96b01c0086fd42313vboxsync uint32_t cwcWinDir = (g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length - sizeof(L"System32")) / sizeof(WCHAR);
02a86c3f55161b12d393bdf96b01c0086fd42313vboxsync return false;
02a86c3f55161b12d393bdf96b01c0086fd42313vboxsync if (memcmp(pwszPath, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcWinDir * sizeof(WCHAR)))
02a86c3f55161b12d393bdf96b01c0086fd42313vboxsync return false;
02a86c3f55161b12d393bdf96b01c0086fd42313vboxsync if (!supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithAscii(&pwszPath[cwcWinDir], "\\AppPatch\\"))
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return false;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Checks if the unsigned DLL is fine or not.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @returns VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED or @a rc.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param hLdrMod The loader module handle.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pwszName The NT name of the DLL/EXE.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param fFlags Flags.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param hFile The file handle.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param rc The status code..
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic int supHardNtViCheckIfNotSignedOk(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, HANDLE hFile, int rc)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if (fFlags & (SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT | SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING))
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Version macros.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync#define IS_XP() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 1) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 2) )
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync#define IS_W2K3() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 2) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 3) )
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync#define IS_VISTA() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 1) )
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync#define IS_W70() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 1) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 2) )
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync#define IS_W80() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 2) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 3) )
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync#define IS_W81() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 3) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) )
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * The System32 directory.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * System32 is full of unsigned DLLs shipped by microsoft, graphics
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * hardware vendors, input device/method vendors and whatnot else that
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * actually needs to be loaded into a process for it to work correctly.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * We have to ASSUME that anything our process attempts to load from
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * System32 is trustworthy and that the Windows system with the help of
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * anti-virus software make sure there is nothing evil lurking in System32
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * or being loaded from it.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * A small measure of protection is to list DLLs we know should be signed
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * and decline loading unsigned versions of them, assuming they have been
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * replaced by an adversary with evil intentions.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync uint32_t cwcOther = g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcOther, true /*fCheckSlash*/))
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync /* Must be owned by trusted installer. (This test is superfuous, thus no relaxation here.) */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync && !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync /* Core DLLs. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_VISTA ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
8ca9bc7876e76fd62c489a54b9a5acf26cace946vboxsync if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "kernel32.dll"))
8ca9bc7876e76fd62c489a54b9a5acf26cace946vboxsync return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_W81 ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
8ca9bc7876e76fd62c489a54b9a5acf26cace946vboxsync if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "kernelbase.dll"))
8ca9bc7876e76fd62c489a54b9a5acf26cace946vboxsync return IS_W80() || IS_W70() ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
8ca9bc7876e76fd62c489a54b9a5acf26cace946vboxsync if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "apisetschema.dll"))
8ca9bc7876e76fd62c489a54b9a5acf26cace946vboxsync if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "apphelp.dll"))
8ca9bc7876e76fd62c489a54b9a5acf26cace946vboxsync return uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "verifier.dll"))
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_W81 ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if (uNtVer >= SUP_NT_VER_W70) /* hard limit: user32.dll is unwanted prior to w7. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
208b6c2dc45ecf098ded011e80eb380698695ee8vboxsync return uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
a5d6536233b36d63d25e3127624f1ddb7b59c52bvboxsync return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_W81 ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync /* Check that this DLL isn't supposed to be signed on this windows
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync version. If it should, it's likely to be a fake. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync /** @todo list of signed dlls for various windows versions. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync#endif /* IN_RING0 */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * The WinSxS white list.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Just like with System32 there are potentially a number of DLLs that
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * could be required from WinSxS.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync cwcOther = g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName, g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcOther, true /*fCheckSlash*/))
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync /* The WinSxS layout means everything worth loading is exactly one level down. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync uint32_t cSlashes = supHardViUtf16PathCountSlashes(pwsz);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync /* Must be owned by trusted installer. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync && !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync#endif /* !IN_RING0 */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * AppPatch whitelist.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync cwcOther = g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR); /* ASSUMES System32 is called System32. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync && !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "AppPatch64\\AcGenral.dll"))
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "AcGenral.dll"))
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync# endif /* !VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync#endif /* VBOX_PERMIT_MORE */
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync# if defined(VBOX_PERMIT_MORE) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE)
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync * Program files and common files.
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync * Permit anything that's signed and correctly installed.
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync if ( supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync g_ProgramFilesNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_ProgramFilesNtPath.UniStr.Length,
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync true /*fCheckSlash*/)
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync || supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync g_CommonFilesNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_CommonFilesNtPath.UniStr.Length,
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync true /*fCheckSlash*/)
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync || supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Length,
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync true /*fCheckSlash*/)
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync || supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync g_CommonFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_CommonFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Length,
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync true /*fCheckSlash*/)
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync && !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync# elif defined(VBOX_PERMIT_MORE) && defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE)
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync * Anything that's owned by the trusted installer.
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync || supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync#endif /* !IN_RING0 */
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync * Not permitted.
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync * @callback_method_impl{RTCRPKCS7VERIFYCERTCALLBACK,
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync * Standard code signing. Use this for Microsoft SPC.}
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsyncstatic DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViCertVerifyCallback(PCRTCRX509CERTIFICATE pCert, RTCRX509CERTPATHS hCertPaths,
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync uint32_t fFlags, void *pvUser, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync * If there is no certificate path build & validator associated with this
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync * callback, it must be because of the build certificate. We trust the
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync * build certificate without any second thoughts.
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync if (RTCrX509Certificate_Compare(pCert, &g_BuildX509Cert) == 0) /* healthy paranoia */
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_BUILD_CERT_IPE, "Not valid kernel code signature.");
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync * Standard code signing capabilites required.
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync int rc = RTCrPkcs7VerifyCertCallbackCodeSigning(pCert, hCertPaths, fFlags, NULL, pErrInfo);
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync * If kernel signing, a valid certificate path must be anchored by the
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync * microsoft kernel signing root certificate.
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync if (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING)
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync uint32_t cPaths = RTCrX509CertPathsGetPathCount(hCertPaths);
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync rc = RTCrX509CertPathsQueryPathInfo(hCertPaths, iPath, &fTrusted, NULL /*pcNodes*/, &pSubject, &pPublicKeyInfo,
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync * Search the kernel signing root store for a matching anchor.
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync rc = RTCrStoreCertFindBySubjectOrAltSubjectByRfc5280(g_hNtKernelRootStore, pSubject, &Search);
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync while ((pCertCtx = RTCrStoreCertSearchNext(g_hNtKernelRootStore, &Search)) != NULL)
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync PCRTCRX509SUBJECTPUBLICKEYINFO pCertPubKeyInfo = NULL;
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync pCertPubKeyInfo = &pCertCtx->pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo;
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync && RTCrX509SubjectPublicKeyInfo_Compare(pCertPubKeyInfo, pPublicKeyInfo) == 0)
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync int rc2 = RTCrStoreCertSearchDestroy(g_hNtKernelRootStore, &Search); AssertRC(rc2);
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_VALID_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNATURE, "Not valid kernel code signature.");
7d6ce198fd361f58bd1ebdeee7772f76b4e58966vboxsync if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && cValid < 2 && g_fHaveOtherRoots)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_UNEXPECTED_VALID_PATH_COUNT,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync "Expected at least %u valid paths, not %u.", 2, cValid);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * More requirements? NT5 build lab?
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViCallback(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, RTLDRSIGNATURETYPE enmSignature,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Check out the input.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync AssertReturn(cbSignature == sizeof(RTCRPKCS7CONTENTINFO), VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync PCRTCRPKCS7CONTENTINFO pContentInfo = (PCRTCRPKCS7CONTENTINFO)pvSignature;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync AssertReturn(RTCrPkcs7ContentInfo_IsSignedData(pContentInfo), VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync AssertReturn(pContentInfo->u.pSignedData->SignerInfos.cItems == 1, VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync PCRTCRPKCS7SIGNERINFO pSignerInfo = &pContentInfo->u.pSignedData->SignerInfos.paItems[0];
02a86c3f55161b12d393bdf96b01c0086fd42313vboxsync * If special certificate requirements, check them out before validating
02a86c3f55161b12d393bdf96b01c0086fd42313vboxsync * the signature.
02a86c3f55161b12d393bdf96b01c0086fd42313vboxsync if (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if (!RTCrX509Certificate_MatchIssuerAndSerialNumber(&g_BuildX509Cert,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return RTErrInfoSet(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_SIGNED_WITH_BUILD_CERT, "Not signed with the build certificate.");
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Verify the signature. We instruct the verifier to use the signing time
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * counter signature present when present, falling back on the timestamp
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * planted by the linker when absent. In ring-0 we don't have all the
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * necessary timestamp server root certificate info, so we have to allow
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * using counter signatures unverified there. Ditto for the early period
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * of ring-3 hardened stub execution.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync RTTimeSpecSetSeconds(&ValidationTime, pNtViRdr->uTimestamp);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync uint32_t fFlags = RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_ALWAYS_USE_SIGNING_TIME_IF_PRESENT
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync | RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_ALWAYS_USE_MS_TIMESTAMP_IF_PRESENT
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync | RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_COUNTER_SIGNATURE_SIGNING_TIME_ONLY;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync fFlags |= RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_USE_SIGNING_TIME_UNVERIFIED | RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_USE_MS_TIMESTAMP_UNVERIFIED;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return RTCrPkcs7VerifySignedData(pContentInfo, fFlags, g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore, g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync &ValidationTime, supHardNtViCertVerifyCallback, pNtViRdr, pErrInfo);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Verifies the given loader image.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @returns IPRT status code.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param hLdrMod File handle to the executable file.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pNtViRdr The reader instance /w flags.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param fAvoidWinVerifyTrust Whether to avoid WinVerifyTrust because of
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * deadlock or other loader related dangers.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pfWinVerifyTrust Where to return whether WinVerifyTrust was used.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncDECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageByLdrMod(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync bool fAvoidWinVerifyTrust, bool *pfWinVerifyTrust, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync /* Check that the caller has performed the necessary library initialization. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if (!RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(&g_BuildX509Cert))
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync "supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle: supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier was not called.");
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Check the trusted installer bit first, if requested as it's somewhat
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * cheaper than the rest.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * We relax this for system32 and a little for WinSxS, like we used to, as
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * there are apparently some systems out there where the user, admin, or
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * someone has changed the ownership of core windows DLLs like user32.dll
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * and comctl32.dll. Since we need user32.dll and will be checking it's
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * digital signature, it's reasonably safe to let this thru. (The report
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * was of SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * owning user32.dll, see public ticket 13187, VBoxStartup.3.log.)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * We've also had problems with graphics driver components like ig75icd64.dll
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * and atig6pxx.dll not being owned by TrustedInstaller, with the result
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * that 3D got broken (mod by zero issue in test build 5). These were also
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * In one report by 'thor' the WinSxS resident comctl32.dll was owned by
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS (with 4.3.16).
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync /** @todo Since we're now allowing Builtin\Administrators after all, perhaps we
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * could drop these system32 + winsxs hacks?? */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if ( (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync && !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(pNtViRdr->hFile, pwszName))
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, (uint32_t)RTUtf16Len(pwszName),
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR),
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync true /*fCheckSlash*/))
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls: Relaxing the TrustedInstaller requirement for this DLL (it's in system32).\n", pwszName));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync else if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, (uint32_t)RTUtf16Len(pwszName),
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR),
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync true /*fCheckSlash*/))
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls: Relaxing the TrustedInstaller requirement for this DLL (it's in WinSxS).\n", pwszName));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_OWNED_BY_TRUSTED_INSTALLER,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync "supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle: TrustedInstaller is not the owner of '%ls'.", pwszName);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Verify it.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * The PKCS #7 SignedData signature is checked in the callback. Any
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * signing certificate restrictions are also enforced there.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * For the time being, we use the executable timestamp as the
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * certificate validation date. We must query that first to avoid
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * potential issues re-entering the loader code from the callback.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Update: Save the first timestamp we validate with build cert and
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * use this as a minimum timestamp for further build cert
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * validations. This works around issues with old DLLs that
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * we sign against with our certificate (crt, sdl, qt).
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync int rc = RTLdrQueryProp(hLdrMod, RTLDRPROP_TIMESTAMP_SECONDS, &pNtViRdr->uTimestamp, sizeof(pNtViRdr->uTimestamp));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if ( (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync && (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE_ENFORCEMENT)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rc = RTLdrVerifySignature(hLdrMod, supHardNtViCallback, pNtViRdr, pErrInfo);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if ((pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT) && g_uBuildTimestampHack == 0 && RT_SUCCESS(rc))
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Microsoft doesn't sign a whole bunch of DLLs, so we have to
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * ASSUME that a bunch of system DLLs are fine.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rc = supHardNtViCheckIfNotSignedOk(hLdrMod, pwszName, pNtViRdr->fFlags, pNtViRdr->hFile, rc);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Check for the signature checking enforcement, if requested to do so.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE_ENFORCEMENT))
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync bool fEnforced = false;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync int rc2 = RTLdrQueryProp(hLdrMod, RTLDRPROP_SIGNATURE_CHECKS_ENFORCED, &fEnforced, sizeof(fEnforced));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc2, "Querying RTLDRPROP_SIGNATURE_CHECKS_ENFORCED failed on %ls: %Rrc.",
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SIGNATURE_CHECKS_NOT_ENFORCED,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync "The image '%ls' was not linked with /IntegrityCheck.", pwszName);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "RTLdrQueryProp/RTLDRPROP_TIMESTAMP_SECONDS failed on %ls: %Rrc", pwszName, rc);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Pass it thru WinVerifyTrust when possible.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rc = supHardenedWinVerifyImageTrust(pNtViRdr->hFile, pwszName, pNtViRdr->fFlags, rc, pfWinVerifyTrust, pErrInfo);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Hook for the LdrLoadDll code to schedule scanning of imports.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheScheduleImports(hLdrMod, pwszName);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Verifies the given executable image.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @returns IPRT status code.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param fAvoidWinVerifyTrust Whether to avoid WinVerifyTrust because of
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * deadlock or other loader related dangers.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pfWinVerifyTrust Where to return whether WinVerifyTrust was used.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncDECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, bool fAvoidWinVerifyTrust,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Create a reader instance.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync int rc = supHardNtViRdrCreate(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, &pNtViRdr);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Open the image.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync RTLDRARCH enmArch = fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_RC_IMAGE ? RTLDRARCH_X86_32 : RTLDRARCH_HOST;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rc = RTLdrOpenWithReader(&pNtViRdr->Core, RTLDR_O_FOR_VALIDATION, enmArch, &hLdrMod, pErrInfo);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Verify it.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rc = supHardenedWinVerifyImageByLdrMod(hLdrMod, pwszName, pNtViRdr, fAvoidWinVerifyTrust, pfWinVerifyTrust, pErrInfo);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SUP_DPRINTF(("supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle: -> %d (%ls)%s\n",
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rc, pwszName, pfWinVerifyTrust && *pfWinVerifyTrust ? "WinVerifyTrust" : ""));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle version without the name.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * The name is derived from the handle.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @returns IPRT status code.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncDECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandleNoName(HANDLE hFile, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Determine the NT name and call the verification function.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync uBuf.UniStr.Buffer[uBuf.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle(hFile, uBuf.UniStr.Buffer, fFlags, false /*fAvoidWinVerifyTrust*/,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync#endif /* IN_RING3 */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Retrieves the full official path to the system root or one of it's sub
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * directories.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * This code is also used by the support driver.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @returns VBox status code.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pvBuf The output buffer. This will contain a
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * UNICODE_STRING followed (at the kernel's
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * discretion) the string buffer.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param cbBuf The size of the buffer @a pvBuf points to.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param enmDir Which directory under the system root we're
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * interested in.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncDECLHIDDEN(int) supHardNtGetSystemRootDir(void *pvBuf, uint32_t cbBuf, SUPHARDNTSYSROOTDIR enmDir, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync static const WCHAR s_wszNameSystem32[] = L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\";
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync NtName.Length = sizeof(s_wszNameSystem32) - sizeof(WCHAR);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync static const WCHAR s_wszNameWinSxS[] = L"\\SystemRoot\\WinSxS\\";
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync NtName.Length = sizeof(s_wszNameWinSxS) - sizeof(WCHAR);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync 0 /*EaLength*/);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync /* Make sure it's terminated so it can safely be printed.*/
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync pUniStr->Buffer[pUniStr->Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SYSTEM32_PATH,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync "NtQueryObject returned an empty path for '%ls'", NtName.Buffer);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SYSTEM32_PATH, "NtQueryObject failed on '%ls' dir: %#x", NtName.Buffer, rcNt);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SYSTEM32_PATH, "Failure to open '%ls': %#x", NtName.Buffer, rcNt);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Initialize one certificate entry.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @returns VBox status code.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pCert The X.509 certificate representation to init.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pabCert The raw DER encoded certificate.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param cbCert The size of the raw certificate.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error info. Optional.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pszErrorTag Error tag.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic int supHardNtViCertInit(PRTCRX509CERTIFICATE pCert, unsigned char const *pabCert, unsigned cbCert,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_3, "%s: cbCert=%#x out of range", pszErrorTag, cbCert));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync AssertReturn(!RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(pCert),
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_WRONG_ORDER, "%s: Certificate already decoded?", pszErrorTag));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync RTAsn1CursorInitPrimary(&PrimaryCursor, pabCert, cbCert, pErrInfo, &g_RTAsn1DefaultAllocator, RTASN1CURSOR_FLAGS_DER, NULL);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync int rc = RTCrX509Certificate_DecodeAsn1(&PrimaryCursor.Cursor, 0, pCert, pszErrorTag);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rc = RTCrX509Certificate_CheckSanity(pCert, 0, pErrInfo, pszErrorTag);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic int supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(RTCRSTORE hStore, PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts, unsigned cCerts, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync int rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(hStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_TAF_DER, paCerts[i].pch, paCerts[i].cb, pErrInfo);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Initialize a certificate table.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param phStore Where to return the store pointer.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param paCerts1 Pointer to the first certificate table.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param cCerts1 Entries in the first certificate table.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param paCerts2 Pointer to the second certificate table.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param cCerts2 Entries in the second certificate table.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param paCerts3 Pointer to the third certificate table.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param cCerts3 Entries in the third certificate table.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error info. Optional.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pszErrorTag Error tag.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic int supHardNtViCertStoreInit(PRTCRSTORE phStore,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync AssertReturn(*phStore == NIL_RTCRSTORE, VERR_WRONG_ORDER);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync int rc = RTCrStoreCreateInMem(phStore, cCerts1 + cCerts2);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "RTCrStoreCreateMemoryStore failed: %Rrc", rc);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rc = supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(*phStore, paCerts1, cCerts1, pErrInfo);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rc = supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(*phStore, paCerts2, cCerts2, pErrInfo);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rc = supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(*phStore, paCerts3, cCerts3, pErrInfo);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync#if defined(IN_RING3) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Initializes the windows paths.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic void supHardenedWinInitImageVerifierWinPaths(void)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Windows paths that we're interested in.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync static const struct
2f9acd6c5608d79e003dda3b5ebbd511d7f6fdd0vboxsync { &g_ProgramFilesNtPath, L"ProgramFilesDir", "ProgDir" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { &g_CommonFilesNtPath, L"CommonFilesDir", "ComDir" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { &g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath, L"ProgramFilesDir (x86)", "ProgDir32" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { &g_CommonFilesX86NtPath, L"CommonFilesDir (x86)", "ComDir32" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Open the registry key containing the paths.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync UNICODE_STRING NtName = RTNT_CONSTANT_UNISTR(L"\\Registry\\Machine\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion");
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync NTSTATUS rcNt = NtOpenKey(&hKey, KEY_QUERY_VALUE, &ObjAttr);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Loop over the paths and resolve their NT paths.
2f9acd6c5608d79e003dda3b5ebbd511d7f6fdd0vboxsync for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aPaths); i++)
2f9acd6c5608d79e003dda3b5ebbd511d7f6fdd0vboxsync * Query the value first.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync ValueName.Buffer = (WCHAR *)s_aPaths[i].pwszRegValue;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync ValueName.Length = (USHORT)(RTUtf16Len(s_aPaths[i].pwszRegValue) * sizeof(WCHAR));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync ValueName.MaximumLength = ValueName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync uint8_t abPadding[sizeof(KEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION) + sizeof(WCHAR) * 128];
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rcNt = NtQueryValueKey(hKey, &ValueName, KeyValuePartialInformation, &uBuf, sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(WCHAR), &cbActual);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Must be a simple string value, terminate it.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Expand any environment variable references before opening it.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * We use the result buffer as storage for the expaneded path,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * reserving space for the windows name space prefix.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if (Src.Length >= sizeof(WCHAR) && Src.Buffer[Src.Length / sizeof(WCHAR) - 1] == '\0')
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync Src.Buffer[uBuf.PartialInfo.DataLength / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync Dst.MaximumLength = sizeof(s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer) - sizeof(WCHAR) * 5;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rcNt = RtlExpandEnvironmentStrings_U(NULL, &Src, &Dst, NULL);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Include the \\??\\ prefix in the result and open the path.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &Dst, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync 0 /*EaLength*/);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Query the real NT name.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync /* Make sure it's terminated.*/
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer[s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SUP_DPRINTF(("%s:%*s %ls\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, 9 - strlen(s_aPaths[i].pszLogName), "",
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtQueryObject returned empty string\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtQueryObject failed: %#x\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtCreateFile failed: %#x (%ls)\n",
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: RtlExpandEnvironmentStrings_U failed: %#x (%ls)\n",
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: type mismatch: %#x\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, uBuf.PartialInfo.Type));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtQueryValueKey failed: %#x\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync /* Stub the entry on failure. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SUP_DPRINTF(("NtOpenKey(%ls) failed: %#x\n", NtName.Buffer, rcNt));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync /* Stub all the entries on failure. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aPaths); i++)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync#endif /* IN_RING3 && !VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * This initializes the certificates globals so we don't have to reparse them
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * every time we need to verify an image.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @returns IPRT status code.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error info. Optional.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncDECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier(PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync AssertReturn(!RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(&g_BuildX509Cert), VERR_WRONG_ORDER);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Get the system root paths.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync int rc = supHardNtGetSystemRootDir(&g_System32NtPath, sizeof(g_System32NtPath), kSupHardNtSysRootDir_System32, pErrInfo);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rc = supHardNtGetSystemRootDir(&g_WinSxSNtPath, sizeof(g_WinSxSNtPath), kSupHardNtSysRootDir_WinSxS, pErrInfo);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SUP_DPRINTF(("System32: %ls\n", g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SUP_DPRINTF(("WinSxS: %ls\n", g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Buffer));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync#if defined(IN_RING3) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Initialize it, leaving the cleanup to the termination call.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rc = supHardNtViCertInit(&g_BuildX509Cert, g_abSUPBuildCert, g_cbSUPBuildCert, pErrInfo, "BuildCertificate");
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hSpcRootStore, g_aSUPSpcRootTAs, g_cSUPSpcRootTAs,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hNtKernelRootStore, g_aSUPNtKernelRootTAs, g_cSUPNtKernelRootTAs,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync#if 0 /* For the time being, always trust the build certificate. It bypasses the timestamp issues of CRT and SDL. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync /* If the build certificate is a test singing certificate, it must be a
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync trusted root or we'll fail to validate anything. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync && RTCrX509Name_Compare(&g_BuildX509Cert.TbsCertificate.Subject, &g_BuildX509Cert.TbsCertificate.Issuer) == 0)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_X509_DER,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Finally initialize known SIDs that we use.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY s_NtAuth = SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync NTSTATUS rcNt = RtlInitializeSid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, &s_NtAuth, SECURITY_SERVICE_ID_RID_COUNT);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 0) = SECURITY_SERVICE_ID_BASE_RID;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 1) = 956008885;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 2) = 3418522649;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 3) = 1831038044;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 4) = 1853292631;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 5) = 2271478464;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rcNt = RtlInitializeSid(&g_LocalSystemSid, &s_NtAuth, 1);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_LocalSystemSid, 0) = SECURITY_LOCAL_SYSTEM_RID;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rcNt = RtlInitializeSid(&g_AdminsGroupSid, &s_NtAuth, 2);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_AdminsGroupSid, 0) = SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_AdminsGroupSid, 1) = DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Releases resources allocated by supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncDECLHIDDEN(void) supHardenedWinTermImageVerifier(void)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if (RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(&g_BuildX509Cert))
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * This is a hardcoded list of certificates we thing we might need.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @returns true if wanted, false if not.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pCert The certificate.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic bool supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA(PCRTCRX509CERTIFICATE pCert)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync RTCrX509Name_FormatAsString(&pCert->TbsCertificate.Subject, szSubject, sizeof(szSubject) - 1, NULL);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Check that it's a plausible root certificate.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - not-self-signed: %s\n", szSubject));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return false;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if (RTAsn1Integer_UnsignedCompareWithU32(&pCert->TbsCertificate.T0.Version, 3) > 0)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if ( !(pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.fExtKeyUsage & RTCRX509CERT_KEY_USAGE_F_KEY_CERT_SIGN)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync && (pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.fFlags & RTCRX509TBSCERTIFICATE_F_PRESENT_KEY_USAGE) )
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - non-cert-sign: %s\n", szSubject));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return false;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync && !pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.pBasicConstraints->CA.fValue)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - non-CA: %s\n", szSubject));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return false;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if (pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo.SubjectPublicKey.cBits < 256) /* mostly for u64KeyId reading. */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - key too small: %u bits %s\n",
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo.SubjectPublicKey.cBits, szSubject));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return false;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync uint64_t const u64KeyId = pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo.SubjectPublicKey.uBits.pu64[1];
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Whitelist - Array of names and key clues of the certificates we want.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync static struct
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync const char *pszName;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "L=Internet, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Commercial Software Publishers CA" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0x491857ead79dde00), "C=US, O=The Go Daddy Group, Inc., OU=Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "O=Microsoft Trust Network, OU=Microsoft Corporation, OU=Microsoft Time Stamping Service Root, OU=Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp." },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "O=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Time Stamping Service Root, OU=NO LIABILITY ACCEPTED, (c)97 VeriSign, Inc." },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Durbanville, O=Thawte, OU=Thawte Certification, CN=Thawte Timestamping CA" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync /* Additional Windows 8.1 list: */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0x5ad46780fa5df300), "DC=com, DC=microsoft, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0x3be670c1bd02a900), "OU=Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp., OU=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Authority" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0x4d3835aa4180b200), "C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2011" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0x646e3fe3ba08df00), "C=US, O=MSFT, CN=Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Root Authority" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0xece4e4289e08b900), "C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2010" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0x59faf1086271bf00), "C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=GoDaddy.com, Inc., CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0x3d98ab22bb04a300), "C=IE, O=Baltimore, OU=CyberTrust, CN=Baltimore CyberTrust Root" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0x91e3728b8b40d000), "C=GB, ST=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=COMODO CA Limited, CN=COMODO Certification Authority" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0x61a3a33f81aace00), "C=US, ST=UT, L=Salt Lake City, O=The USERTRUST Network, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, CN=UTN-USERFirst-Object" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0x9e5bc2d78b6a3636), "C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Cape Town, O=Thawte Consulting cc, OU=Certification Services Division, CN=Thawte Premium Server CA, Email=premium-server@thawte.com" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0xf4fd306318ccda00), "C=US, O=GeoTrust Inc., CN=GeoTrust Global CA" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0xa0ee62086758b15d), "C=US, O=Equifax, OU=Equifax Secure Certificate Authority" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0x8ff6fc03c1edbd00), "C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., CN=Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0xa3ce8d99e60eda00), "C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, OU=Root CA, CN=GlobalSign Root CA" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0xa671e9fec832b700), "C=US, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., OU=Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0xa8de7211e13be200), "C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Global Root CA" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0x0ff3891b54348328), "C=US, O=Entrust.net, OU=www.entrust.net/CPS incorp. by ref. (limits liab.), OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited, CN=Entrust.netSecure Server Certification Authority" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0x7ae89c50f0b6a00f), "C=US, O=GTE Corporation, OU=GTE CyberTrust Solutions, Inc., CN=GTE CyberTrust Global Root" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0xd45980fbf0a0ac00), "C=US, O=thawte, Inc., OU=Certification Services Division, OU=(c) 2006 thawte, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=thawte Primary Root CA" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0x9e5bc2d78b6a3636), "C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Cape Town, O=Thawte Consulting cc, OU=Certification Services Division, CN=Thawte Premium Server CA, Email=premium-server@thawte.com" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0x7c4fd32ec1b1ce00), "C=PL, O=Unizeto Sp. z o.o., CN=Certum CA" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0xd4fbe673e5ccc600), "C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0x16e64d2a56ccf200), "C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., OU=http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/, CN=Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0x6e2ba21058eedf00), "C=US, ST=UT, L=Salt Lake City, O=The USERTRUST Network, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, CN=UTN - DATACorp SGC" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0xb28612a94b4dad00), "O=Entrust.net, OU=www.entrust.net/CPS_2048 incorp. by ref. (limits liab.), OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited, CN=Entrust.netCertification Authority (2048)" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0x357a29080824af00), "C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=(c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=VeriSign Class3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0x466cbc09db88c100), "C=IL, O=StartCom Ltd., OU=Secure Digital Certificate Signing, CN=StartCom Certification Authority" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0x9259c8abe5ca713a), "L=ValiCert Validation Network, O=ValiCert, Inc., OU=ValiCert Class 2 Policy Validation Authority, CN=http://www.valicert.com/, Email=info@valicert.com" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0x1f78fc529cbacb00), "C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=(c) 1999 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=VeriSign Class3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G3" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0x8043e4ce150ead00), "C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Assured ID Root CA" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0x00f2e6331af7b700), "C=SE, O=AddTrust AB, OU=AddTrust External TTP Network, CN=AddTrust External CA Root" },
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync while (i-- > 0)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if (RTCrX509Name_MatchWithString(&pCert->TbsCertificate.Subject, s_aWanted[i].pszName))
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: Adding %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return true;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return false;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Blacklist approach.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync static struct
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync const char *pszName;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync { UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "C=US, O=U.S. Robots and Mechanical Men, Inc., OU=V.I.K.I." }, /* dummy entry */
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync while (i-- > 0)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if (RTCrX509Name_MatchWithString(&pCert->TbsCertificate.Subject, s_aUnwanted[i].pszName))
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - blacklisted: %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return false;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: Adding %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject));
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync return true;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Loads a module in the system32 directory.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @returns Module handle on success. Won't return on faliure.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * @param pszName The name of the DLL to load.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncDECLHIDDEN(HMODULE) supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll(const char *pszName)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync UINT cwcDir = GetSystemDirectoryW(wszName, RT_ELEMENTS(wszName) - 60);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync RTUtf16CopyAscii(&wszName[cwcDir + 1], RT_ELEMENTS(wszName) - cwcDir, pszName);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0))
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync HMODULE hMod = LoadLibraryExW(wszName, NULL, fFlags);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync && RtlGetLastWin32Error() == ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync supR3HardenedFatal("Error loading '%s': %u [%ls]", pszName, RtlGetLastWin32Error(), wszName);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Called by supR3HardenedWinResolveVerifyTrustApiAndHookThreadCreation to
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * import selected root CAs from the system certificate store.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * These certificates permits us to correctly validate third party DLLs.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsyncstatic void supR3HardenedWinRetrieveTrustedRootCAs(void)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Load crypt32.dll and resolve the APIs we need.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync HMODULE hCrypt32 = supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll("crypt32.dll");
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync a_pfnType pfn##a_Name = (a_pfnType)GetProcAddress(hCrypt32, #a_Name); \
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if (pfn##a_Name == NULL) supR3HardenedFatal("Error locating '" #a_Name "' in 'crypt32.dll': %u", RtlGetLastWin32Error())
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(CertOpenStore, PFNCERTOPENSTORE);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(CertCloseStore, PFNCERTCLOSESTORE);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(CertEnumCertificatesInStore, PFNCERTENUMCERTIFICATESINSTORE);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync * Open the root store and look for the certificates we wish to use.
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync DWORD fOpenStore = CERT_STORE_OPEN_EXISTING_FLAG | CERT_STORE_READONLY_FLAG;
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync HCERTSTORE hStore = pfnCertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W, PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING | X509_ASN_ENCODING,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync NULL /* hCryptProv = default */, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE | fOpenStore, L"Root");
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync hStore = pfnCertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W, PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING | X509_ASN_ENCODING,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync NULL /* hCryptProv = default */, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER | fOpenStore, L"Root");
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync while ((pCurCtx = pfnCertEnumCertificatesInStore(hStore, pCurCtx)) != NULL)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync if (pCurCtx->dwCertEncodingType & X509_ASN_ENCODING)
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync RTAsn1CursorInitPrimary(&PrimaryCursor, pCurCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCurCtx->cbCertEncoded,
fd658895339cb48b2ba581b1a1141aea39009ff7vboxsync &g_RTAsn1DefaultAllocator, RTASN1CURSOR_FLAGS_DER, "CurCtx");
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync int rc = RTCrX509Certificate_DecodeAsn1(&PrimaryCursor.Cursor, 0, &MyCert, "Cert");
fd658895339cb48b2ba581b1a1141aea39009ff7vboxsync rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(g_hSpcRootStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_X509_DER,
fd658895339cb48b2ba581b1a1141aea39009ff7vboxsync pCurCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCurCtx->cbCertEncoded, NULL /*pErrInfo*/);
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_X509_DER,
13493ab7596e827b8d0caab2c89e635dd65f78f9vboxsync pCurCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCurCtx->cbCertEncoded, NULL /*pErrInfo*/);
g_fHaveOtherRoots = true;
DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedWinResolveVerifyTrustApiAndHookThreadCreation(const char *pszProgName)
# ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust = (PFNWINVERIFYTRUST)GetProcAddress(hWintrust, "WinVerifyTrust");
if (!pfnWinVerifyTrust)
supR3HardenedFatal("Error locating 'WinVerifyTrust' in 'Wintrust.dll': %u", RtlGetLastWin32Error());
RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2, PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE2, SUP_NT_VER_W80);
# ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0)) /* ntdll isn't signed on XP, assuming this is the case on W2K3 for now. */
supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(NULL, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\ntdll.dll", 0, NULL, pfnWinVerifyTrust);
supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(NULL, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\ntdll.dll", 0, NULL, pfnWinVerifyTrust);
# ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
return VERR_FILENAME_TOO_LONG;
memcpy(&pwszWinPathBuf[sizeof(s_wszPrefix) / sizeof(RTUTF16) - 1], pwszNtName, (cwcNtName + 1) * sizeof(RTUTF16));
return VINF_SUCCESS;
static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
int rc = supR3HardNtViNtToWinPath(pwszName, &pwszWinPath, wszWinPathBuf, RT_ELEMENTS(wszWinPathBuf));
return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "Bad path passed to supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust: rc=%Rrc '%ls'", rc, pwszName);
# ifdef DEBUG_bird
__debugbreak();
switch (hrc)
if (pszErrConst)
return rc;
static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
int rc = supR3HardNtViNtToWinPath(pwszName, &pwszWinPath, wszWinPathBuf, RT_ELEMENTS(wszWinPathBuf));
return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "Bad path passed to supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: rc=%Rrc '%ls'", rc, pwszName);
InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/);
&ObjAttr,
&Ios,
} s_aHashes[] =
bool fTryNextPolicy;
fTryNextPolicy = false;
bool fFreshContext = false;
if (hCatAdmin)
fFreshContext = false;
fFreshContext = true;
fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2(&hCatAdmin, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], s_aHashes[i].pszAlgorithm,
if (fRc)
if (fRc)
int rc2 = RTUtf16PrintHexBytes(wszDigest, RT_ELEMENTS(wszDigest), abHash, cbHash, RTSTRPRINTHEXBYTES_F_UPPER);
SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: cbHash=%u wszDigest=%ls\n", cbHash, wszDigest));
HCATINFO hCatInfo = g_pfnCryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash(hCatAdmin, abHash, cbHash, 0, &hCatInfoPrev);
if (!hCatInfo)
if (!fFreshContext)
SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: Retrying with fresh context (CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash -> %u; iCat=%#x)\n", RtlGetLastWin32Error(), iCat));
goto l_fresh_context;
if (iCat == 0)
SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash failed ERRROR_NOT_FOUND (%u)\n", ulErr));
else if (iCat == 0)
SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash failed %u\n", ulErr));
SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: WinVerifyTrust => %#x; cat='%ls'; file='%ls'\n",
iCat++;
AssertFailed();
AssertFailed();
iPolicy++;
} while ( fTryNextPolicy
bool fCoreSystemDll = false;
if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcOther, true /*fCheckSlash*/))
&& !fCoreSystemDll)
return rc;
DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageTrust(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, int rc,
if (pfWinVerifyTrust)
*pfWinVerifyTrust = false;
bool fNoRecursion;
if (fNoRecursion)
if (fNoRecursion)
if (pfWinVerifyTrust)
*pfWinVerifyTrust = true;
int rc2 = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo, g_pfnWinVerifyTrust);
AssertFailed();
return rc;