/***
This file is part of systemd.
Copyright 2014 Lennart Poettering
under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
Lesser General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
***/
#include <sd-messages.h>
#include "af-list.h"
#include "alloc-util.h"
#include "dns-domain.h"
#include "errno-list.h"
#include "fd-util.h"
#include "random-util.h"
#include "resolved-dns-cache.h"
#include "resolved-dns-transaction.h"
#include "resolved-llmnr.h"
#include "string-table.h"
assert(t);
t->answer_rcode = 0;
t->answer_authenticated = false;
t->answer_errno = 0;
}
DnsTransaction *z;
assert(t);
while ((z = set_steal_first(t->dnssec_transactions))) {
set_remove(z->notify_transactions, t);
}
}
assert(t);
}
assert(t);
}
DnsZoneItem *i;
DnsTransaction *z;
if (!t)
return NULL;
dns_packet_unref(t->sent);
dns_server_unref(t->server);
if (t->scope) {
if (t->id != 0)
}
while ((c = set_steal_first(t->notify_query_candidates)))
set_remove(c->transactions, t);
while ((i = set_steal_first(t->notify_zone_items)))
i->probe_transaction = NULL;
while ((z = set_steal_first(t->notify_transactions)))
set_remove(z->dnssec_transactions, t);
free(t->key_string);
free(t);
return NULL;
}
assert(t);
if (t->block_gc > 0)
return true;
if (set_isempty(t->notify_query_candidates) &&
set_isempty(t->notify_zone_items) &&
set_isempty(t->notify_transactions)) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
/* Find a fresh, unused transaction id. Note that this loop is bounded because there's a limit on the number of
* transactions, and it's much lower than the space of IDs. */
do
while (new_id == 0 ||
return new_id;
}
int r;
assert(s);
/* Don't allow looking up invalid or pseudo RRs */
return -EINVAL;
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* We only support the IN class */
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return -EBUSY;
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (!t)
return -ENOMEM;
t->dns_udp_fd = -1;
if (r < 0) {
t->id = 0;
return r;
}
if (r < 0) {
return r;
}
t->scope = s;
s->manager->n_transactions_total ++;
if (ret)
*ret = t;
t = NULL;
return 0;
}
assert(t);
/* Pick a new ID for this transaction. */
assert_se(hashmap_remove_and_put(t->scope->manager->dns_transactions, UINT_TO_PTR(t->id), UINT_TO_PTR(new_id), t) >= 0);
/* Make sure we generate a new packet with the new ID */
}
DnsZoneItem *z;
assert(t);
assert(p);
return;
t->id,
pretty);
/* RFC 4795, Section 4.1 says that the peer with the
* lexicographically smaller IP address loses */
log_debug("Peer has lexicographically larger IP address and thus lost in the conflict.");
return;
}
log_debug("We have the lexicographically larger IP address and thus lost in the conflict.");
t->block_gc++;
while ((z = set_first(t->notify_zone_items))) {
/* First, make sure the zone item drops the reference
* to us */
/* Secondly, report this as conflict, so that we might
* look for a different hostname */
}
t->block_gc--;
}
DnsZoneItem *z;
DnsTransaction *d;
Iterator i;
const char *st;
assert(t);
if (state == DNS_TRANSACTION_DNSSEC_FAILED)
LOG_MESSAGE("DNSSEC validation failed for question %s: %s", dns_transaction_key_string(t), dnssec_result_to_string(t->answer_dnssec_result)),
"DNS_QUESTION=%s", dns_transaction_key_string(t),
"DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL=%s", dns_server_feature_level_to_string(t->server->possible_feature_level),
NULL);
/* Note that this call might invalidate the query. Callers
* should hence not attempt to access the query or transaction
* after calling this function. */
if (state == DNS_TRANSACTION_ERRNO)
else
log_debug("Transaction %" PRIu16 " for <%s> on scope %s on %s/%s now complete with <%s> from %s (%s).",
t->id,
st,
/* Notify all queries that are interested, but make sure the
* transaction isn't freed while we are still looking at it */
t->block_gc++;
SET_FOREACH(c, t->notify_query_candidates, i)
SET_FOREACH(z, t->notify_zone_items, i)
if (!set_isempty(t->notify_transactions)) {
unsigned j, n = 0;
/* We need to be careful when notifying other
* transactions, as that might destroy other
* transactions in our list. Hence, in order to be
* able to safely iterate through the list of
* transactions, take a GC lock on all of them
* first. Then, in a second loop, notify them, but
* first unlock that specific transaction. */
SET_FOREACH(d, t->notify_transactions, i) {
nt[n++] = d;
d->block_gc++;
}
for (j = 0; j < n; j++) {
dns_transaction_notify(nt[j], t);
dns_transaction_gc(nt[j]);
}
}
t->block_gc--;
}
assert(t);
if (!server)
return -ESRCH;
return 0;
dns_server_unref(t->server);
return 1;
}
int r;
assert(t);
/* Before we try again, switch to a new server. */
r = dns_transaction_go(t);
if (r < 0) {
t->answer_errno = -r;
}
}
assert(t);
if (!t->server)
return 0;
return 0;
/* The server's current feature level is lower than when we sent the original query. We learnt something from
the response or possibly an auxiliary DNSSEC response that we didn't know before. We take that as reason to
restart the whole transaction. This is a good idea to deal with servers that respond rubbish if we include
OPT RR or DO bit. One of these cases is documented here, for example:
log_debug("Server feature level is now lower than when we began our transaction. Restarting with new ID.");
return dns_transaction_go(t);
}
DnsTransaction *t;
assert(s);
assert(s->transaction);
/* Copy the data we care about out of the stream before we
* destroy it. */
t = s->transaction;
p = dns_packet_ref(s->read_packet);
if (ERRNO_IS_DISCONNECT(error)) {
* question on this scope. */
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
if (error != 0) {
t->answer_errno = error;
return 0;
}
if (dns_packet_validate_reply(p) <= 0) {
log_debug("Invalid TCP reply packet.");
return 0;
}
dns_scope_check_conflicts(t->scope, p);
t->block_gc++;
t->block_gc--;
/* If the response wasn't useful, then complete the transition
* now. After all, we are the worst feature set now with TCP
* sockets, and there's really no point in retrying. */
if (t->state == DNS_TRANSACTION_PENDING)
else
return 0;
}
int r;
assert(t);
case DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS:
r = dns_transaction_pick_server(t);
if (r < 0)
return r;
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (r < 0)
return r;
break;
case DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR:
/* When we already received a reply to this (but it was truncated), send to its sender address */
if (t->received)
fd = dns_scope_socket_tcp(t->scope, t->received->family, &t->received->sender, NULL, t->received->sender_port);
else {
/* Otherwise, try to talk to the owner of a
* the IP address, in case this is a reverse
* PTR lookup */
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
return -EINVAL;
return -ESRCH;
}
break;
default:
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
if (fd < 0)
return fd;
if (r < 0)
return r;
fd = -1;
if (r < 0) {
return r;
}
t->stream->transaction = t;
/* The interface index is difficult to determine if we are
* connecting to the local host, hence fill this in right away
* instead of determining it from the socket */
t->tried_stream = true;
return 0;
}
assert(t);
/* For mDNS we cache whenever we get the packet, rather than
* in each transaction. */
return;
/* We never cache if this packet is from the local host, under
* the assumption that a locally running DNS server would
* cache this anyway, and probably knows better when to flush
* the cache then we could. */
if (!DNS_PACKET_SHALL_CACHE(t->received))
return;
t->key,
t->answer_rcode,
t->answer,
t->answer_nsec_ttl,
0,
}
Iterator i;
assert(t);
return true;
return false;
}
Iterator i;
assert(t);
/* Checks whether the auxiliary DNSSEC transactions of our transaction have completed, or are still
* ongoing. Returns 0, if we aren't ready for the DNSSEC validation, positive if we are. */
case DNS_TRANSACTION_NULL:
case DNS_TRANSACTION_PENDING:
/* Still ongoing */
return 0;
log_debug("Auxiliary DNSSEC RR query failed with rcode=%s.", dns_rcode_to_string(dt->answer_rcode));
goto fail;
}
/* Fall-through: NXDOMAIN is good enough for us. This is because some DNS servers erronously
* return NXDOMAIN for empty non-terminals (Akamai...), and we need to handle that nicely, when
* asking for parent SOA or similar RRs to make unsigned proofs. */
case DNS_TRANSACTION_SUCCESS:
/* All good. */
break;
/* We handle DNSSEC failures different from other errors, as we care about the DNSSEC
* validationr result */
log_debug("Auxiliary DNSSEC RR query failed validation: %s", dnssec_result_to_string(dt->answer_dnssec_result));
return 0;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
/* All is ready, we can go and validate */
return 1;
fail:
return 0;
}
int r;
assert(t);
/* Are there ongoing DNSSEC transactions? If so, let's wait for them. */
r = dns_transaction_dnssec_ready(t);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
if (r == 0) /* We aren't ready yet (or one of our auxiliary transactions failed, and we shouldn't validate now */
return;
/* See if we learnt things from the additional DNSSEC transactions, that we didn't know before, and better
* restart the lookup immediately. */
r = dns_transaction_maybe_restart(t);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
if (r > 0) /* Transaction got restarted... */
return;
/* All our auxiliary DNSSEC transactions are complete now. Try
* to validate our RRset now. */
r = dns_transaction_validate_dnssec(t);
if (r == -EBADMSG) {
return;
}
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
if (t->answer_dnssec_result == DNSSEC_INCOMPATIBLE_SERVER &&
/* We are not in automatic downgrade mode, and the
* server is bad, refuse operation. */
return;
}
if (!IN_SET(t->answer_dnssec_result,
_DNSSEC_RESULT_INVALID, /* No DNSSEC validation enabled */
DNSSEC_VALIDATED, /* Answer is signed and validated successfully */
DNSSEC_UNSIGNED, /* Answer is right-fully unsigned */
DNSSEC_INCOMPATIBLE_SERVER)) { /* Server does not do DNSSEC (Yay, we are downgrade attack vulnerable!) */
return;
}
if (t->answer_dnssec_result == DNSSEC_INCOMPATIBLE_SERVER)
if (t->answer_rcode == DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS)
else
return;
fail:
t->answer_errno = -r;
}
int r;
assert(t);
/* Checks whether the answer is positive, i.e. either a direct
if (r != 0)
return r;
if (r != 0)
return r;
return false;
}
int r;
assert(t);
/* Fix up the RCODE to SUCCESS if we get at least one matching RR in a response. Note that this contradicts the
* DNS RFCs a bit. Specifically, RFC 6604 Section 3 clarifies that the RCODE shall say something about a
* CNAME/DNAME chain element coming after the last chain element contained in the message, and not the first
* one included. However, it also indicates that not all DNS servers implement this correctly. Moreover, when
* using DNSSEC we usually only can prove the first element of a CNAME/DNAME chain anyway, hence let's settle
* on always processing the RCODE as referring to the immediate look-up we do, i.e. the first element of a
* incorrectly implements RCODE, whether DNSSEC is in use, or whether the DNS server only supplied us with an
*
* Or in other words: if we get at least one positive reply in a message we patch NXDOMAIN to become SUCCESS,
* and then rely on the CNAME chasing logic to figure out that there's actually a CNAME error with a new
* lookup. */
if (t->answer_rcode != DNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN)
return 0;
r = dns_transaction_has_positive_answer(t, NULL);
if (r <= 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
int r;
assert(t);
assert(p);
if (t->state != DNS_TRANSACTION_PENDING)
return;
/* Note that this call might invalidate the query. Callers
* should hence not attempt to access the query or transaction
* after calling this function. */
case DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR:
/* For LLMNR we will not accept any packets from other
* interfaces */
return;
return;
/* Tentative packets are not full responses but still
* useful for identifying uniqueness conflicts during
* probing. */
if (DNS_PACKET_LLMNR_T(p)) {
dns_transaction_tentative(t, p);
return;
}
break;
case DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS:
/* For mDNS we will not accept any packets from other interfaces */
return;
return;
break;
case DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS:
/* Note that we do not need to verify the
* invoked connect() on our UDP socket in which case
* the kernel already does the needed verification for
* us. */
break;
default:
assert_not_reached("Invalid DNS protocol.");
}
if (t->received != p) {
dns_packet_unref(t->received);
t->received = dns_packet_ref(p);
}
if (p->ipproto == IPPROTO_TCP) {
if (DNS_PACKET_TC(p)) {
/* Truncated via TCP? Somebody must be fucking with us */
return;
}
if (DNS_PACKET_ID(p) != t->id) {
/* Not the reply to our query? Somebody must be fucking with us */
return;
}
}
case DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS:
/* Request failed, immediately try again with reduced features */
return;
} else if (DNS_PACKET_TC(p))
break;
case DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR:
case DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS:
break;
default:
assert_not_reached("Invalid DNS protocol.");
}
if (DNS_PACKET_TC(p)) {
/* Truncated packets for mDNS are not allowed. Give up immediately. */
return;
}
log_debug("Reply truncated, retrying via TCP.");
/* Response was truncated, let's try again with good old TCP */
r = dns_transaction_open_tcp(t);
if (r == -ESRCH) {
/* No servers found? Damn! */
return;
}
if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
/* Tried to ask for DNSSEC RRs, on a server that doesn't do DNSSEC */
return;
}
if (r < 0) {
/* On LLMNR, if we cannot connect to the host,
* we immediately give up */
goto fail;
/* On DNS, couldn't send? Try immediately again, with a new server */
}
return;
}
/* After the superficial checks, actually parse the message. */
r = dns_packet_extract(p);
if (r < 0) {
return;
}
/* Report that the OPT RR was missing */
if (t->server) {
if (!p->opt)
dns_server_packet_received(t->server, p->ipproto, t->current_feature_level, ts - t->start_usec, p->size);
}
/* See if we know things we didn't know before that indicate we better restart the lookup immediately. */
r = dns_transaction_maybe_restart(t);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
if (r > 0) /* Transaction got restarted... */
return;
/* Only consider responses with equivalent query section to the request */
r = dns_packet_is_reply_for(p, t->key);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
if (r == 0) {
return;
}
/* Install the answer as answer to the transaction */
dns_answer_unref(t->answer);
t->answer_rcode = DNS_PACKET_RCODE(p);
t->answer_authenticated = false;
r = dns_transaction_fix_rcode(t);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
/* Block GC while starting requests for additional DNSSEC RRs */
t->block_gc++;
t->block_gc--;
/* Maybe the transaction is ready for GC'ing now? If so, free it and return. */
if (!dns_transaction_gc(t))
return;
/* Requesting additional keys might have resulted in
* this transaction to fail, since the auxiliary
* request failed for some reason. If so, we are not
* in pending state anymore, and we should exit
* quickly. */
if (t->state != DNS_TRANSACTION_PENDING)
return;
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
if (r > 0) {
/* There are DNSSEC transactions pending now. Update the state accordingly. */
return;
}
}
return;
fail:
t->answer_errno = -r;
}
DnsTransaction *t = userdata;
int r;
assert(t);
if (ERRNO_IS_DISCONNECT(-r)) {
/* UDP connection failure get reported via ICMP and then are possible delivered to us on the next
* recvmsg(). Treat this like a lost packet. */
log_debug_errno(r, "Connection failure for DNS UDP packet: %m");
return 0;
}
if (r < 0) {
t->answer_errno = -r;
return 0;
}
r = dns_packet_validate_reply(p);
if (r < 0) {
log_debug_errno(r, "Received invalid DNS packet as response, ignoring: %m");
return 0;
}
if (r == 0) {
log_debug("Received inappropriate DNS packet as response, ignoring.");
return 0;
}
if (DNS_PACKET_ID(p) != t->id) {
log_debug("Received packet with incorrect transaction ID, ignoring.");
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
int r;
assert(t);
r = dns_transaction_pick_server(t);
if (r < 0)
return r;
return -EAGAIN;
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (r > 0 || t->dns_udp_fd < 0) { /* Server changed, or no connection yet. */
int fd;
if (fd < 0)
return fd;
r = sd_event_add_io(t->scope->manager->event, &t->dns_udp_event_source, fd, EPOLLIN, on_dns_packet, t);
if (r < 0) {
safe_close(fd);
return r;
}
t->dns_udp_fd = fd;
}
if (r < 0)
return r;
} else
if (r < 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
DnsTransaction *t = userdata;
assert(s);
assert(t);
if (!t->initial_jitter_scheduled || t->initial_jitter_elapsed) {
/* Timeout reached? Increase the timeout for the server used */
case DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS:
dns_server_packet_lost(t->server, t->stream ? IPPROTO_TCP : IPPROTO_UDP, t->current_feature_level, usec - t->start_usec);
break;
case DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR:
case DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS:
break;
default:
assert_not_reached("Invalid DNS protocol.");
}
if (t->initial_jitter_scheduled)
t->initial_jitter_elapsed = true;
}
return 0;
}
assert(t);
case DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS:
return t->server->resend_timeout;
case DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS:
assert(t->n_attempts > 0);
case DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR:
return t->scope->resend_timeout;
default:
assert_not_reached("Invalid DNS protocol.");
}
}
int r;
assert(t);
r = dns_scope_network_good(t->scope);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0) {
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
/* If we already tried via a stream, then we don't
* retry on LLMNR. See RFC 4795, Section 2.7. */
return 0;
}
t->n_attempts++;
t->start_usec = ts;
/* Check the trust anchor. Do so only on classic DNS, since DNSSEC does not apply otherwise. */
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0) {
t->answer_authenticated = true;
return 0;
}
/* Hmm, this is a request for the root DS? A
* DS RR doesn't exist in the root zone, and
* if our trust anchor didn't know it either,
* this means we cannot do any DNSSEC logic
* anymore. */
/* We are in downgrade mode. In this
* case, synthesize an unsigned empty
* response, so that the any lookup
* depending on this one can continue
* assuming there was no DS, and hence
* the root zone was unsigned. */
t->answer_authenticated = false;
} else
/* If we are not in downgrade mode,
* then fail the lookup, because we
* cannot reasonably answer it. There
* might be DS RRs, but we don't know
* them, and the DNS server won't tell
* them to us (and even if it would,
* we couldn't validate it and trust
* it). */
return 0;
}
}
/* Check the zone, but only if this transaction is not used
* for probing or verifying a zone item. */
if (set_isempty(t->notify_zone_items)) {
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0) {
t->answer_authenticated = true;
return 0;
}
}
/* Check the cache, but only if this transaction is not used
* for probing or verifying a zone item. */
if (set_isempty(t->notify_zone_items)) {
/* Before trying the cache, let's make sure we figured out a
* server to use. Should this cause a change of server this
* might flush the cache. */
/* Let's then prune all outdated entries */
r = dns_cache_lookup(&t->scope->cache, t->key, &t->answer_rcode, &t->answer, &t->answer_authenticated);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0) {
if (t->answer_rcode == DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS)
else
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
bool add_known_answers = false;
unsigned qdcount;
int r;
assert(t);
/* Discard any previously prepared packet, so we can start over and coalesce again */
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r < 0)
return r;
qdcount = 1;
if (dns_key_is_shared(t->key))
add_known_answers = true;
/*
* For mDNS, we want to coalesce as many open queries in pending transactions into one single
* query packet on the wire as possible. To achieve that, we iterate through all pending transactions
* in our current scope, and see whether their timing contraints allow them to be sent.
*/
/* Skip ourselves */
if (other == t)
continue;
continue;
continue;
if (qdcount >= UINT16_MAX)
break;
/*
* If we can't stuff more questions into the packet, just give up.
* One of the 'other' transactions will fire later and take care of the rest.
*/
if (r == -EMSGSIZE)
break;
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r <= 0)
continue;
r = sd_event_add_time(
ts, 0,
if (r < 0)
return r;
qdcount ++;
add_known_answers = true;
}
/* Append known answer section if we're asking for any shared record */
if (add_known_answers) {
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
t->sent = p;
p = NULL;
return 0;
}
int r;
assert(t);
return dns_transaction_make_packet_mdns(t);
if (t->sent)
return 0;
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r < 0)
return r;
t->sent = p;
p = NULL;
return 0;
}
int r;
assert(t);
r = dns_transaction_prepare(t, ts);
if (r <= 0)
return r;
t->id,
if (!t->initial_jitter_scheduled &&
/* RFC 4795 Section 2.7 suggests all queries should be
* delayed by a random time from 0 to JITTER_INTERVAL. */
t->initial_jitter_scheduled = true;
case DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR:
break;
case DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS:
break;
default:
assert_not_reached("bad protocol");
}
r = sd_event_add_time(
&t->timeout_event_source,
if (r < 0)
return r;
t->n_attempts = 0;
t->next_attempt_after = ts;
t->state = DNS_TRANSACTION_PENDING;
log_debug("Delaying %s transaction for " USEC_FMT "us.", dns_protocol_to_string(t->scope->protocol), jitter);
return 0;
}
/* Otherwise, we need to ask the network */
r = dns_transaction_make_packet(t);
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* RFC 4795, Section 2.4. says reverse lookups shall
* always be made via TCP on LLMNR */
r = dns_transaction_open_tcp(t);
} else {
/* Try via UDP, and if that fails due to large size or lack of
* support try via TCP */
r = dns_transaction_emit_udp(t);
if (r == -EMSGSIZE)
log_debug("Sending query via TCP since it is too large.");
if (r == -EAGAIN)
log_debug("Sending query via TCP since server doesn't support UDP.");
r = dns_transaction_open_tcp(t);
}
if (r == -ESRCH) {
/* No servers to send this to? */
return 0;
}
if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
/* Tried to ask for DNSSEC RRs, on a server that doesn't do DNSSEC */
return 0;
}
/* On LLMNR, if we cannot connect to a host via TCP when doing reverse lookups. This means we cannot
* answer this request with this protocol. */
return 0;
}
if (r < 0) {
return r;
/* Couldn't send? Try immediately again, with a new server */
return dns_transaction_go(t);
}
ts += transaction_get_resend_timeout(t);
r = sd_event_add_time(
&t->timeout_event_source,
ts, 0,
if (r < 0)
return r;
t->state = DNS_TRANSACTION_PENDING;
t->next_attempt_after = ts;
return 1;
}
DnsTransaction *n;
Iterator i;
int r;
assert(t);
/* Try to find cyclic dependencies between transaction objects */
if (t == aux)
return 1;
r = dns_transaction_find_cyclic(t, n);
if (r != 0)
return r;
}
return 0;
}
static int dns_transaction_add_dnssec_transaction(DnsTransaction *t, DnsResourceKey *key, DnsTransaction **ret) {
int r;
assert(t);
if (!aux) {
if (r < 0)
return r;
} else {
return 0;
}
r = dns_transaction_find_cyclic(t, aux);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0) {
log_debug("Detected potential cyclic dependency, refusing to add transaction %" PRIu16 " (%s) as dependency for %" PRIu16 " (%s).",
t->id,
return -ELOOP;
}
}
if (r < 0)
goto gc;
if (r < 0)
goto gc;
if (r < 0)
goto gc;
if (r < 0) {
goto gc;
}
return 1;
gc:
return r;
}
int r;
assert(t);
/* Try to get the data from the trust anchor */
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0) {
r = dns_answer_extend(&t->validated_keys, a);
if (r < 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
if (r == -ELOOP) /* This would result in a cyclic dependency */
return 0;
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = dns_transaction_go(aux);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
return 1;
}
int r;
assert(t);
/* Check whether the specified name is in the the NTA
* database, either in the global one, or the link-local
* one. */
if (r != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
int r;
assert(t);
* RRs to prove it */
r = dns_transaction_has_positive_answer(t, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0)
return false;
/* Is this key explicitly listed as a negative trust anchor?
* If so, it's nothing we need to care about */
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0)
return false;
/* The answer does not contain any RRs that match to the
* included. If not, the answer is unsigned. */
r = dns_answer_contains_nsec_or_nsec3(t->answer);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0)
return false;
return true;
}
int r;
assert(t);
/* Check if the specified RR is the "primary" response,
* i.e. either matches the question precisely or is a
if (r != 0)
return r;
}
assert(t);
/* Checks whether our transaction's DNS server is assumed to be compatible with DNSSEC. Returns false as soon
* as we changed our mind about a server, and now believe it is incompatible with DNSSEC. */
return false;
/* If we have picked no server, then we are working from the cache or some other source, and DNSSEC might well
* be supported, hence return true. */
if (!t->server)
return true;
return false;
return dns_server_dnssec_supported(t->server);
}
Iterator i;
assert(t);
/* Checks whether our transaction our any of the auxiliary transactions couldn't do DNSSEC. */
if (!dns_transaction_dnssec_supported(t))
return false;
return false;
return true;
}
int r;
assert(t);
/*
* Retrieve all auxiliary RRs for the answer we got, so that
* we can verify signatures or prove that RRs are rightfully
* unsigned. Specifically:
*
* - For RRSIG we get the matching DNSKEY
* - For DNSKEY we get the matching DS
* - For other unsigned RRs we get the matching SOA RR
*/
return 0;
if (t->answer_source != DNS_TRANSACTION_NETWORK)
return 0; /* We only need to validate stuff from the network */
if (!dns_transaction_dnssec_supported(t))
return 0; /* If we can't do DNSSEC anyway there's no point in geting the auxiliary RRs */
continue;
/* If this RR is in the negative trust anchor, we don't need to validate it. */
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0)
continue;
case DNS_TYPE_RRSIG: {
/* For each RRSIG we request the matching DNSKEY */
/* If this RRSIG is about a DNSKEY RR and the
* signer is the same as the owner, then we
* already have the DNSKEY, and we don't have
* to look for more. */
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0)
continue;
}
/* If the signer is not a parent of our
* original query, then this is about an
* auxiliary RRset, but not anything we asked
* for. In this case we aren't interested,
* because we don't want to request additional
* RRs for stuff we didn't really ask for, and
* also to avoid request loops, where
* additional RRs from one transaction result
* in another transaction whose additonal RRs
* point back to the original transaction, and
* we deadlock. */
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
continue;
if (!dnskey)
return -ENOMEM;
log_debug("Requesting DNSKEY to validate transaction %" PRIu16" (%s, RRSIG with key tag: %" PRIu16 ").", t->id, DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), rr->rrsig.key_tag);
r = dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr(t, dnskey);
if (r < 0)
return r;
break;
}
case DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY: {
/* For each DNSKEY we request the matching DS */
/* If the DNSKEY we are looking at is not for
* zone we are interested in, nor any of its
* parents, we aren't interested, and don't
* request it. After all, we don't want to end
* up in request loops, and want to keep
* additional traffic down. */
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
continue;
if (!ds)
return -ENOMEM;
log_debug("Requesting DS to validate transaction %" PRIu16" (%s, DNSKEY with key tag: %" PRIu16 ").", t->id, DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), dnssec_keytag(rr, false));
r = dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr(t, ds);
if (r < 0)
return r;
break;
}
case DNS_TYPE_SOA:
case DNS_TYPE_NS: {
/* For an unsigned SOA or NS, try to acquire
* the matching DS RR, as we are at a zone cut
* then, and whether a DS exists tells us
* whether the zone is signed. Do so only if
* this RR matches our original question,
* however. */
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
continue;
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0)
continue;
if (!ds)
return -ENOMEM;
log_debug("Requesting DS to validate transaction %" PRIu16 " (%s, unsigned SOA/NS RRset).", t->id, DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key));
r = dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr(t, ds);
if (r < 0)
return r;
break;
}
case DNS_TYPE_DS:
case DNS_TYPE_CNAME:
case DNS_TYPE_DNAME: {
const char *name;
/* CNAMEs and DNAMEs cannot be located at a
* zone apex, hence ask for the parent SOA for
* apex. But do all that only if this is
* actually a response to our original
* question.
*
* Similar for DS RRs, which are signed when
* the parent SOA is signed. */
r = dns_transaction_is_primary_response(t, rr);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
continue;
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0)
continue;
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0)
continue;
r = dns_name_parent(&name);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
continue;
if (!soa)
return -ENOMEM;
log_debug("Requesting parent SOA to validate transaction %" PRIu16 " (%s, unsigned CNAME/DNAME/DS RRset).", t->id, DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key));
r = dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr(t, soa);
if (r < 0)
return r;
break;
}
default: {
/* For other unsigned RRsets (including
* unsigned, by requesting the SOA RR of the
* zone. However, do so only if they are
* directly relevant to our original
* question. */
r = dns_transaction_is_primary_response(t, rr);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
continue;
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0)
continue;
if (!soa)
return -ENOMEM;
log_debug("Requesting SOA to validate transaction %" PRIu16 " (%s, unsigned non-SOA/NS RRset <%s>).", t->id, DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), dns_resource_record_to_string(rr));
r = dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr(t, soa);
if (r < 0)
return r;
break;
}}
}
/* Above, we requested everything necessary to validate what
* we got. Now, let's request what we need to validate what we
* didn't get... */
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0) {
const char *name;
/* If this was a SOA or NS request, then this
* indicates that we are not at a zone apex, hence ask
* the parent name instead. If this was a DS request,
* then it's signed when the parent zone is signed,
* hence ask the parent in that case, too. */
r = dns_name_parent(&name);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0)
log_debug("Requesting parent SOA to validate transaction %" PRIu16 " (%s, unsigned empty SOA/NS/DS response).", t->id, DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(t->key));
else
} else
log_debug("Requesting SOA to validate transaction %" PRIu16 " (%s, unsigned empty non-SOA/NS/DS response).", t->id, DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(t->key));
if (name) {
if (!soa)
return -ENOMEM;
r = dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr(t, soa);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
}
return dns_transaction_dnssec_is_live(t);
}
assert(t);
/* Invoked whenever any of our auxiliary DNSSEC transactions completed its work. If the state is still PENDING,
we are still in the loop that adds further DNSSEC transactions, hence don't check if we are ready yet. If
the state is VALIDATING however, we should check if we are complete now. */
if (t->state == DNS_TRANSACTION_VALIDATING)
}
int ifindex, r;
assert(t);
/* Add all DNSKEY RRs from the answer that are validated by DS
* RRs from the list of validated keys to the list of
* validated keys. */
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
continue;
/* If so, the DNSKEY is validated too. */
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
return 0;
}
int r;
assert(t);
/* Checks if the RR we are looking for must be signed with an
* RRSIG. This is used for positive responses. */
return false;
return -EINVAL;
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0)
return false;
case DNS_TYPE_RRSIG:
/* RRSIGs are the signatures themselves, they need no signing. */
return false;
case DNS_TYPE_SOA:
case DNS_TYPE_NS: {
Iterator i;
/* For SOA or NS RRs we look for a matching DS transaction */
continue;
continue;
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
continue;
* RRs we are looking at. If it discovered signed DS
* RRs, then we need to be signed, too. */
if (!dt->answer_authenticated)
return false;
}
/* We found nothing that proves this is safe to leave
* this unauthenticated, hence ask inist on
* authentication. */
return true;
}
case DNS_TYPE_DS:
case DNS_TYPE_CNAME:
case DNS_TYPE_DNAME: {
Iterator i;
/*
*
* DS RRs are signed if the parent is signed, hence also look at the parent SOA
*/
continue;
continue;
if (!parent) {
r = dns_name_parent(&parent);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0) {
return true;
return -EBADMSG;
}
}
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
continue;
return t->answer_authenticated;
}
return true;
}
default: {
Iterator i;
/* Any other kind of RR (including DNSKEY/NSEC/NSEC3). Let's see if our SOA lookup was authenticated */
continue;
continue;
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
continue;
/* We found the transaction that was supposed to find
* the SOA RR for us. It was successful, but found no
* RR for us. This means we are not at a zone cut. In
* this case, we require authentication if the SOA
* lookup was authenticated too. */
return t->answer_authenticated;
}
return true;
}}
}
const char *tld;
Iterator i;
int r;
/* If DNSSEC downgrade mode is on, checks whether the
* specified RR is one level below a TLD we have proven not to
* exist. In such a case we assume that this is a private
* domain, and permit it.
*
* This detects cases like the Fritz!Box router networks. Each
* Fritz!Box router serves a private "fritz.box" zone, in the
* non-existing TLD "box". Requests for the "fritz.box" domain
* are served by the router itself, while requests for the
* "box" domain will result in NXDOMAIN.
*
* Note that this logic is unable to detect cases where a
* router serves a private DNS zone directly under
* non-existing TLD. In such a case we cannot detect whether
* the TLD is supposed to exist or not, as all requests we
* make for it will be answered by the router's zone, and not
* by the root zone. */
assert(t);
return false; /* In strict DNSSEC mode what doesn't exist, doesn't exist */
r = dns_name_parent(&tld);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
return false; /* Already the root domain */
if (!dns_name_is_single_label(tld))
return false;
continue;
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
continue;
/* We found an auxiliary lookup we did for the TLD. If
* that returned with NXDOMAIN, we know the TLD didn't
* exist, and hence this might be a private zone. */
}
return false;
}
const char *name;
Iterator i;
int r;
assert(t);
* this negative reply */
return false;
return -EINVAL;
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0)
return false;
r = dns_transaction_in_private_tld(t, t->key);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0) {
/* The lookup is from a TLD that is proven not to
* exist, and we are in downgrade mode, hence ignore
* that fact that we didn't get any NSEC RRs.*/
log_info("Detected a negative query %s in a private DNS zone, permitting unsigned response.", dns_transaction_key_string(t));
return false;
}
* so, then we are not at a zone apex, and thus should
* look at the result of the parent SOA lookup.
*
* We got a negative reply for this DS lookup? DS RRs
* are signed when their parent zone is signed, hence
* also check the parent SOA in this case. */
r = dns_name_parent(&name);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
return true;
}
/* For all other RRs we check the SOA on the same level to see
* if it's signed. */
continue;
continue;
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
continue;
return dt->answer_authenticated;
}
return true;
}
bool found = false;
int r;
/* Checks whether any of the DNSKEYs used for the RRSIGs for
* the specified RRset is authenticated (i.e. has a matching
* DS RR). */
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0)
return false;
Iterator i;
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
continue;
continue;
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
continue;
/* OK, we found an auxiliary DNSKEY
* lookup. If that lookup is
* authenticated, report this. */
if (dt->answer_authenticated)
return true;
found = true;
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
continue;
/* OK, we found an auxiliary DS
* lookup. If that lookup is
* authenticated and non-zero, we
* won! */
if (!dt->answer_authenticated)
return false;
}
}
}
}
assert(t);
/* We know that the root domain is signed, hence if it appears
* not to be signed, there's a problem with the DNS server */
}
int r;
assert(t);
/* Maybe warn the user that we encountered a revoked DNSKEY
* for a key from our trust anchor. Note that we don't care
* whether the DNSKEY can be authenticated or not. It's
* sufficient if it is self-signed. */
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
return 0;
}
bool changed;
int r;
assert(t);
* our trust anchors database considers revoked. */
do {
changed = false;
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0) {
if (r < 0)
return r;
assert(r > 0);
changed = true;
break;
}
}
} while (changed);
return 0;
}
Iterator i;
int r;
assert(t);
/* Copy all validated RRs from the auxiliary DNSSEC transactions into our set of validated RRs */
continue;
if (!dt->answer_authenticated)
continue;
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
return 0;
}
enum {
} phase;
int r;
assert(t);
/* We have now collected all DS and DNSKEY RRs in
* t->validated_keys, let's see which RRs we can now
* authenticate with that. */
return 0;
/* Already validated */
if (t->answer_dnssec_result != _DNSSEC_RESULT_INVALID)
return 0;
/* Our own stuff needs no validation */
t->answer_authenticated = true;
return 0;
}
/* Cached stuff is not affected by validation. */
if (t->answer_source != DNS_TRANSACTION_NETWORK)
return 0;
if (!dns_transaction_dnssec_supported_full(t)) {
/* The server does not support DNSSEC, or doesn't augment responses with RRSIGs. */
return 0;
}
log_debug("Validating response from transaction %" PRIu16 " (%s).", t->id, dns_transaction_key_string(t));
/* First, see if this response contains any revoked trust
* anchors we care about */
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* Third, copy all RRs we acquired successfully from auxiliary RRs over. */
r = dns_transaction_copy_validated(t);
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* Second, see if there are DNSKEYs we already know a
* validated DS for. */
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* Fourth, remove all DNSKEY and DS RRs again that our trust
* anchor says are revoked. After all we might have marked
* some keys revoked above, but they might still be lingering
* in our validated_keys list. */
if (r < 0)
return r;
for (;;) {
case DNS_TYPE_RRSIG:
continue;
case DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY:
/* We validate DNSKEYs only in the DNSKEY and ALL phases */
if (phase == PHASE_NSEC)
continue;
break;
case DNS_TYPE_NSEC:
case DNS_TYPE_NSEC3:
have_nsec = true;
if (phase == PHASE_DNSKEY)
continue;
break;
default:
/* We validate all other RRs only in the ALL phases */
continue;
break;
}
r = dnssec_verify_rrset_search(t->answer, rr->key, t->validated_keys, USEC_INFINITY, &result, &rrsig);
if (r < 0)
return r;
log_debug("Looking at %s: %s", strna(dns_resource_record_to_string(rr)), dnssec_result_to_string(result));
if (result == DNSSEC_VALIDATED) {
/* If we just validated a
* DNSKEY RRset, then let's
* add these keys to the set
* of validated keys for this
* transaction. */
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* some of the DNSKEYs we just
* added might already have
* been revoked, remove them
* again in that case. */
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
/* Add the validated RRset to the new
* list of validated RRsets, and
* remove it from the unvalidated
* RRsets. We mark the RRset as
* authenticated and cacheable. */
r = dns_answer_move_by_key(&validated, &t->answer, rr->key, DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED|DNS_ANSWER_CACHEABLE);
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* Exit the loop, we dropped something from the answer, start from the beginning */
changed = true;
break;
}
/* If we haven't read all DNSKEYs yet a negative result of the validation is irrelevant, as
continue;
if (result == DNSSEC_VALIDATED_WILDCARD) {
bool authenticated = false;
const char *source;
* that no matching non-wildcard RR exists.*/
/* First step, determine the source of synthesis */
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* Unless the NSEC proof showed that the key really doesn't exist something is off. */
if (r == 0)
else {
r = dns_answer_move_by_key(&validated, &t->answer, rr->key, authenticated ? (DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED|DNS_ANSWER_CACHEABLE) : 0);
if (r < 0)
return r;
manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, authenticated ? DNSSEC_SECURE : DNSSEC_INSECURE, rr->key);
/* Exit the loop, we dropped something from the answer, start from the beginning */
changed = true;
break;
}
}
if (result == DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE) {
r = dns_transaction_requires_rrsig(t, rr);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0) {
/* Data does not require signing. In that case, just copy it over,
* but remember that this is by no means authenticated.*/
if (r < 0)
return r;
changed = true;
break;
}
r = dns_transaction_known_signed(t, rr);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0) {
/* This is an RR we know has to be signed. If it isn't this means
* the server is not attaching RRSIGs, hence complain. */
/* Downgrading is OK? If so, just consider the information unsigned */
if (r < 0)
return r;
changed = true;
break;
}
/* Otherwise, fail */
return 0;
}
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0) {
_cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL;
/* The data is from a TLD that is proven not to exist, and we are in downgrade
* mode, hence ignore the fact that this was not signed. */
log_info("Detected RRset %s is in a private DNS zone, permitting unsigned RRs.", strna(s ? strstrip(s) : NULL));
if (r < 0)
return r;
changed = true;
break;
}
}
r = dns_transaction_dnskey_authenticated(t, rr);
if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO)
return r;
if (r == 0) {
/* The DNSKEY transaction was not authenticated, this means there's
* no DS for this, which means it's OK if no keys are found for this signature. */
if (r < 0)
return r;
changed = true;
break;
}
}
r = dns_transaction_is_primary_response(t, rr);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0) {
/* Look for a matching DNAME for this CNAME */
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0) {
/* Also look among the stuff we already validated */
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
if (r == 0) {
else /* DNSSEC_MISSING_KEY or DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM */
/* This is a primary response to our question, and it failed validation. That's
* fatal. */
t->answer_dnssec_result = result;
return 0;
}
/* This is a primary response, but we do have a DNAME RR in the RR that can replay this
* CNAME, hence rely on that, and we can remove the CNAME in favour of it. */
}
/* This is just some auxiliary data. Just remove the RRset and continue. */
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* Exit the loop, we dropped something from the answer, start from the beginning */
changed = true;
break;
}
/* Restart the inner loop as long as we managed to achieve something */
if (changed)
continue;
phase = PHASE_NSEC;
continue;
}
* third phase we start to remove RRs we couldn't validate. */
continue;
}
/* We're done */
break;
}
dns_answer_unref(t->answer);
/* At this point the answer only contains validated
* RRsets. Now, let's see if it actually answers the question
* we asked. If so, great! If it doesn't, then see if
r = dns_transaction_has_positive_answer(t, &flags);
if (r > 0) {
/* Yes, it answers the question! */
if (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED) {
/* The answer is fully authenticated, yay. */
t->answer_authenticated = true;
} else {
/* The answer is not fully authenticated. */
t->answer_authenticated = false;
}
} else if (r == 0) {
bool authenticated = false;
if (r < 0)
return r;
switch (nr) {
case DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN:
/* NSEC proves the domain doesn't exist. Very good. */
log_debug("Proved NXDOMAIN via NSEC/NSEC3 for transaction %u (%s)", t->id, dns_transaction_key_string(t));
break;
case DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA:
/* NSEC proves that there's no data here, very good. */
log_debug("Proved NODATA via NSEC/NSEC3 for transaction %u (%s)", t->id, dns_transaction_key_string(t));
break;
case DNSSEC_NSEC_OPTOUT:
/* NSEC3 says the data might not be signed */
log_debug("Data is NSEC3 opt-out via NSEC/NSEC3 for transaction %u (%s)", t->id, dns_transaction_key_string(t));
t->answer_authenticated = false;
break;
case DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR:
/* No NSEC data? Bummer! */
r = dns_transaction_requires_nsec(t);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0) {
} else {
t->answer_authenticated = false;
}
break;
/* We don't know the NSEC3 algorithm used? */
break;
case DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND:
case DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME:
/* NSEC says it needs to be there, but we couldn't find it? Bummer! */
break;
default:
assert_not_reached("Unexpected NSEC result.");
}
}
return 1;
}
assert(t);
if (!t->key_string) {
return "n/a";
}
return strstrip(t->key_string);
}
[DNS_TRANSACTION_NULL] = "null",
[DNS_TRANSACTION_PENDING] = "pending",
[DNS_TRANSACTION_VALIDATING] = "validating",
[DNS_TRANSACTION_RCODE_FAILURE] = "rcode-failure",
[DNS_TRANSACTION_SUCCESS] = "success",
[DNS_TRANSACTION_NO_SERVERS] = "no-servers",
[DNS_TRANSACTION_TIMEOUT] = "timeout",
[DNS_TRANSACTION_ATTEMPTS_MAX_REACHED] = "attempts-max-reached",
[DNS_TRANSACTION_INVALID_REPLY] = "invalid-reply",
[DNS_TRANSACTION_ERRNO] = "errno",
[DNS_TRANSACTION_ABORTED] = "aborted",
[DNS_TRANSACTION_DNSSEC_FAILED] = "dnssec-failed",
[DNS_TRANSACTION_NO_TRUST_ANCHOR] = "no-trust-anchor",
[DNS_TRANSACTION_RR_TYPE_UNSUPPORTED] = "rr-type-unsupported",
[DNS_TRANSACTION_NETWORK_DOWN] = "network-down",
[DNS_TRANSACTION_NOT_FOUND] = "not-found",
};
[DNS_TRANSACTION_NETWORK] = "network",
[DNS_TRANSACTION_CACHE] = "cache",
[DNS_TRANSACTION_ZONE] = "zone",
[DNS_TRANSACTION_TRUST_ANCHOR] = "trust-anchor",
};