sctp_cookie.c revision 47b333251f6569b2d2a85df530163c314e6eb46c
/*
* CDDL HEADER START
*
* The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
* Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
* You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
*
* You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
* or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions
* and limitations under the License.
*
* When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
* file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
* If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
* fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
* information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
*
* CDDL HEADER END
*/
/*
* Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Use is subject to license terms.
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/stream.h>
#include <sys/cmn_err.h>
#include <sys/md5.h>
#include <sys/kmem.h>
#include <sys/strsubr.h>
#include <sys/random.h>
#include <sys/tsol/tnet.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/ip6.h>
#include <inet/common.h>
#include <inet/ip.h>
#include <inet/ip6.h>
#include <inet/sctp_ip.h>
#include <inet/ipclassifier.h>
#include "sctp_impl.h"
/*
* Helper function for SunCluster (PSARC/2005/602) to get the original source
* address from the COOKIE
*/
int cl_sctp_cookie_paddr(sctp_chunk_hdr_t *, in6_addr_t *);
/*
* From RFC 2104. This should probably go into libmd5 (and while
* we're at it, maybe we should make a libdigest so we can later
* add SHA1 and others, esp. since some weaknesses have been found
* with MD5).
*
* text IN pointer to data stream
* text_len IN length of data stream
* key IN pointer to authentication key
* key_len IN length of authentication key
* digest OUT caller digest to be filled in
*/
static void
hmac_md5(uchar_t *text, size_t text_len, uchar_t *key, size_t key_len,
uchar_t *digest)
{
MD5_CTX context;
uchar_t k_ipad[65]; /* inner padding - key XORd with ipad */
uchar_t k_opad[65]; /* outer padding - key XORd with opad */
uchar_t tk[16];
int i;
/* if key is longer than 64 bytes reset it to key=MD5(key) */
if (key_len > 64) {
MD5_CTX tctx;
MD5Init(&tctx);
MD5Update(&tctx, key, key_len);
MD5Final(tk, &tctx);
key = tk;
key_len = 16;
}
/*
* the HMAC_MD5 transform looks like:
*
* MD5(K XOR opad, MD5(K XOR ipad, text))
*
* where K is an n byte key
* ipad is the byte 0x36 repeated 64 times
* opad is the byte 0x5c repeated 64 times
* and text is the data being protected
*/
/* start out by storing key in pads */
bzero(k_ipad, sizeof (k_ipad));
bzero(k_opad, sizeof (k_opad));
bcopy(key, k_ipad, key_len);
bcopy(key, k_opad, key_len);
/* XOR key with ipad and opad values */
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
k_ipad[i] ^= 0x36;
k_opad[i] ^= 0x5c;
}
/*
* perform inner MD5
*/
MD5Init(&context); /* init context for 1st */
/* pass */
MD5Update(&context, k_ipad, 64); /* start with inner pad */
MD5Update(&context, text, text_len); /* then text of datagram */
MD5Final(digest, &context); /* finish up 1st pass */
/*
* perform outer MD5
*/
MD5Init(&context); /* init context for 2nd */
/* pass */
MD5Update(&context, k_opad, 64); /* start with outer pad */
MD5Update(&context, digest, 16); /* then results of 1st */
/* hash */
MD5Final(digest, &context); /* finish up 2nd pass */
}
/*
* If inmp is non-NULL, and we need to abort, it will use the IP/SCTP
* info in initmp to send the abort. Otherwise, no abort will be sent.
*
* When called from stcp_send_initack() while processing parameters
* from a received INIT_CHUNK want_cookie will be NULL.
*
* When called from sctp_send_cookie_echo() while processing an INIT_ACK,
* want_cookie contains a pointer to a pointer of type *sctp_parm_hdr_t.
* However, this last pointer will be NULL until the cookie is processed
* at which time it will be set to point to a sctp_parm_hdr_t that contains
* the cookie info.
*
* Note: an INIT_ACK is expected to contain a cookie.
*
* When processing an INIT_ACK, an ERROR chunk and chain of one or more
* error CAUSE blocks will be created if unrecognized parameters marked by
* the sender as reportable are found.
*
* When processing an INIT chunk, a chain of one or more error CAUSE blocks
* will be created if unrecognized parameters marked by the sender as
* reportable are found. These are appended directly to the INIT_ACK chunk.
*
* In both cases the error chain is visible to the caller via *errmp.
*
* Returns 1 if the parameters are OK (or if there are no optional
* parameters), returns 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
validate_init_params(sctp_t *sctp, sctp_chunk_hdr_t *ch,
sctp_init_chunk_t *init, mblk_t *inmp, sctp_parm_hdr_t **want_cookie,
mblk_t **errmp, int *supp_af, uint_t *sctp_options)
{
sctp_parm_hdr_t *cph;
sctp_init_chunk_t *ic;
ssize_t remaining;
uint16_t serror = 0;
char *details = NULL;
size_t errlen = 0;
boolean_t got_cookie = B_FALSE;
boolean_t got_errchunk = B_FALSE;
uint16_t ptype;
sctp_mpc_t mpc;
ASSERT(errmp != NULL);
if (sctp_options != NULL)
*sctp_options = 0;
/* First validate stream parameters */
if (init->sic_instr == 0 || init->sic_outstr == 0) {
serror = SCTP_ERR_BAD_MANDPARM;
dprint(1, ("validate_init_params: bad sid, is=%d os=%d\n",
htons(init->sic_instr), htons(init->sic_outstr)));
goto abort;
}
if (ntohl(init->sic_inittag) == 0) {
serror = SCTP_ERR_BAD_MANDPARM;
dprint(1, ("validate_init_params: inittag = 0\n"));
goto abort;
}
remaining = ntohs(ch->sch_len) - sizeof (*ch);
ic = (sctp_init_chunk_t *)(ch + 1);
remaining -= sizeof (*ic);
if (remaining < sizeof (*cph)) {
/*
* When processing a received INIT_ACK, a cookie is
* expected, if missing there is nothing to validate.
*/
if (want_cookie != NULL)
goto cookie_abort;
return (1);
}
cph = (sctp_parm_hdr_t *)(ic + 1);
while (cph != NULL) {
ptype = ntohs(cph->sph_type);
switch (ptype) {
case PARM_HBINFO:
case PARM_UNRECOGNIZED:
case PARM_ECN:
/* just ignore them */
break;
case PARM_FORWARD_TSN:
if (sctp_options != NULL)
*sctp_options |= SCTP_PRSCTP_OPTION;
break;
case PARM_COOKIE:
got_cookie = B_TRUE;
/*
* Processing a received INIT_ACK, we have a cookie
* and a valid pointer in our caller to attach it to.
*/
if (want_cookie != NULL) {
*want_cookie = cph;
}
break;
case PARM_ADDR4:
*supp_af |= PARM_SUPP_V4;
break;
case PARM_ADDR6:
*supp_af |= PARM_SUPP_V6;
break;
case PARM_COOKIE_PRESERVE:
case PARM_ADAPT_LAYER_IND:
/* These are OK */
break;
case PARM_ADDR_HOST_NAME:
/* Don't support this; abort the association */
serror = SCTP_ERR_BAD_ADDR;
details = (char *)cph;
errlen = ntohs(cph->sph_len);
dprint(1, ("sctp:validate_init_params: host addr\n"));
goto abort;
case PARM_SUPP_ADDRS: {
/* Make sure we have a supported addr intersection */
uint16_t *p, addrtype;
int plen;
plen = ntohs(cph->sph_len);
p = (uint16_t *)(cph + 1);
while (plen > 0) {
addrtype = ntohs(*p);
switch (addrtype) {
case PARM_ADDR6:
*supp_af |= PARM_SUPP_V6;
break;
case PARM_ADDR4:
*supp_af |= PARM_SUPP_V4;
break;
default:
/*
* Do nothing, silently ignore hostname
* address.
*/
break;
}
p++;
plen -= sizeof (*p);
}
break;
}
default:
/*
* Handle any unrecognized params, the two high order
* bits of ptype define how the remote wants them
* handled.
* Top bit:
* 1. Continue processing other params in the chunk
* 0. Stop processing params after this one.
* 2nd bit:
* 1. Must report this unrecognized param to remote
* 0. Obey the top bit silently.
*/
if (ptype & SCTP_REPORT_THIS_PARAM) {
if (!got_errchunk && want_cookie != NULL) {
/*
* Processing an INIT_ACK, this is the
* first reportable param, create an
* ERROR chunk and populate it with a
* CAUSE block for this parameter.
*/
*errmp = sctp_make_err(sctp,
PARM_UNRECOGNIZED,
(void *)cph,
ntohs(cph->sph_len));
got_errchunk = B_TRUE;
} else {
/*
* If processing an INIT chunk add
* an additional CAUSE block to an
* INIT_ACK, got_errchunk is B_FALSE.
*/
sctp_add_unrec_parm(cph, errmp,
got_errchunk);
}
}
if (ptype & SCTP_CONT_PROC_PARAMS) {
/*
* Continue processing params after this
* parameter.
*/
break;
}
/*
* Stop processing params, report any reportable
* unrecognized params found so far.
*/
goto done;
}
cph = sctp_next_parm(cph, &remaining);
}
done:
/*
* Some sanity checks. The following should not fail unless the
* other side is broken.
*
* 1. If this is a V4 endpoint but V4 address is not
* supported, abort.
* 2. If this is a V6 only endpoint but V6 address is
* not supported, abort. This assumes that a V6
* endpoint can use both V4 and V6 addresses.
* We only care about supp_af when processing INIT, i.e want_cookie
* is NULL.
*/
if (want_cookie == NULL &&
((sctp->sctp_family == AF_INET && !(*supp_af & PARM_SUPP_V4)) ||
(sctp->sctp_family == AF_INET6 && !(*supp_af & PARM_SUPP_V6) &&
sctp->sctp_connp->conn_ipv6_v6only))) {
dprint(1, ("sctp:validate_init_params: supp addr\n"));
serror = SCTP_ERR_BAD_ADDR;
goto abort;
}
if (want_cookie != NULL && !got_cookie) {
cookie_abort:
/* Will populate the CAUSE block in the ABORT chunk. */
mpc.mpc_num = htons(1);
mpc.mpc_param = htons(PARM_COOKIE);
mpc.mpc_pad = 0;
dprint(1, ("validate_init_params: cookie absent\n"));
sctp_send_abort(sctp, sctp_init2vtag(ch), SCTP_ERR_MISSING_PARM,
(char *)&mpc, sizeof (sctp_mpc_t), inmp, 0, B_FALSE);
return (0);
}
/* OK */
return (1);
abort:
if (want_cookie != NULL)
return (0);
sctp_send_abort(sctp, sctp_init2vtag(ch), serror, details,
errlen, inmp, 0, B_FALSE);
return (0);
}
/*
* Initialize params from the INIT and INIT-ACK when the assoc. is
* established.
*/
boolean_t
sctp_initialize_params(sctp_t *sctp, sctp_init_chunk_t *init,
sctp_init_chunk_t *iack)
{
/* Get initial TSN */
sctp->sctp_ftsn = ntohl(init->sic_inittsn);
sctp->sctp_lastacked = sctp->sctp_ftsn - 1;
/* Serial number is initialized to the same value as the TSN */
sctp->sctp_fcsn = sctp->sctp_lastacked;
/*
* Get verification tags; no byteordering is necessary, since
* verfication tags are never processed except for byte-by-byte
* comparisons.
*/
sctp->sctp_fvtag = init->sic_inittag;
sctp->sctp_sctph->sh_verf = init->sic_inittag;
sctp->sctp_sctph6->sh_verf = init->sic_inittag;
sctp->sctp_lvtag = iack->sic_inittag;
/* Get the peer's rwnd */
sctp->sctp_frwnd = ntohl(init->sic_a_rwnd);
/* Allocate the in/out-stream counters */
sctp->sctp_num_ostr = iack->sic_outstr;
sctp->sctp_ostrcntrs = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (uint16_t) *
sctp->sctp_num_ostr, KM_NOSLEEP);
if (sctp->sctp_ostrcntrs == NULL)
return (B_FALSE);
sctp->sctp_num_istr = iack->sic_instr;
sctp->sctp_instr = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (*sctp->sctp_instr) *
sctp->sctp_num_istr, KM_NOSLEEP);
if (sctp->sctp_instr == NULL) {
kmem_free(sctp->sctp_ostrcntrs, sizeof (uint16_t) *
sctp->sctp_num_ostr);
sctp->sctp_ostrcntrs = NULL;
return (B_FALSE);
}
return (B_TRUE);
}
/*
* Copy the peer's original source address into addr. This relies on the
* following format (see sctp_send_initack() below):
* relative timestamp for the cookie (int64_t) +
* cookie lifetime (uint32_t) +
* local tie-tag (uint32_t) + peer tie-tag (uint32_t) +
* Peer's original src ...
*/
int
cl_sctp_cookie_paddr(sctp_chunk_hdr_t *ch, in6_addr_t *addr)
{
uchar_t *off;
ASSERT(addr != NULL);
if (ch->sch_id != CHUNK_COOKIE)
return (EINVAL);
off = (uchar_t *)ch + sizeof (*ch) + sizeof (int64_t) +
sizeof (uint32_t) + sizeof (uint32_t) + sizeof (uint32_t);
bcopy(off, addr, sizeof (*addr));
return (0);
}
#define SCTP_CALC_COOKIE_LEN(initcp) \
sizeof (int64_t) + /* timestamp */ \
sizeof (uint32_t) + /* cookie lifetime */ \
sizeof (sctp_init_chunk_t) + /* INIT ACK */ \
sizeof (in6_addr_t) + /* peer's original source */ \
ntohs((initcp)->sch_len) + /* peer's INIT */ \
sizeof (uint32_t) + /* local tie-tag */ \
sizeof (uint32_t) + /* peer tie-tag */ \
sizeof (sctp_parm_hdr_t) + /* param header */ \
16 /* MD5 hash */
void
sctp_send_initack(sctp_t *sctp, sctp_hdr_t *initsh, sctp_chunk_hdr_t *ch,
mblk_t *initmp)
{
ipha_t *initiph;
ip6_t *initip6h;
ipha_t *iackiph;
ip6_t *iackip6h;
sctp_chunk_hdr_t *iack_ch;
sctp_init_chunk_t *iack;
sctp_init_chunk_t *init;
sctp_hdr_t *iacksh;
size_t cookielen;
size_t iacklen;
size_t ipsctplen;
size_t errlen = 0;
sctp_parm_hdr_t *cookieph;
mblk_t *iackmp;
uint32_t itag;
uint32_t itsn;
int64_t *now;
int64_t nowt;
uint32_t *lifetime;
char *p;
boolean_t isv4;
int supp_af = 0;
uint_t sctp_options;
uint32_t *ttag;
int pad;
mblk_t *errmp = NULL;
boolean_t initcollision = B_FALSE;
boolean_t linklocal = B_FALSE;
cred_t *cr;
ts_label_t *initlabel;
sctp_stack_t *sctps = sctp->sctp_sctps;
BUMP_LOCAL(sctp->sctp_ibchunks);
isv4 = (IPH_HDR_VERSION(initmp->b_rptr) == IPV4_VERSION);
/* Extract the INIT chunk */
if (isv4) {
initiph = (ipha_t *)initmp->b_rptr;
ipsctplen = sctp->sctp_ip_hdr_len;
supp_af |= PARM_SUPP_V4;
} else {
initip6h = (ip6_t *)initmp->b_rptr;
ipsctplen = sctp->sctp_ip_hdr6_len;
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(&initip6h->ip6_src))
linklocal = B_TRUE;
supp_af |= PARM_SUPP_V6;
}
ASSERT(OK_32PTR(initsh));
init = (sctp_init_chunk_t *)((char *)(initsh + 1) + sizeof (*iack_ch));
/* Make sure we like the peer's parameters */
if (validate_init_params(sctp, ch, init, initmp, NULL, &errmp,
&supp_af, &sctp_options) == 0) {
return;
}
if (errmp != NULL)
errlen = msgdsize(errmp);
if (sctp->sctp_family == AF_INET) {
/*
* Irregardless of the supported address in the INIT, v4
* must be supported.
*/
supp_af = PARM_SUPP_V4;
}
if (sctp->sctp_state <= SCTPS_LISTEN) {
/* normal, expected INIT: generate new vtag and itsn */
(void) random_get_pseudo_bytes((uint8_t *)&itag, sizeof (itag));
if (itag == 0)
itag = (uint32_t)gethrtime();
itsn = itag + 1;
itag = htonl(itag);
} else if (sctp->sctp_state == SCTPS_COOKIE_WAIT ||
sctp->sctp_state == SCTPS_COOKIE_ECHOED) {
/* init collision; copy vtag and itsn from sctp */
itag = sctp->sctp_lvtag;
itsn = sctp->sctp_ltsn;
/*
* In addition we need to send all the params that was sent
* in our INIT chunk. Essentially, it is only the supported
* address params that we need to add.
*/
initcollision = B_TRUE;
/*
* When we sent the INIT, we should have set linklocal in
* the sctp which should be good enough.
*/
if (linklocal)
linklocal = B_FALSE;
} else {
/* peer restart; generate new vtag but keep everything else */
(void) random_get_pseudo_bytes((uint8_t *)&itag, sizeof (itag));
if (itag == 0)
itag = (uint32_t)gethrtime();
itag = htonl(itag);
itsn = sctp->sctp_ltsn;
}
/*
* Allocate a mblk for the INIT ACK, consisting of the link layer
* header, the IP header, the SCTP common header, and INIT ACK chunk,
* and finally the COOKIE parameter.
*/
cookielen = SCTP_CALC_COOKIE_LEN(ch);
iacklen = sizeof (*iack_ch) + sizeof (*iack) + cookielen;
if (sctp->sctp_send_adaptation)
iacklen += (sizeof (sctp_parm_hdr_t) + sizeof (uint32_t));
if (((sctp_options & SCTP_PRSCTP_OPTION) || initcollision) &&
sctp->sctp_prsctp_aware && sctps->sctps_prsctp_enabled) {
iacklen += sctp_options_param_len(sctp, SCTP_PRSCTP_OPTION);
}
if (initcollision)
iacklen += sctp_supaddr_param_len(sctp);
if (!linklocal)
iacklen += sctp_addr_params(sctp, supp_af, NULL, B_FALSE);
ipsctplen += sizeof (*iacksh) + iacklen;
iacklen += errlen;
if ((pad = ipsctplen % 4) != 0) {
pad = 4 - pad;
ipsctplen += pad;
}
/*
* If the listen socket is bound to a trusted extensions
* multi-label port, attach a copy of the listener's cred
* to the new INITACK mblk. Modify the cred to contain
* the security label of the received INIT packet.
* If not a multi-label port, attach the unmodified
* listener's cred directly.
*
* We expect Sun developed kernel modules to properly set
* cred labels for sctp connections. We can't be so sure this
* will be done correctly when 3rd party kernel modules
* directly use sctp. The initlabel panic guard logic was
* added to cover this possibility.
*/
if (sctp->sctp_connp->conn_mlp_type != mlptSingle) {
pid_t cpid;
cr = msg_getcred(initmp, &cpid);
if (cr == NULL || (initlabel = crgetlabel(cr)) == NULL) {
sctp_send_abort(sctp, sctp_init2vtag(ch),
SCTP_ERR_UNKNOWN, NULL, 0, initmp, 0, B_FALSE);
return;
}
cr = copycred_from_bslabel(CONN_CRED(sctp->sctp_connp),
&initlabel->tsl_label, initlabel->tsl_doi, KM_NOSLEEP);
if (cr == NULL) {
sctp_send_abort(sctp, sctp_init2vtag(ch),
SCTP_ERR_NO_RESOURCES, NULL, 0, initmp, 0, B_FALSE);
return;
}
iackmp = allocb_cred(ipsctplen + sctps->sctps_wroff_xtra,
cr, cpid);
crfree(cr);
} else {
iackmp = allocb_cred(ipsctplen + sctps->sctps_wroff_xtra,
CONN_CRED(sctp->sctp_connp), sctp->sctp_cpid);
}
if (iackmp == NULL) {
sctp_send_abort(sctp, sctp_init2vtag(ch),
SCTP_ERR_NO_RESOURCES, NULL, 0, initmp, 0, B_FALSE);
return;
}
/* Copy in the [imcomplete] IP/SCTP composite header */
p = (char *)(iackmp->b_rptr + sctps->sctps_wroff_xtra);
iackmp->b_rptr = (uchar_t *)p;
if (isv4) {
bcopy(sctp->sctp_iphc, p, sctp->sctp_hdr_len);
iackiph = (ipha_t *)p;
/* Copy the peer's IP addr */
iackiph->ipha_dst = initiph->ipha_src;
iackiph->ipha_src = initiph->ipha_dst;
iackiph->ipha_length = htons(ipsctplen + errlen);
iacksh = (sctp_hdr_t *)(p + sctp->sctp_ip_hdr_len);
} else {
bcopy(sctp->sctp_iphc6, p, sctp->sctp_hdr6_len);
iackip6h = (ip6_t *)p;
/* Copy the peer's IP addr */
iackip6h->ip6_dst = initip6h->ip6_src;
iackip6h->ip6_src = initip6h->ip6_dst;
iackip6h->ip6_plen = htons(ipsctplen - sizeof (*iackip6h) +
errlen);
iacksh = (sctp_hdr_t *)(p + sctp->sctp_ip_hdr6_len);
}
ASSERT(OK_32PTR(iacksh));
/* Fill in the holes in the SCTP common header */
iacksh->sh_sport = initsh->sh_dport;
iacksh->sh_dport = initsh->sh_sport;
iacksh->sh_verf = init->sic_inittag;
/* INIT ACK chunk header */
iack_ch = (sctp_chunk_hdr_t *)(iacksh + 1);
iack_ch->sch_id = CHUNK_INIT_ACK;
iack_ch->sch_flags = 0;
iack_ch->sch_len = htons(iacklen);
/* The INIT ACK itself */
iack = (sctp_init_chunk_t *)(iack_ch + 1);
iack->sic_inittag = itag; /* already in network byteorder */
iack->sic_inittsn = htonl(itsn);
iack->sic_a_rwnd = htonl(sctp->sctp_rwnd);
/* Advertise what we would want to have as stream #'s */
iack->sic_outstr = htons(MIN(sctp->sctp_num_ostr,
ntohs(init->sic_instr)));
iack->sic_instr = htons(sctp->sctp_num_istr);
p = (char *)(iack + 1);
p += sctp_adaptation_code_param(sctp, (uchar_t *)p);
if (initcollision)
p += sctp_supaddr_param(sctp, (uchar_t *)p);
if (!linklocal)
p += sctp_addr_params(sctp, supp_af, (uchar_t *)p, B_FALSE);
if (((sctp_options & SCTP_PRSCTP_OPTION) || initcollision) &&
sctp->sctp_prsctp_aware && sctps->sctps_prsctp_enabled) {
p += sctp_options_param(sctp, p, SCTP_PRSCTP_OPTION);
}
/*
* Generate and lay in the COOKIE parameter.
*
* Any change here that results in a change of location for
* the peer's orig source address must be propagated to the fn
* cl_sctp_cookie_paddr() above.
*
* The cookie consists of:
* 1. The relative timestamp for the cookie (lbolt64)
* 2. The cookie lifetime (uint32_t) in tick
* 3. The local tie-tag
* 4. The peer tie-tag
* 5. Peer's original src, used to confirm the validity of address.
* 6. Our INIT ACK chunk, less any parameters
* 7. The INIT chunk (may contain parameters)
* 8. 128-bit MD5 signature.
*
* Since the timestamp values will only be evaluated locally, we
* don't need to worry about byte-ordering them.
*/
cookieph = (sctp_parm_hdr_t *)p;
cookieph->sph_type = htons(PARM_COOKIE);
cookieph->sph_len = htons(cookielen);
/* timestamp */
now = (int64_t *)(cookieph + 1);
nowt = lbolt64;
bcopy(&nowt, now, sizeof (*now));
/* cookie lifetime -- need configuration */
lifetime = (uint32_t *)(now + 1);
*lifetime = sctp->sctp_cookie_lifetime;
/* Set the tie-tags */
ttag = (uint32_t *)(lifetime + 1);
if (sctp->sctp_state <= SCTPS_COOKIE_WAIT) {
*ttag = 0;
ttag++;
*ttag = 0;
ttag++;
} else {
/* local tie-tag (network byte-order) */
*ttag = sctp->sctp_lvtag;
ttag++;
/* peer tie-tag (network byte-order) */
*ttag = sctp->sctp_fvtag;
ttag++;
}
/*
* Copy in peer's original source address so that we can confirm
* the reachability later.
*/
p = (char *)ttag;
if (isv4) {
in6_addr_t peer_addr;
IN6_IPADDR_TO_V4MAPPED(iackiph->ipha_dst, &peer_addr);
bcopy(&peer_addr, p, sizeof (in6_addr_t));
} else {
bcopy(&iackip6h->ip6_dst, p, sizeof (in6_addr_t));
}
p += sizeof (in6_addr_t);
/* Copy in our INIT ACK chunk */
bcopy(iack, p, sizeof (*iack));
iack = (sctp_init_chunk_t *)p;
/* Set the # of streams we'll end up using */
iack->sic_outstr = MIN(sctp->sctp_num_ostr, ntohs(init->sic_instr));
iack->sic_instr = MIN(sctp->sctp_num_istr, ntohs(init->sic_outstr));
p += sizeof (*iack);
/* Copy in the peer's INIT chunk */
bcopy(ch, p, ntohs(ch->sch_len));
p += ntohs(ch->sch_len);
/*
* Calculate the HMAC ICV into the digest slot in buf.
* First, generate a new secret if the current secret is
* older than the new secret lifetime parameter permits,
* copying the current secret to sctp_old_secret.
*/
if (sctps->sctps_new_secret_interval > 0 &&
(sctp->sctp_last_secret_update +
MSEC_TO_TICK(sctps->sctps_new_secret_interval)) <= nowt) {
bcopy(sctp->sctp_secret, sctp->sctp_old_secret,
SCTP_SECRET_LEN);
(void) random_get_pseudo_bytes(sctp->sctp_secret,
SCTP_SECRET_LEN);
sctp->sctp_last_secret_update = nowt;
}
hmac_md5((uchar_t *)now, cookielen - sizeof (*cookieph) - 16,
(uchar_t *)sctp->sctp_secret, SCTP_SECRET_LEN, (uchar_t *)p);
iackmp->b_wptr = iackmp->b_rptr + ipsctplen;
if (pad != 0)
bzero((iackmp->b_wptr - pad), pad);
iackmp->b_cont = errmp; /* OK if NULL */
if (is_system_labeled() && (cr = msg_getcred(iackmp, NULL)) != NULL &&
crgetlabel(cr) != NULL) {
conn_t *connp = sctp->sctp_connp;
int err;
if (isv4)
err = tsol_check_label(cr, &iackmp,
connp->conn_mac_exempt,
sctps->sctps_netstack->netstack_ip);
else
err = tsol_check_label_v6(cr, &iackmp,
connp->conn_mac_exempt,
sctps->sctps_netstack->netstack_ip);
if (err != 0) {
sctp_send_abort(sctp, sctp_init2vtag(ch),
SCTP_ERR_AUTH_ERR, NULL, 0, initmp, 0, B_FALSE);
freemsg(iackmp);
return;
}
}
/*
* Stash the conn ptr info. for IP only as e don't have any
* cached IRE.
*/
SCTP_STASH_IPINFO(iackmp, (ire_t *)NULL);
/* XXX sctp == sctp_g_q, so using its obchunks is valid */
BUMP_LOCAL(sctp->sctp_opkts);
BUMP_LOCAL(sctp->sctp_obchunks);
/* OK to call IP_PUT() here instead of sctp_add_sendq(). */
CONN_INC_REF(sctp->sctp_connp);
iackmp->b_flag |= MSGHASREF;
IP_PUT(iackmp, sctp->sctp_connp, isv4);
}
void
sctp_send_cookie_ack(sctp_t *sctp)
{
sctp_chunk_hdr_t *cach;
mblk_t *camp;
sctp_stack_t *sctps = sctp->sctp_sctps;
camp = sctp_make_mp(sctp, NULL, sizeof (*cach));
if (camp == NULL) {
/* XXX should abort, but don't have the inmp anymore */
SCTP_KSTAT(sctps, sctp_send_cookie_ack_failed);
return;
}
cach = (sctp_chunk_hdr_t *)camp->b_wptr;
camp->b_wptr = (uchar_t *)(cach + 1);
cach->sch_id = CHUNK_COOKIE_ACK;
cach->sch_flags = 0;
cach->sch_len = htons(sizeof (*cach));
sctp_set_iplen(sctp, camp);
BUMP_LOCAL(sctp->sctp_obchunks);
sctp_add_sendq(sctp, camp);
}
static int
sctp_find_al_ind(sctp_parm_hdr_t *sph, ssize_t len, uint32_t *adaptation_code)
{
if (len < sizeof (*sph))
return (-1);
while (sph != NULL) {
if (sph->sph_type == htons(PARM_ADAPT_LAYER_IND) &&
ntohs(sph->sph_len) >= (sizeof (*sph) +
sizeof (uint32_t))) {
*adaptation_code = *(uint32_t *)(sph + 1);
return (0);
}
sph = sctp_next_parm(sph, &len);
}
return (-1);
}
void
sctp_send_cookie_echo(sctp_t *sctp, sctp_chunk_hdr_t *iackch, mblk_t *iackmp)
{
mblk_t *cemp;
mblk_t *mp = NULL;
mblk_t *head;
mblk_t *meta;
sctp_faddr_t *fp;
sctp_chunk_hdr_t *cech;
sctp_init_chunk_t *iack;
int32_t cansend;
int32_t seglen;
size_t ceclen;
sctp_parm_hdr_t *cph;
sctp_data_hdr_t *sdc;
sctp_tf_t *tf;
int pad = 0;
int hdrlen;
mblk_t *errmp = NULL;
uint_t sctp_options;
int error;
uint16_t old_num_str;
sctp_stack_t *sctps = sctp->sctp_sctps;
iack = (sctp_init_chunk_t *)(iackch + 1);
cph = NULL;
if (validate_init_params(sctp, iackch, iack, iackmp, &cph, &errmp,
&pad, &sctp_options) == 0) { /* result in 'pad' ignored */
BUMP_MIB(&sctps->sctps_mib, sctpAborted);
sctp_assoc_event(sctp, SCTP_CANT_STR_ASSOC, 0, NULL);
sctp_clean_death(sctp, ECONNABORTED);
return;
}
ASSERT(cph != NULL);
ASSERT(sctp->sctp_cookie_mp == NULL);
/* Got a cookie to echo back; allocate an mblk */
ceclen = sizeof (*cech) + ntohs(cph->sph_len) - sizeof (*cph);
if ((pad = ceclen & (SCTP_ALIGN - 1)) != 0)
pad = SCTP_ALIGN - pad;
if (IPH_HDR_VERSION(iackmp->b_rptr) == IPV4_VERSION)
hdrlen = sctp->sctp_hdr_len;
else
hdrlen = sctp->sctp_hdr6_len;
cemp = allocb_cred(sctps->sctps_wroff_xtra + hdrlen + ceclen + pad,
CONN_CRED(sctp->sctp_connp), sctp->sctp_cpid);
if (cemp == NULL) {
SCTP_FADDR_TIMER_RESTART(sctp, sctp->sctp_current,
sctp->sctp_current->rto);
if (errmp != NULL)
freeb(errmp);
return;
}
cemp->b_rptr += (sctps->sctps_wroff_xtra + hdrlen);
/* Process the INIT ACK */
sctp->sctp_sctph->sh_verf = iack->sic_inittag;
sctp->sctp_sctph6->sh_verf = iack->sic_inittag;
sctp->sctp_fvtag = iack->sic_inittag;
sctp->sctp_ftsn = ntohl(iack->sic_inittsn);
sctp->sctp_lastacked = sctp->sctp_ftsn - 1;
sctp->sctp_fcsn = sctp->sctp_lastacked;
sctp->sctp_frwnd = ntohl(iack->sic_a_rwnd);
/*
* Populate sctp with addresses given in the INIT ACK or IP header.
* Need to set the df bit in the current fp as it has been cleared
* in sctp_connect().
*/
sctp->sctp_current->df = B_TRUE;
/*
* Since IP uses this info during the fanout process, we need to hold
* the lock for this hash line while performing this operation.
*/
/* XXX sctp_conn_fanout + SCTP_CONN_HASH(sctps, sctp->sctp_ports); */
ASSERT(sctp->sctp_conn_tfp != NULL);
tf = sctp->sctp_conn_tfp;
/* sctp isn't a listener so only need to hold conn fanout lock */
mutex_enter(&tf->tf_lock);
if (sctp_get_addrparams(sctp, NULL, iackmp, iackch, NULL) != 0) {
mutex_exit(&tf->tf_lock);
freeb(cemp);
SCTP_FADDR_TIMER_RESTART(sctp, sctp->sctp_current,
sctp->sctp_current->rto);
if (errmp != NULL)
freeb(errmp);
return;
}
mutex_exit(&tf->tf_lock);
fp = sctp->sctp_current;
/*
* There could be a case when we get an INIT-ACK again, if the INIT
* is re-transmitted, for e.g., which means we would have already
* allocated this resource earlier (also for sctp_instr). In this
* case we check and re-allocate, if necessary.
*/
old_num_str = sctp->sctp_num_ostr;
if (ntohs(iack->sic_instr) < sctp->sctp_num_ostr)
sctp->sctp_num_ostr = ntohs(iack->sic_instr);
if (sctp->sctp_ostrcntrs == NULL) {
sctp->sctp_ostrcntrs = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (uint16_t) *
sctp->sctp_num_ostr, KM_NOSLEEP);
} else {
ASSERT(old_num_str > 0);
if (old_num_str != sctp->sctp_num_ostr) {
kmem_free(sctp->sctp_ostrcntrs, sizeof (uint16_t) *
old_num_str);
sctp->sctp_ostrcntrs = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (uint16_t) *
sctp->sctp_num_ostr, KM_NOSLEEP);
}
}
if (sctp->sctp_ostrcntrs == NULL) {
freeb(cemp);
SCTP_FADDR_TIMER_RESTART(sctp, fp, fp->rto);
if (errmp != NULL)
freeb(errmp);
return;
}
/*
* Allocate the in stream tracking array. Comments for sctp_ostrcntrs
* hold here too.
*/
old_num_str = sctp->sctp_num_istr;
if (ntohs(iack->sic_outstr) < sctp->sctp_num_istr)
sctp->sctp_num_istr = ntohs(iack->sic_outstr);
if (sctp->sctp_instr == NULL) {
sctp->sctp_instr = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (*sctp->sctp_instr) *
sctp->sctp_num_istr, KM_NOSLEEP);
} else {
ASSERT(old_num_str > 0);
if (old_num_str != sctp->sctp_num_istr) {
kmem_free(sctp->sctp_instr,
sizeof (*sctp->sctp_instr) * old_num_str);
sctp->sctp_instr = kmem_zalloc(
sizeof (*sctp->sctp_instr) * sctp->sctp_num_istr,
KM_NOSLEEP);
}
}
if (sctp->sctp_instr == NULL) {
kmem_free(sctp->sctp_ostrcntrs,
sizeof (uint16_t) * sctp->sctp_num_ostr);
freeb(cemp);
SCTP_FADDR_TIMER_RESTART(sctp, fp, fp->rto);
if (errmp != NULL)
freeb(errmp);
return;
}
if (!(sctp_options & SCTP_PRSCTP_OPTION) && sctp->sctp_prsctp_aware)
sctp->sctp_prsctp_aware = B_FALSE;
if (sctp_find_al_ind((sctp_parm_hdr_t *)(iack + 1),
ntohs(iackch->sch_len) - (sizeof (*iackch) + sizeof (*iack)),
&sctp->sctp_rx_adaptation_code) == 0) {
sctp->sctp_recv_adaptation = 1;
}
cech = (sctp_chunk_hdr_t *)cemp->b_rptr;
ASSERT(OK_32PTR(cech));
cech->sch_id = CHUNK_COOKIE;
cech->sch_flags = 0;
cech->sch_len = htons(ceclen);
/* Copy the cookie (less the parm hdr) to the chunk */
bcopy(cph + 1, cech + 1, ceclen - sizeof (*cph));
cemp->b_wptr = cemp->b_rptr + ceclen;
if (sctp->sctp_unsent > 0) {
sctp_msg_hdr_t *smh;
mblk_t *prev = NULL;
uint32_t unsent = 0;
mp = sctp->sctp_xmit_unsent;
do {
smh = (sctp_msg_hdr_t *)mp->b_rptr;
if (smh->smh_sid >= sctp->sctp_num_ostr) {
unsent += smh->smh_msglen;
if (prev != NULL)
prev->b_next = mp->b_next;
else
sctp->sctp_xmit_unsent = mp->b_next;
mp->b_next = NULL;
sctp_sendfail_event(sctp, mp, SCTP_ERR_BAD_SID,
B_FALSE);
if (prev != NULL)
mp = prev->b_next;
else
mp = sctp->sctp_xmit_unsent;
} else {
prev = mp;
mp = mp->b_next;
}
} while (mp != NULL);
if (unsent > 0) {
ASSERT(sctp->sctp_unsent >= unsent);
sctp->sctp_unsent -= unsent;
/*
* Update ULP the amount of queued data, which is
* sent-unack'ed + unsent.
* This is not necessary, but doesn't harm, we
* just use unsent instead of sent-unack'ed +
* unsent, since there won't be any sent-unack'ed
* here.
*/
if (!SCTP_IS_DETACHED(sctp))
SCTP_TXQ_UPDATE(sctp);
}
if (sctp->sctp_xmit_unsent == NULL)
sctp->sctp_xmit_unsent_tail = NULL;
}
ceclen += pad;
cansend = MIN(sctp->sctp_unsent, sctp->sctp_frwnd);
meta = sctp_get_msg_to_send(sctp, &mp, NULL, &error, ceclen,
cansend, NULL);
/*
* The error cannot be anything else since we could have an non-zero
* error only if sctp_get_msg_to_send() tries to send a Forward
* TSN which will not happen here.
*/
ASSERT(error == 0);
if (meta == NULL)
goto sendcookie;
sctp->sctp_xmit_tail = meta;
sdc = (sctp_data_hdr_t *)mp->b_rptr;
seglen = ntohs(sdc->sdh_len);
if ((ceclen + seglen) > fp->sfa_pmss ||
(seglen - sizeof (*sdc)) > cansend) {
goto sendcookie;
}
/* OK, if this fails */
cemp->b_cont = dupmsg(mp);
sendcookie:
head = sctp_add_proto_hdr(sctp, fp, cemp, 0, NULL);
if (head == NULL) {
freemsg(cemp);
SCTP_FADDR_TIMER_RESTART(sctp, fp, fp->rto);
if (errmp != NULL)
freeb(errmp);
SCTP_KSTAT(sctps, sctp_send_cookie_failed);
return;
}
/*
* Even if cookie-echo exceeds MTU for one of the hops, it'll
* have a chance of getting there.
*/
if (fp->isv4) {
ipha_t *iph = (ipha_t *)head->b_rptr;
iph->ipha_fragment_offset_and_flags = 0;
}
BUMP_LOCAL(sctp->sctp_obchunks);
sctp->sctp_cookie_mp = dupmsg(head);
/* Don't bundle, we will just resend init if this cookie is lost. */
if (sctp->sctp_cookie_mp == NULL) {
if (cemp->b_cont != NULL) {
freemsg(cemp->b_cont);
cemp->b_cont = NULL;
}
} else if (cemp->b_cont != NULL) {
ASSERT(mp != NULL && mp == meta->b_cont);
SCTP_CHUNK_CLEAR_FLAGS(cemp->b_cont);
cemp->b_wptr += pad;
seglen -= sizeof (*sdc);
SCTP_CHUNK_SENT(sctp, mp, sdc, fp, seglen, meta);
}
if (errmp != NULL) {
if (cemp->b_cont == NULL)
cemp->b_wptr += pad;
linkb(head, errmp);
}
sctp->sctp_state = SCTPS_COOKIE_ECHOED;
SCTP_FADDR_TIMER_RESTART(sctp, fp, fp->rto);
sctp_set_iplen(sctp, head);
sctp_add_sendq(sctp, head);
}
int
sctp_process_cookie(sctp_t *sctp, sctp_chunk_hdr_t *ch, mblk_t *cmp,
sctp_init_chunk_t **iackpp, sctp_hdr_t *insctph, int *recv_adaptation,
in6_addr_t *peer_addr)
{
int32_t clen;
size_t initplen;
uchar_t *p;
uchar_t *given_hash;
uchar_t needed_hash[16];
int64_t ts;
int64_t diff;
uint32_t *lt;
sctp_init_chunk_t *iack;
sctp_chunk_hdr_t *initch;
sctp_init_chunk_t *init;
uint32_t *lttag;
uint32_t *fttag;
uint32_t ports;
sctp_stack_t *sctps = sctp->sctp_sctps;
BUMP_LOCAL(sctp->sctp_ibchunks);
/* Verify the ICV */
clen = ntohs(ch->sch_len) - sizeof (*ch) - 16;
if (clen < 0) {
dprint(1, ("invalid cookie chunk length %d\n",
ntohs(ch->sch_len)));
return (-1);
}
p = (uchar_t *)(ch + 1);
hmac_md5(p, clen, (uchar_t *)sctp->sctp_secret, SCTP_SECRET_LEN,
needed_hash);
/* The given hash follows the cookie data */
given_hash = p + clen;
if (bcmp(given_hash, needed_hash, 16) != 0) {
/* The secret may have changed; try the old secret */
hmac_md5(p, clen, (uchar_t *)sctp->sctp_old_secret,
SCTP_SECRET_LEN, needed_hash);
if (bcmp(given_hash, needed_hash, 16) != 0) {
return (-1);
}
}
/* Timestamp is int64_t, and we only guarantee 32-bit alignment */
bcopy(p, &ts, sizeof (ts));
/* Cookie life time, uint32_t */
lt = (uint32_t *)(p + sizeof (ts));
/*
* To quote PRC, "this is our baby", so let's continue.
* We need to pull out the encapsulated INIT ACK and
* INIT chunks. Note that we don't process these until
* we have verified the timestamp, but we need them before
* processing the timestamp since if the time check fails,
* we need to get the verification tag from the INIT in order
* to send a stale cookie error.
*/
lttag = (uint32_t *)(lt + 1);
fttag = lttag + 1;
if (peer_addr != NULL)
bcopy(fttag + 1, peer_addr, sizeof (in6_addr_t));
iack = (sctp_init_chunk_t *)((char *)(fttag + 1) + sizeof (in6_addr_t));
initch = (sctp_chunk_hdr_t *)(iack + 1);
init = (sctp_init_chunk_t *)(initch + 1);
initplen = ntohs(initch->sch_len) - (sizeof (*init) + sizeof (*initch));
*iackpp = iack;
*recv_adaptation = 0;
/*
* Check the staleness of the Cookie, specified in 3.3.10.3 of
* RFC 2960.
*
* The mesaure of staleness is the difference, in microseconds,
* between the current time and the time the State Cookie expires.
* So it is lbolt64 - (ts + *lt). If it is positive, it means
* that the Cookie has expired.
*/
diff = lbolt64 - (ts + *lt);
if (diff > 0 && (init->sic_inittag != sctp->sctp_fvtag ||
iack->sic_inittag != sctp->sctp_lvtag)) {
uint32_t staleness;
staleness = TICK_TO_USEC(diff);
staleness = htonl(staleness);
sctp_send_abort(sctp, init->sic_inittag, SCTP_ERR_STALE_COOKIE,
(char *)&staleness, sizeof (staleness), cmp, 1, B_FALSE);
dprint(1, ("stale cookie %d\n", staleness));
return (-1);
}
/* Check for attack by adding addresses to a restart */
bcopy(insctph, &ports, sizeof (ports));
if (sctp_secure_restart_check(cmp, initch, ports, KM_NOSLEEP,
sctps) != 1) {
return (-1);
}
/* Look for adaptation code if there any parms in the INIT chunk */
if ((initplen >= sizeof (sctp_parm_hdr_t)) &&
(sctp_find_al_ind((sctp_parm_hdr_t *)(init + 1), initplen,
&sctp->sctp_rx_adaptation_code) == 0)) {
*recv_adaptation = 1;
}
/* Examine tie-tags */
if (sctp->sctp_state >= SCTPS_COOKIE_WAIT) {
if (sctp->sctp_state == SCTPS_ESTABLISHED &&
init->sic_inittag == sctp->sctp_fvtag &&
iack->sic_inittag == sctp->sctp_lvtag &&
*fttag == 0 && *lttag == 0) {
dprint(1, ("duplicate cookie from %x:%x:%x:%x (%d)\n",
SCTP_PRINTADDR(sctp->sctp_current->faddr),
(int)(sctp->sctp_fport)));
return (-1);
}
if (init->sic_inittag != sctp->sctp_fvtag &&
iack->sic_inittag != sctp->sctp_lvtag &&
*fttag == sctp->sctp_fvtag &&
*lttag == sctp->sctp_lvtag) {
int i;
/* Section 5.2.4 case A: restart */
sctp->sctp_fvtag = init->sic_inittag;
sctp->sctp_lvtag = iack->sic_inittag;
sctp->sctp_sctph->sh_verf = init->sic_inittag;
sctp->sctp_sctph6->sh_verf = init->sic_inittag;
sctp->sctp_ftsn = ntohl(init->sic_inittsn);
sctp->sctp_lastacked = sctp->sctp_ftsn - 1;
sctp->sctp_frwnd = ntohl(init->sic_a_rwnd);
sctp->sctp_fcsn = sctp->sctp_lastacked;
if (sctp->sctp_state < SCTPS_ESTABLISHED) {
sctp->sctp_state = SCTPS_ESTABLISHED;
sctp->sctp_assoc_start_time = (uint32_t)lbolt;
}
dprint(1, ("sctp peer %x:%x:%x:%x (%d) restarted\n",
SCTP_PRINTADDR(sctp->sctp_current->faddr),
(int)(sctp->sctp_fport)));
/* reset parameters */
sctp_congest_reset(sctp);
/* reset stream bookkeeping */
sctp_instream_cleanup(sctp, B_FALSE);
sctp->sctp_istr_nmsgs = 0;
sctp->sctp_rxqueued = 0;
for (i = 0; i < sctp->sctp_num_ostr; i++) {
sctp->sctp_ostrcntrs[i] = 0;
}
/* XXX flush xmit_list? */
return (0);
} else if (init->sic_inittag != sctp->sctp_fvtag &&
iack->sic_inittag == sctp->sctp_lvtag) {
/* Section 5.2.4 case B: INIT collision */
if (sctp->sctp_state < SCTPS_ESTABLISHED) {
if (!sctp_initialize_params(sctp, init, iack))
return (-1); /* Drop? */
sctp->sctp_state = SCTPS_ESTABLISHED;
sctp->sctp_assoc_start_time = (uint32_t)lbolt;
}
dprint(1, ("init collision with %x:%x:%x:%x (%d)\n",
SCTP_PRINTADDR(sctp->sctp_current->faddr),
(int)(sctp->sctp_fport)));
return (0);
} else if (iack->sic_inittag != sctp->sctp_lvtag &&
init->sic_inittag == sctp->sctp_fvtag &&
*fttag == 0 && *lttag == 0) {
/* Section 5.2.4 case C: late COOKIE */
dprint(1, ("late cookie from %x:%x:%x:%x (%d)\n",
SCTP_PRINTADDR(sctp->sctp_current->faddr),
(int)(sctp->sctp_fport)));
return (-1);
} else if (init->sic_inittag == sctp->sctp_fvtag &&
iack->sic_inittag == sctp->sctp_lvtag) {
/*
* Section 5.2.4 case D: COOKIE ECHO retransmit
* Don't check cookie lifetime
*/
dprint(1, ("cookie tags match from %x:%x:%x:%x (%d)\n",
SCTP_PRINTADDR(sctp->sctp_current->faddr),
(int)(sctp->sctp_fport)));
if (sctp->sctp_state < SCTPS_ESTABLISHED) {
if (!sctp_initialize_params(sctp, init, iack))
return (-1); /* Drop? */
sctp->sctp_state = SCTPS_ESTABLISHED;
sctp->sctp_assoc_start_time = (uint32_t)lbolt;
}
return (0);
} else {
/* unrecognized case -- silently drop it */
return (-1);
}
}
return (0);
}
/*
* Similar to ip_fanout_sctp, except that the src addr(s) are drawn
* from address parameters in an INIT ACK's address list. This
* function is used when an INIT ACK is received but IP's fanout
* function could not find a sctp via the normal lookup routine.
* This can happen when a host sends an INIT ACK from a different
* address than the INIT was sent to.
*
* Returns the sctp_t if found, or NULL if not found.
*/
sctp_t *
sctp_addrlist2sctp(mblk_t *mp, sctp_hdr_t *sctph, sctp_chunk_hdr_t *ich,
zoneid_t zoneid, sctp_stack_t *sctps)
{
int isv4;
ipha_t *iph;
ip6_t *ip6h;
in6_addr_t dst;
in6_addr_t src;
sctp_parm_hdr_t *ph;
ssize_t remaining;
sctp_init_chunk_t *iack;
uint32_t ports;
sctp_t *sctp = NULL;
ASSERT(ich->sch_id == CHUNK_INIT_ACK);
isv4 = (IPH_HDR_VERSION(mp->b_rptr) == IPV4_VERSION);
if (isv4) {
iph = (ipha_t *)mp->b_rptr;
IN6_IPADDR_TO_V4MAPPED(iph->ipha_dst, &dst);
} else {
ip6h = (ip6_t *)mp->b_rptr;
dst = ip6h->ip6_dst;
}
ports = *(uint32_t *)sctph;
dprint(1, ("sctp_addrlist2sctp: ports=%u, dst = %x:%x:%x:%x\n",
ports, SCTP_PRINTADDR(dst)));
/* pull out any address parameters */
remaining = ntohs(ich->sch_len) - sizeof (*ich) - sizeof (*iack);
if (remaining < sizeof (*ph)) {
return (NULL);
}
iack = (sctp_init_chunk_t *)(ich + 1);
ph = (sctp_parm_hdr_t *)(iack + 1);
while (ph != NULL) {
/*
* params have been put in host byteorder by
* sctp_check_input()
*/
if (ph->sph_type == PARM_ADDR4) {
IN6_INADDR_TO_V4MAPPED((struct in_addr *)(ph + 1),
&src);
sctp = sctp_conn_match(&src, &dst, ports, zoneid,
sctps);
dprint(1,
("sctp_addrlist2sctp: src=%x:%x:%x:%x, sctp=%p\n",
SCTP_PRINTADDR(src), (void *)sctp));
if (sctp != NULL) {
return (sctp);
}
} else if (ph->sph_type == PARM_ADDR6) {
src = *(in6_addr_t *)(ph + 1);
sctp = sctp_conn_match(&src, &dst, ports, zoneid,
sctps);
dprint(1,
("sctp_addrlist2sctp: src=%x:%x:%x:%x, sctp=%p\n",
SCTP_PRINTADDR(src), (void *)sctp));
if (sctp != NULL) {
return (sctp);
}
}
ph = sctp_next_parm(ph, &remaining);
}
return (NULL);
}