pkcs11_softtoken/common/softSSL.c

	softSSL.c revision 7c478bd95313f5f23a4c958a745db2134aa03244
/*
 * CDDL HEADER START
 *
 * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
 * Common Development and Distribution License, Version 1.0 only
 * (the "License").  You may not use this file except in compliance
 * with the License.
 *
 * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
 * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions
 * and limitations under the License.
 *
 * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
 * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
 * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
 * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
 * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
 *
 * CDDL HEADER END
 */
/*
 * Copyright 2004 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
 * Use is subject to license terms.
 */

#pragma ident   "%Z%%M% %I% %E% SMI"

#include <fcntl.h>
#include <strings.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/sha1.h>
#include <sys/md5.h>
#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
#include <security/cryptoki.h>
#include "softGlobal.h"
#include "softKeys.h"
#include "softKeystore.h"
#include "softMAC.h"
#include "softObject.h"
#include "softSession.h"
#include "softSSL.h"

/*
 * This files contains the implementation of the following PKCS#11
 * mechanisms needed by SSL:
 * CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE
 * CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH
 * CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_DERIVE
 * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE
 * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH
 * CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_DERIVE
 *
 * SSL refers to common functions between SSL v3.0 and SSL v3.1 (a.k.a TLS.)
 */

#define MAX_KEYBLOCK    160 /* should be plenty for all known cipherspecs */

#define MAX_DEFAULT_ATTRS   10  /* Enough for major applicarions */

static  char *ssl3_const_vals[] = {
    "A",
    "BB",
    "CCC",
    "DDDD",
    "EEEEE",
    "FFFFFF",
    "GGGGGGG",
    "HHHHHHHH",
    "IIIIIIIII",
    "JJJJJJJJJJ",
};
static  uint_t ssl3_const_lens[] = { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10};

static uchar_t TLS_MASTER_SECRET_LABEL[] = {"master secret"};
#define TLS_MASTER_SECRET_LABEL_LEN 13

static uchar_t TLS_KEY_EXPANSION_LABEL[] = {"key expansion"};
#define TLS_KEY_EXPANSION_LABEL_LEN 13

static uchar_t TLS_CLIENT_KEY_LABEL[] = {"client write key"};
#define TLS_CLIENT_KEY_LABEL_LEN    16

static uchar_t TLS_SERVER_KEY_LABEL[] = {"server write key"};
#define TLS_SERVER_KEY_LABEL_LEN    16

static uchar_t TLS_IV_BLOCK_LABEL[] = {"IV block"};
#define TLS_IV_BLOCK_LABEL_LEN  8

static void P_MD5(uchar_t *, uint_t, uchar_t *, uint_t, uchar_t *, uint_t,
    uchar_t *, uint_t, uchar_t *, uint_t, boolean_t);
static void P_SHA1(uchar_t *, uint_t, uchar_t *, uint_t, uchar_t *, uint_t,
    uchar_t *, uint_t, uchar_t *, uint_t, boolean_t);

static CK_RV soft_add_derived_key(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR, CK_ULONG,
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR, soft_session_t *, soft_object_t *);
static void soft_delete_derived_key(soft_session_t *, soft_object_t *);
static void soft_ssl_weaken_key(CK_MECHANISM_PTR, uchar_t *, uint_t,
    uchar_t *, uint_t, uchar_t *, uint_t, uchar_t *, boolean_t);

/*
 * soft_ssl3_churn()
 * Called for derivation of the master secret from the pre-master secret,
 * and for the derivation of the key_block in an SSL3 handshake
 * result is assumed to be larger than rounds * MD5_HASH_SIZE.
 */
static void
soft_ssl3_churn(uchar_t *secret, uint_t secretlen, uchar_t *rand1,
    uint_t rand1len, uchar_t *rand2, uint_t rand2len, int rounds,
    uchar_t *result)
{
    SHA1_CTX sha1_ctx;
    MD5_CTX md5_ctx;
    uchar_t sha1_digest[SHA1_HASH_SIZE];
    int i;
    uchar_t *ms = result;
    for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
        SHA1Init(&sha1_ctx);
        SHA1Update(&sha1_ctx, (const uint8_t *)ssl3_const_vals[i],
            ssl3_const_lens[i]);
        SHA1Update(&sha1_ctx, secret, secretlen);
        SHA1Update(&sha1_ctx, rand1, rand1len);
        SHA1Update(&sha1_ctx, rand2, rand2len);
        SHA1Final(sha1_digest, &sha1_ctx);

        MD5Init(&md5_ctx);
        MD5Update(&md5_ctx, secret, secretlen);
        MD5Update(&md5_ctx, sha1_digest, SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
        MD5Final(ms, &md5_ctx);
        ms += MD5_HASH_SIZE;
    }
}

/*
 * This TLS generic Pseudo Random Function expands a triplet
 * {secret, label, seed} into any arbitrary length string of pseudo
 * random bytes.
 * Here, it is called for the derivation of the master secret from the
 * pre-master secret, and for the derivation of the key_block in a TLS
 * handshake
 */
static void
soft_tls_prf(uchar_t *secret, uint_t secretlen, uchar_t *label, uint_t labellen,
    uchar_t *rand1, uint_t rand1len, uchar_t *rand2, uint_t rand2len,
    uchar_t *result, uint_t resultlen)
{
    uchar_t *S1, *S2;
    uchar_t md5_digested_key[MD5_HASH_SIZE];
    uchar_t sha1_digested_key[SHA1_HASH_SIZE];
    uint_t L_S, L_S1, L_S2;

    /* secret is NULL for IV's in exportable ciphersuites */
    if (secret == NULL) {
        L_S = 0;
        L_S2 = L_S1 = 0;
        S1 = NULL;
        S2 = NULL;
        goto do_P_HASH;
    }

    L_S = roundup(secretlen, 2) / 2;
    L_S1 = L_S;
    L_S2 = L_S;
    S1 = secret;
    S2 = secret + (secretlen / 2);  /* Possible overlap of S1 and S2. */

    /* Reduce the half secrets if bigger than the HASH's block size */
    if (L_S > MD5_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE) {
        MD5_CTX md5_ctx;
        SHA1_CTX sha1_ctx;

        MD5Init(&md5_ctx);
        MD5Update(&md5_ctx, S1, L_S);
        MD5Final(md5_digested_key, &md5_ctx);
        S1 = md5_digested_key;
        L_S1 = MD5_HASH_SIZE;

        SHA1Init(&sha1_ctx);
        SHA1Update(&sha1_ctx, S2, L_S);
        SHA1Final(sha1_digested_key, &sha1_ctx);
        S2 = sha1_digested_key;
        L_S2 = SHA1_HASH_SIZE;
    }

    /*
     * PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_MD5(S1, label + seed) XOR
     *              P_SHA-1(S2, label + seed);
     * the 'seed' here is rand1 + rand2
     */
do_P_HASH:
    /* The first one writes directly to the result */
    P_MD5(S1, L_S1, label, labellen, rand1, rand1len, rand2, rand2len,
        result, resultlen, B_FALSE);

    /* The second one XOR's with the result. */
    P_SHA1(S2, L_S2, label, labellen, rand1, rand1len, rand2, rand2len,
        result, resultlen, B_TRUE);
}

/*
 * These two expansion routines are very similar. (they can merge one day).
 * They implement the P_HASH() function for MD5 and for SHA1, as defined in
 * RFC2246:
 *
 *  P_hash(secret, seed) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) + seed) +
 *              HMAC_hash(secret, A(2) + seed) +
 *              HMAC_hash(secret, A(3) + seed) + ...
 * Where + indicates concatenation.
 * A() is defined as:
 *  A(0) = seed
 *  A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1))
 *
 * The seed is the concatenation of 'babel', 'rand1', and 'rand2'.
 */
static void
P_MD5(uchar_t *secret, uint_t secretlen, uchar_t *label, uint_t labellen,
    uchar_t *rand1, uint_t rand1len, uchar_t *rand2, uint_t rand2len,
    uchar_t *result, uint_t resultlen, boolean_t xor_it)
{
    uint32_t md5_ipad[MD5_HMAC_INTS_PER_BLOCK];
    uint32_t md5_opad[MD5_HMAC_INTS_PER_BLOCK];
    uchar_t md5_hmac[MD5_HASH_SIZE];
    uchar_t A[MD5_HASH_SIZE];
    md5_hc_ctx_t md5_hmac_ctx;
    uchar_t *res, *cur;
    uint_t left = resultlen;
    int i;

    /* good compilers will leverage the aligment */
    bzero(md5_ipad, MD5_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE);
    bzero(md5_opad, MD5_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE);

    if (secretlen > 0) {
        bcopy(secret, md5_ipad, secretlen);
        bcopy(secret, md5_opad, secretlen);
    }

    /* A(1) = HMAC_MD5(secret, rand1 + rand2) */
    md5_hmac_ctx_init(&md5_hmac_ctx, md5_ipad, md5_opad);
    SOFT_MAC_UPDATE(MD5, &md5_hmac_ctx, label, labellen);
    SOFT_MAC_UPDATE(MD5, &md5_hmac_ctx, rand1, rand1len);
    SOFT_MAC_UPDATE(MD5, &md5_hmac_ctx, rand2, rand2len);
    SOFT_MAC_FINAL(MD5, &md5_hmac_ctx, A);

    if (xor_it) {
        res = md5_hmac;
        cur = result;
    } else {
        res = result;
    }

    while (left > 0) {
        /*
         * Compute HMAC_MD5(secret, A(i) + seed);
         * The secret is already expanded in the ictx and octx, so
         * we can call the SOFT_MAC_INIT_CTX() directly.
         */
        SOFT_MAC_INIT_CTX(MD5, &md5_hmac_ctx, md5_ipad, md5_opad,
            MD5_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE);
        SOFT_MAC_UPDATE(MD5, &md5_hmac_ctx, A, MD5_HASH_SIZE);
        SOFT_MAC_UPDATE(MD5, &md5_hmac_ctx, label, labellen);
        SOFT_MAC_UPDATE(MD5, &md5_hmac_ctx, rand1, rand1len);
        SOFT_MAC_UPDATE(MD5, &md5_hmac_ctx, rand2, rand2len);

        if (left > MD5_HASH_SIZE) {
            SOFT_MAC_FINAL(MD5, &md5_hmac_ctx, res);
            if (xor_it) {
                for (i = 0; i < MD5_HASH_SIZE; i++) {
                    *cur ^= res[i];
                    cur++;
                }
            } else {
                res += MD5_HASH_SIZE;
            }
            left -= MD5_HASH_SIZE;
        } else {
            SOFT_MAC_FINAL(MD5, &md5_hmac_ctx, md5_hmac);
            if (xor_it) {
                for (i = 0; i < left; i++) {
                    *cur ^= md5_hmac[i];
                    cur++;
                }
            } else {
                bcopy(md5_hmac, res, left);
            }
            break;
        }
        /* A(i) = HMAC_MD5(secret, A(i-1) */
        SOFT_MAC_INIT_CTX(MD5, &md5_hmac_ctx, md5_ipad, md5_opad,
            MD5_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE);
        SOFT_MAC_UPDATE(MD5, &md5_hmac_ctx, A, MD5_HASH_SIZE);
        SOFT_MAC_FINAL(MD5, &md5_hmac_ctx, A);
    }
}
static void
P_SHA1(uchar_t *secret, uint_t secretlen, uchar_t *label, uint_t labellen,
    uchar_t *rand1, uint_t rand1len, uchar_t *rand2, uint_t rand2len,
    uchar_t *result, uint_t resultlen, boolean_t xor_it)
{
    uint32_t sha1_ipad[SHA1_HMAC_INTS_PER_BLOCK];
    uint32_t sha1_opad[SHA1_HMAC_INTS_PER_BLOCK];
    uchar_t sha1_hmac[SHA1_HASH_SIZE];
    uchar_t A[SHA1_HASH_SIZE];
    sha1_hc_ctx_t sha1_hmac_ctx;
    uchar_t *res, *cur;
    uint_t left = resultlen;
    int i;

    /* good compilers will leverage the aligment */
    bzero(sha1_ipad, SHA1_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE);
    bzero(sha1_opad, SHA1_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE);

    if (secretlen > 0) {
        bcopy(secret, sha1_ipad, secretlen);
        bcopy(secret, sha1_opad, secretlen);
    }

    /* A(1) = HMAC_SHA1(secret, rand1 + rand2) */
    sha1_hmac_ctx_init(&sha1_hmac_ctx, sha1_ipad, sha1_opad);
    SOFT_MAC_UPDATE(SHA1, &sha1_hmac_ctx, label, labellen);
    SOFT_MAC_UPDATE(SHA1, &sha1_hmac_ctx, rand1, rand1len);
    SOFT_MAC_UPDATE(SHA1, &sha1_hmac_ctx, rand2, rand2len);
    SOFT_MAC_FINAL(SHA1, &sha1_hmac_ctx, A);

    if (xor_it) {
        res = sha1_hmac;
        cur = result;
    } else {
        res = result;
    }

    while (left > 0) {
        /*
         * Compute HMAC_SHA1(secret, A(i) + seed);
         * The secret is already expanded in the ictx and octx, so
         * we can call the SOFT_MAC_INIT_CTX() directly.
         */
        SOFT_MAC_INIT_CTX(SHA1, &sha1_hmac_ctx,
            (const uchar_t *)sha1_ipad, (const uchar_t *)sha1_opad,
            SHA1_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE);
        SOFT_MAC_UPDATE(SHA1, &sha1_hmac_ctx, A, SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
        SOFT_MAC_UPDATE(SHA1, &sha1_hmac_ctx, label, labellen);
        SOFT_MAC_UPDATE(SHA1, &sha1_hmac_ctx, rand1, rand1len);
        SOFT_MAC_UPDATE(SHA1, &sha1_hmac_ctx, rand2, rand2len);

        if (left > SHA1_HASH_SIZE) {
            SOFT_MAC_FINAL(SHA1, &sha1_hmac_ctx, res);
            if (xor_it) {
                for (i = 0; i < SHA1_HASH_SIZE; i++) {
                    *cur ^= res[i];
                    cur++;
                }
            } else {
                res += SHA1_HASH_SIZE;
            }
            left -= SHA1_HASH_SIZE;
        } else {
            SOFT_MAC_FINAL(SHA1, &sha1_hmac_ctx, sha1_hmac);
            if (xor_it) {
                for (i = 0; i < left; i++) {
                    *cur ^= sha1_hmac[i];
                    cur++;
                }
            } else {
                bcopy(sha1_hmac, res, left);
            }
            break;
        }
        /* A(i) = HMAC_SHA1(secret, A(i-1) */
        SOFT_MAC_INIT_CTX(SHA1, &sha1_hmac_ctx,
            (const uchar_t *)sha1_ipad, (const uchar_t *)sha1_opad,
            SHA1_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE);
        SOFT_MAC_UPDATE(SHA1, &sha1_hmac_ctx, A, SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
        SOFT_MAC_FINAL(SHA1, &sha1_hmac_ctx, A);
    }
}
/*
 * soft_ssl_master_key_derive()
 *
 * Arguments:
 * . session_p
 * . mech_p:    key derivation mechanism. the mechanism parameter carries the
 *      client and master random from the Hello handshake messages.
 * . basekey_p: The pre-master secret key.
 * . pTemplate & ulAttributeCount: Any extra attributes for the key to be
 *      created.
 * . phKey: store for handle to the derived key.
 *
 * Description:
 *  Derive the SSL master secret from the pre-master secret, the client
 *  and server random.
 *  In SSL 3.0, master_secret =
 *      MD5(pre_master_secret + SHA('A' + pre_master_secret +
 *          ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random)) +
 *      MD5(pre_master_secret + SHA('BB' + pre_master_secret +
 *          ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random)) +
 *      MD5(pre_master_secret + SHA('CCC' + pre_master_secret +
 *          ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random));
 *
 *  In TLS 1.0 (a.k.a. SSL 3.1), master_secret =
 *      PRF(pre_master_secret, "master secret",
 *      ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random)
 */
CK_RV
soft_ssl_master_key_derive(soft_session_t *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR mech,
    soft_object_t *basekey_p, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,
    CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
{
    uchar_t *pmsecret = OBJ_SEC_VALUE(basekey_p);
#ifdef  __sparcv9
    /* LINTED */
    uint_t pmlen = (uint_t)OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(basekey_p);
#else   /* __sparcv9 */
    uint_t pmlen = OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(basekey_p);
#endif  /* __sparcv9 */
    CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *mkd_params;
    CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA *random_data;
    CK_VERSION_PTR  pVersion;
    uchar_t ssl_master_secret[48];
    CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
    CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
    CK_BBOOL true = TRUE;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE obj_tmpl[MAX_DEFAULT_ATTRS];
    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR new_tmpl;
    CK_ULONG newattrcount;
    boolean_t new_tmpl_allocated = B_FALSE, is_tls = B_FALSE;
    ulong_t i;
    CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
    uint_t ClientRandomLen, ServerRandomLen;

    /* Check the validity of the mechanism's parameter */

    mkd_params = (CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *)mech->pParameter;

    if (mkd_params == NULL ||
        mech->ulParameterLen != sizeof (CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS))
        return (CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);

    pVersion = mkd_params->pVersion;

    switch (mech->mechanism) {
    case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
        is_tls = B_TRUE;
    /* FALLTHRU */
    case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
        /* Invalid pre-master key length. What else to return? */
        if (pmlen != 48)
            return (CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD);

        /* Get the SSL version number from the premaster secret */
        if (pVersion == NULL_PTR)
            return (CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);

        bcopy(pmsecret, pVersion, sizeof (CK_VERSION));

        break;
    case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH:
        is_tls = B_TRUE;
    /* FALLTHRU */
    case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH:
        if (pVersion != NULL_PTR)
            return (CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
    }

    random_data = &mkd_params->RandomInfo;
#ifdef  __sparcv9
    /* LINTED */
    ClientRandomLen = (uint_t)random_data->ulClientRandomLen;
    /* LINTED */
    ServerRandomLen = (uint_t)random_data->ulServerRandomLen;
#else   /* __sparcv9 */
    ClientRandomLen = random_data->ulClientRandomLen;
    ServerRandomLen = random_data->ulServerRandomLen;
#endif  /* __sparcv9 */

    if (random_data->pClientRandom == NULL_PTR || ClientRandomLen == 0 ||
        random_data->pServerRandom == NULL_PTR || ServerRandomLen == 0) {
        return (CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
    }

    /* Now the actual secret derivation */
    if (!is_tls) {
        soft_ssl3_churn(pmsecret, pmlen, random_data->pClientRandom,
            ClientRandomLen, random_data->pServerRandom,
            ServerRandomLen, 3, ssl_master_secret);
    } else {
        soft_tls_prf(pmsecret, pmlen, TLS_MASTER_SECRET_LABEL,
            TLS_MASTER_SECRET_LABEL_LEN, random_data->pClientRandom,
            ClientRandomLen, random_data->pServerRandom,
            ServerRandomLen, ssl_master_secret, 48);
    }

    /*
     * The object creation attributes need to be in one contiguous
     * array. In addition to the attrs from the application supplied
     * pTemplates, We need to add the class, type, value, valuelen and
     * CKA_DERIVE.
     * In the most likely case, the application passes between zero and
     * handful of attributes, We optimize for that case by allocating
     * the new template on the stack. Oherwise we malloc() it.
     */

    newattrcount = ulAttributeCount + 4;
    if (newattrcount > MAX_DEFAULT_ATTRS) {
        new_tmpl = malloc(sizeof (CK_ATTRIBUTE) * newattrcount);

        if (new_tmpl == NULL)
            return (CKR_HOST_MEMORY);

        new_tmpl_allocated = B_TRUE;
    } else
        new_tmpl = obj_tmpl;

    /*
     * Fill in the new template.
     * We put the attributes contributed by the mechanism first
     * so that they override the application supplied ones.
     */
    new_tmpl[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
    new_tmpl[0].pValue = &class;
    new_tmpl[0].ulValueLen = sizeof (class);
    new_tmpl[1].type = CKA_KEY_TYPE;
    new_tmpl[1].pValue = &keyType;
    new_tmpl[1].ulValueLen = sizeof (keyType);
    new_tmpl[2].type = CKA_DERIVE;
    new_tmpl[2].pValue = &true;
    new_tmpl[2].ulValueLen = sizeof (true);
    new_tmpl[3].type = CKA_VALUE;
    new_tmpl[3].pValue = ssl_master_secret;
    new_tmpl[3].ulValueLen = 48;

    /* Any attributes left? */
    if (ulAttributeCount > 0) {

        /* Validate the default class and type attributes */
        for (i = 0; i < ulAttributeCount; i++) {
            /* The caller is responsible for proper alignment */
            if ((pTemplate[i].type == CKA_CLASS) &&
                (*((CK_OBJECT_CLASS *)pTemplate[i].pValue) !=
                CKO_SECRET_KEY)) {
                rv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
                goto out;
            }
            if ((pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE) &&
                (*((CK_KEY_TYPE *)pTemplate[i].pValue) !=
                CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) {
                rv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
                goto out;
            }
        }
        bcopy(pTemplate, &new_tmpl[4],
            ulAttributeCount * sizeof (CK_ATTRIBUTE));
    }

    rv = soft_add_derived_key(new_tmpl, newattrcount, phKey, sp, basekey_p);
out:
    if (new_tmpl_allocated)
        free(new_tmpl);

    return (rv);
}

/*
 * soft_ssl3_key_and_mac_derive()
 *
 * Arguments:
 * . session_p
 * . mech_p:    key derivation mechanism. the mechanism parameter carries the
 *      client and mastter random from the Hello handshake messages,
 *      the specification of the key and IV sizes, and the location
 *      for the resulting keys and IVs.
 * . basekey_p: The master secret key.
 * . pTemplate & ulAttributeCount: Any extra attributes for the key to be
 *      created.
 *
 * Description:
 *  Derive the SSL key material (Client and server MAC secrets, symmetric
 *  keys and IVs), from the master secret and the client
 *  and server random.
 *  First a keyblock is generated usining the following formula:
 *  key_block =
 *          MD5(master_secret + SHA(`A' + master_secret +
 *                  ServerHello.random +
 *                  ClientHello.random)) +
 *          MD5(master_secret + SHA(`BB' + master_secret +
 *                  ServerHello.random +
 *                  ClientHello.random)) +
 *          MD5(master_secret + SHA(`CCC' + master_secret +
 *                  ServerHello.random +
 *                  ClientHello.random)) + [...];
 *
 *  In TLS 1.0 (a.k.a. SSL 3.1), key_block =
 *      PRF(master_secret, "key expansion",
 *      ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)
 *
 *  Then the keys materials are taken from the keyblock.
 */

CK_RV
soft_ssl_key_and_mac_derive(soft_session_t *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR mech,
    soft_object_t *basekey_p, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,
    CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount)
{
    uchar_t *msecret = OBJ_SEC_VALUE(basekey_p);
#ifdef  __sparcv9
    /* LINTED */
    uint_t mslen = (uint_t)OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(basekey_p);
#else   /* __sparcv9 */
    uint_t mslen = OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(basekey_p);
#endif  /* __sparcv9 */
    CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *km_params;
    CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA *random_data;
    CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT *kmo;
    uchar_t key_block[MAX_KEYBLOCK], *kb, *export_keys = NULL;
    CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
    CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
    CK_BBOOL true = TRUE;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE obj_tmpl[MAX_DEFAULT_ATTRS];
    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR new_tmpl;
    ulong_t newattrcount, mac_key_bytes, secret_key_bytes, iv_bytes;
    uint_t size;
    int rounds;
    boolean_t new_tmpl_allocated = B_FALSE, isExport;
    CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
    uint_t ClientRandomLen, ServerRandomLen;

    /* Check the validity of the mechanism's parameter */

    km_params = (CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *)mech->pParameter;

    if (km_params == NULL ||
        mech->ulParameterLen != sizeof (CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS) ||
        (kmo = km_params->pReturnedKeyMaterial) == NULL)
        return (CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);

    isExport = (km_params->bIsExport == TRUE);

    random_data = &km_params->RandomInfo;
#ifdef  __sparcv9
    /* LINTED */
    ClientRandomLen = (uint_t)random_data->ulClientRandomLen;
    /* LINTED */
    ServerRandomLen = (uint_t)random_data->ulServerRandomLen;
#else   /* __sparcv9 */
    ClientRandomLen = random_data->ulClientRandomLen;
    ServerRandomLen = random_data->ulServerRandomLen;
#endif  /* __sparcv9 */

    if (random_data->pClientRandom == NULL_PTR || ClientRandomLen == 0 ||
        random_data->pServerRandom == NULL_PTR || ServerRandomLen == 0) {
        return (CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
    }

    mac_key_bytes = km_params->ulMacSizeInBits / 8;
    secret_key_bytes = km_params->ulKeySizeInBits / 8;
    iv_bytes = km_params->ulIVSizeInBits / 8;

    if ((iv_bytes > 0) &&
        ((kmo->pIVClient == NULL) || (kmo->pIVServer == NULL)))
        return (CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);

    /*
     * For exportable ciphersuites, the IV's aren't taken from the
     * key block. They are directly derived from the client and
     * server random data.
     * For SSL3.0:
     *  client_write_IV = MD5(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random);
     *  server_write_IV = MD5(ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random);
     * For TLS1.0:
     *  iv_block = PRF("", "IV block", client_random +
     *          server_random)[0..15]
     *  client_write_IV = iv_block[0..7]
     *  server_write_IV = iv_block[8..15]
     */
    if ((isExport) && (iv_bytes > 0)) {

        if (mech->mechanism == CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE) {
            MD5_CTX exp_md5_ctx;

            if (iv_bytes > MD5_HASH_SIZE)
                return (CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);

            MD5Init(&exp_md5_ctx);
            MD5Update(&exp_md5_ctx, random_data->pClientRandom,
                ClientRandomLen);
            MD5Update(&exp_md5_ctx, random_data->pServerRandom,
                ServerRandomLen);

            /* there's room in key_block. use it */
            MD5Final(key_block, &exp_md5_ctx);
            bcopy(key_block, kmo->pIVClient, iv_bytes);

            MD5Init(&exp_md5_ctx);
            MD5Update(&exp_md5_ctx, random_data->pServerRandom,
                ServerRandomLen);
            MD5Update(&exp_md5_ctx, random_data->pClientRandom,
                ClientRandomLen);
            MD5Final(key_block, &exp_md5_ctx);
            bcopy(key_block, kmo->pIVServer, iv_bytes);
        } else {
            uchar_t iv_block[16];

            if (iv_bytes != 8)
                return (CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);

            soft_tls_prf(NULL, 0, TLS_IV_BLOCK_LABEL,
                TLS_IV_BLOCK_LABEL_LEN,
                random_data->pClientRandom, ClientRandomLen,
                random_data->pServerRandom, ServerRandomLen,
                iv_block, 16);
        }
        /* so we won't allocate a key_block bigger than needed */
        iv_bytes = 0;
    }

    /* Now the actual secret derivation */

#ifdef  __sparcv9
    /* LINTED */
    size = (uint_t)((mac_key_bytes + secret_key_bytes + iv_bytes) * 2);
#else   /* __sparcv9 */
    size = (mac_key_bytes + secret_key_bytes + iv_bytes) * 2;
#endif  /* __sparcv9 */

    /* Need to handle this better */
    if (size > MAX_KEYBLOCK)
        return (CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);

    rounds = howmany(size, MD5_HASH_SIZE);

    kb = key_block;

    if (mech->mechanism == CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE) {
        soft_ssl3_churn(msecret, mslen, random_data->pServerRandom,
            ServerRandomLen, random_data->pClientRandom,
            ClientRandomLen, rounds, kb);
    } else {
        soft_tls_prf(msecret, mslen, TLS_KEY_EXPANSION_LABEL,
            TLS_KEY_EXPANSION_LABEL_LEN,
            random_data->pServerRandom, ServerRandomLen,
            random_data->pClientRandom, ClientRandomLen,
            kb, size);
    }

    /* Now create the objects */

    kmo->hClientMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
    kmo->hServerMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
    kmo->hClientKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
    kmo->hServerKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;

    /* First the MAC secrets */
    if (mac_key_bytes > 0) {
        obj_tmpl[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
        obj_tmpl[0].pValue = &class;    /* CKO_SECRET_KEY */
        obj_tmpl[0].ulValueLen = sizeof (class);
        obj_tmpl[1].type = CKA_KEY_TYPE;
        obj_tmpl[1].pValue = &keyType;  /* CKK_GENERIC_SECRET */
        obj_tmpl[1].ulValueLen = sizeof (keyType);
        obj_tmpl[2].type = CKA_DERIVE;
        obj_tmpl[2].pValue = &true;
        obj_tmpl[2].ulValueLen = sizeof (true);
        obj_tmpl[3].type = CKA_SIGN;
        obj_tmpl[3].pValue = &true;
        obj_tmpl[3].ulValueLen = sizeof (true);
        obj_tmpl[4].type = CKA_VERIFY;
        obj_tmpl[4].pValue = &true;
        obj_tmpl[4].ulValueLen = sizeof (true);
        obj_tmpl[5].type = CKA_VALUE;
        obj_tmpl[5].pValue = kb;
        obj_tmpl[5].ulValueLen = mac_key_bytes;

        rv = soft_add_derived_key(obj_tmpl, 6,
            &(kmo->hClientMacSecret), sp, basekey_p);

        if (rv != CKR_OK)
            goto out_err;

        kb += mac_key_bytes;

        obj_tmpl[5].pValue = kb;
        rv = soft_add_derived_key(obj_tmpl, 6,
            &(kmo->hServerMacSecret), sp, basekey_p);

        if (rv != CKR_OK)
            goto out_err;

        kb += mac_key_bytes;
    }

    /* Then the symmetric ciphers keys */
    if (secret_key_bytes > 0) {

        newattrcount = ulAttributeCount + 5;
        if (newattrcount > MAX_DEFAULT_ATTRS) {
            new_tmpl = malloc(sizeof (CK_ATTRIBUTE) * newattrcount);

            if (new_tmpl == NULL)
                return (CKR_HOST_MEMORY);

            new_tmpl_allocated = B_TRUE;
        } else
            new_tmpl = obj_tmpl;

        new_tmpl[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
        new_tmpl[0].pValue = &class;    /* CKO_SECRET_KEY */
        new_tmpl[0].ulValueLen = sizeof (class);
        /*
         * The keyType comes from the application's template, and
         * depends on the ciphersuite
         */
        new_tmpl[1].type = CKA_DERIVE;
        new_tmpl[1].pValue = &true;
        new_tmpl[1].ulValueLen = sizeof (true);
        new_tmpl[2].type = CKA_ENCRYPT;
        new_tmpl[2].pValue = &true;
        new_tmpl[2].ulValueLen = sizeof (true);
        new_tmpl[3].type = CKA_DECRYPT;
        new_tmpl[3].pValue = &true;
        new_tmpl[3].ulValueLen = sizeof (true);
        new_tmpl[4].type = CKA_VALUE;

        if (isExport) {
            if (secret_key_bytes > MD5_HASH_SIZE) {
                rv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
                goto out_err;
            }
            if ((export_keys = malloc(2 * MD5_HASH_SIZE)) == NULL) {
                rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
                goto out_err;
            }
#ifdef  __sparcv9
            /* LINTED */
            soft_ssl_weaken_key(mech, kb, (uint_t)secret_key_bytes,
#else   /* __sparcv9 */
            soft_ssl_weaken_key(mech, kb, secret_key_bytes,
#endif  /* __sparcv9 */
                random_data->pClientRandom, ClientRandomLen,
                random_data->pServerRandom, ServerRandomLen,
                export_keys, B_TRUE);
                new_tmpl[4].pValue = export_keys;
        } else {
            new_tmpl[4].pValue = kb;
        }
        new_tmpl[4].ulValueLen = secret_key_bytes;

        if (ulAttributeCount > 0)
            bcopy(pTemplate, &new_tmpl[5],
                ulAttributeCount * sizeof (CK_ATTRIBUTE));

        rv = soft_add_derived_key(new_tmpl, newattrcount,
            &(kmo->hClientKey), sp, basekey_p);

        if (rv != CKR_OK)
            goto out_err;

        kb += secret_key_bytes;

        if (isExport) {
#ifdef  __sparcv9
            /* LINTED */
            soft_ssl_weaken_key(mech, kb, (uint_t)secret_key_bytes,
#else   /* __sparcv9 */
            soft_ssl_weaken_key(mech, kb, secret_key_bytes,
#endif  /* __sparcv9 */
                random_data->pServerRandom, ServerRandomLen,
                random_data->pClientRandom, ClientRandomLen,
                export_keys + MD5_HASH_SIZE, B_FALSE);
                new_tmpl[4].pValue = export_keys + MD5_HASH_SIZE;
        } else
            new_tmpl[4].pValue = kb;

        rv = soft_add_derived_key(new_tmpl, newattrcount,
            &(kmo->hServerKey), sp, basekey_p);

        if (rv != CKR_OK)
            goto out_err;

        kb += secret_key_bytes;
    }

    /* Finally, the IVs */
    if (iv_bytes > 0) {
        bcopy(kb, kmo->pIVClient, iv_bytes);
        kb += iv_bytes;
        bcopy(kb, kmo->pIVServer, iv_bytes);
    }

    if (new_tmpl_allocated)
        free(new_tmpl);

    if (export_keys != NULL)
        free(export_keys);

    return (rv);

out_err:
    if (kmo->hClientMacSecret != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
        (void) soft_delete_derived_key(sp,
            (soft_object_t *)(kmo->hClientMacSecret));
        kmo->hClientMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
    }
    if (kmo->hServerMacSecret != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
        (void) soft_delete_derived_key(sp,
            (soft_object_t *)(kmo->hServerMacSecret));
        kmo->hServerMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
    }
    if (kmo->hClientKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
        (void) soft_delete_derived_key(sp,
            (soft_object_t *)(kmo->hClientKey));
        kmo->hClientKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
    }
    if (kmo->hServerKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
        (void) soft_delete_derived_key(sp,
            (soft_object_t *)(kmo->hServerKey));
        kmo->hServerKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
    }

    if (new_tmpl_allocated)
        free(new_tmpl);

    if (export_keys != NULL)
        free(export_keys);

    return (rv);
}

/*
 * Add the derived key to the session, and, if it's a token object,
 * write it to the token.
 */
static CK_RV
soft_add_derived_key(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR tmpl, CK_ULONG attrcount,
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey, soft_session_t *sp, soft_object_t *basekey_p)
{
    CK_RV rv;
    soft_object_t *secret_key;

    if ((secret_key = calloc(1, sizeof (soft_object_t))) == NULL) {
        return (CKR_HOST_MEMORY);
    }

    if (((rv = soft_build_secret_key_object(tmpl, attrcount, secret_key,
        SOFT_CREATE_OBJ_INT, 0, (CK_KEY_TYPE)~0UL)) != CKR_OK) ||
        ((rv = soft_pin_expired_check(secret_key)) != CKR_OK) ||
        ((rv = soft_object_write_access_check(sp, secret_key)) != CKR_OK)) {

        free(secret_key);
        return (rv);
    }

    /* Set the sensitivity and extractability attributes as a needed */
    soft_derive_enforce_flags(basekey_p, secret_key);

    /* Initialize the rest of stuffs in soft_object_t. */
    (void) pthread_mutex_init(&secret_key->object_mutex, NULL);
    secret_key->magic_marker = SOFTTOKEN_OBJECT_MAGIC;

    /* ... and, if it needs to persist, write on the token */
    if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(secret_key)) {
        secret_key->session_handle = (CK_SESSION_HANDLE)NULL;
        soft_add_token_object_to_slot(secret_key);
        rv = soft_put_object_to_keystore(secret_key);
        if (rv != CKR_OK) {
            soft_delete_token_object(secret_key, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
            return (rv);
        }
        *phKey = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)secret_key;

        return (CKR_OK);
    }

    /* Add the new object to the session's object list. */
    soft_add_object_to_session(secret_key, sp);
    secret_key->session_handle = (CK_SESSION_HANDLE)sp;

    *phKey = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)secret_key;

    return (rv);
}

/*
 * Delete the derived key from the session, and, if it's a token object,
 * remove it from the token.
 */
static void
soft_delete_derived_key(soft_session_t *sp, soft_object_t *key)
{
    /* session_handle is the creating session. It's NULL for token objs */

    if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(key))
        soft_delete_token_object(key, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
    else
        soft_delete_object(sp, key, B_FALSE);
}

/*
 * soft_ssl_weaken_key()
 * Reduce the key length to an exportable size.
 * For SSL3.0:
 *  final_client_write_key = MD5(client_write_key +
 *                                ClientHello.random +
 *                                ServerHello.random);
 *  final_server_write_key = MD5(server_write_key +
 *                                ServerHello.random +
 *                                ClientHello.random);
 * For TLS1.0:
 *  final_client_write_key = PRF(SecurityParameters.client_write_key,
 *                  "client write key",
 *                  SecurityParameters.client_random +
 *                  SecurityParameters.server_random)[0..15];
 *  final_server_write_key = PRF(SecurityParameters.server_write_key,
 *                  "server write key",
 *                  SecurityParameters.client_random +
 *                  SecurityParameters.server_random)[0..15];
 */
static void
soft_ssl_weaken_key(CK_MECHANISM_PTR mech, uchar_t *secret, uint_t secretlen,
    uchar_t *rand1, uint_t rand1len, uchar_t *rand2, uint_t rand2len,
    uchar_t *result, boolean_t isclient)
{
    MD5_CTX exp_md5_ctx;
    uchar_t *label;
    uint_t labellen;

    if (mech->mechanism == CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE) {
        MD5Init(&exp_md5_ctx);
        MD5Update(&exp_md5_ctx, secret, secretlen);
        MD5Update(&exp_md5_ctx, rand1, rand1len);
        MD5Update(&exp_md5_ctx, rand2, rand2len);
        MD5Final(result, &exp_md5_ctx);
    } else {
        if (isclient) {
            label = TLS_CLIENT_KEY_LABEL;
            labellen = TLS_CLIENT_KEY_LABEL_LEN;
        } else {
            label = TLS_SERVER_KEY_LABEL;
            labellen = TLS_SERVER_KEY_LABEL_LEN;
        }
        soft_tls_prf(secret, secretlen, label, labellen,
            rand1, rand1len, rand2, rand2len, result, 16);
    }
}