adt.c revision f89940742f5d14dde79b69b98a414dd7b7f585c7
/*
* CDDL HEADER START
*
* The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
* Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
* You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
*
* You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
* or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions
* and limitations under the License.
*
* When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
* file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
* If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
* fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
* information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
*
* CDDL HEADER END
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
*/
#include <bsm/adt.h>
#include <bsm/adt_event.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <bsm/audit.h>
#include <bsm/audit_record.h>
#include <bsm/libbsm.h>
#include <door.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <generic.h>
#include <md5.h>
#include <sys/mkdev.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <nss_dbdefs.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <synch.h>
#include <sys/systeminfo.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#include <thread.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <adt_xlate.h>
#include <adt_ucred.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <libinetutil.h>
static int adt_selected(struct adt_event_state *, au_event_t, int);
static int adt_init(adt_internal_state_t *, int);
static int adt_import(adt_internal_state_t *, const adt_export_data_t *);
static m_label_t *adt_ucred_label(ucred_t *);
static void adt_setto_unaudited(adt_internal_state_t *);
static int adt_get_local_address(int, struct ifaddrlist *);
#ifdef C2_DEBUG
#define DPRINTF(x) { (void) printf x; }
#define DFLUSH (void) fflush(stdout);
#else
#define DPRINTF(x)
#define DFLUSH
#endif
/*
* Local audit states are a bit mask
*
* The global audit states are
*
* AUC_UNSET 0 - on/off hasn't been decided
* AUC_ENABLED 1 - loaded and enabled
*
* The local Zone states are
*
* AUC_AUDITING 0x1 - audit daemon is active
* AUC_NOAUDIT 0x2 - audit daemon is not active
* AUC_INIT_AUDIT 0x4 - audit is ready but auditd has not run
* AUC_NOSPACE 0x8 - audit enabled, no space for audit records
*
* The only values returned by auditon(A_GETCOND) are:
* AUC_INIT_AUDIT, AUC_AUDITING, AUC_NOAUDIT, AUC_NOSPACE
*
* The pseudo audit state used when the c2audit module is excluded is
*
* AUC_DISABLED 0x100 - c2audit module is excluded
*/
static int auditstate = AUC_DISABLED; /* default state */
/*
* adt_write_syslog
*
* errors that are not the user's fault (bugs or whatever in
* the underlying audit code are noted in syslog.)
*
* Avoid calling adt_write_syslog for things that can happen
* at high volume.
*
* syslog's open (openlog) and close (closelog) are interesting;
* openlog *may* create a file descriptor and is optional. closelog
* *will* close any open file descriptors and is also optional.
*
* Since syslog may also be used by the calling application, the
* choice is to avoid openlog, which sets some otherwise useful
* parameters, and to embed "Solaris_audit" in the log message.
*/
void
adt_write_syslog(const char *message, int err)
{
int save_errno = errno;
int mask_priority;
DPRINTF(("syslog called: %s\n", message));
mask_priority = setlogmask(LOG_MASK(LOG_ALERT));
errno = err;
syslog(LOG_ALERT, "Solaris_audit %s: %m", message);
(void) setlogmask(mask_priority);
errno = save_errno;
}
/*
* return true if c2audit is not excluded.
*
* For purpose of this API, anything but AUC_DISABLED
* is enabled; however one never actually sees
* AUC_DISABLED since auditon returns ENOTSUP in that case. Any
* auditon error is considered the same as ENOTSUP for our
* purpose. auditstate is not changed by auditon if an error
* is returned.
*/
/*
* XXX this should probably be eliminated and adt_audit_state() replace it.
* All the legitimate uses are to not fork a waiting process for
* process exit processing, as in su, login, dtlogin. Other bogus
* users are zoneadmd and init.
* All but dtlogin are in ON, so we can do this without cross gate
* synchronization.
*
* No longer used in adt.c.
*/
boolean_t
adt_audit_enabled(void)
{
(void) auditon(A_GETCOND, (caddr_t)&auditstate, sizeof (auditstate));
return (auditstate != AUC_DISABLED);
}
/*
* See adt_audit_enabled() for state discussions.
* The state parameter is a hedge until all the uses become clear.
* Likely if adt_audit_enabled is brought internal to this file,
* it could be modified to take one or more parameters to describe the
* state.
*/
boolean_t
adt_audit_state(int states)
{
(void) auditon(A_GETCOND, (caddr_t)&auditstate, sizeof (auditstate));
return ((auditstate & states) ? B_TRUE : B_FALSE);
}
/*
* Get user_specific/non-attributable audit mask. This may be called even when
* auditing is off.
*/
static int
adt_get_mask_from_user(uid_t uid, au_mask_t *mask)
{
struct passwd pwd;
long buff_sz;
char *pwd_buff;
if (auditstate & AUC_DISABLED) {
/* c2audit excluded */
mask->am_success = 0;
mask->am_failure = 0;
} else if (uid <= MAXUID) {
if ((buff_sz = sysconf(_SC_GETPW_R_SIZE_MAX)) == -1) {
adt_write_syslog("couldn't determine maximum size of "
"password buffer", errno);
return (-1);
}
if ((pwd_buff = calloc(1, (size_t)++buff_sz)) == NULL) {
return (-1);
}
if (getpwuid_r(uid, &pwd, pwd_buff, (int)buff_sz) == NULL) {
errno = EINVAL; /* user doesn't exist */
free(pwd_buff);
return (-1);
}
free(pwd_buff);
if (au_user_mask(pwd.pw_name, mask)) {
errno = EFAULT; /* undetermined failure */
return (-1);
}
} else if (auditon(A_GETKMASK, (caddr_t)mask, sizeof (*mask)) == -1) {
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
/*
* adt_get_unique_id -- generate a hopefully unique 32 bit value
*
* there will be a follow up to replace this with the use of /dev/random
*
* An MD5 hash is taken on a buffer of
* hostname . audit id . unix time . pid . count
*
* "count = noise++;" is subject to a race condition but I don't
* see a need to put a lock around it.
*/
au_asid_t
adt_get_unique_id(au_id_t uid)
{
char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
union {
au_id_t v[4];
unsigned char obuff[128/8];
} output;
MD5_CTX context;
static int noise = 0;
int count = noise++;
time_t timebits = time(NULL);
pid_t pidbits = getpid();
au_asid_t retval = 0;
if (gethostname(hostname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
adt_write_syslog("gethostname call failed", errno);
(void) strncpy(hostname, "invalidHostName", MAXHOSTNAMELEN);
}
while (retval == 0) { /* 0 is the only invalid result */
MD5Init(&context);
MD5Update(&context, (unsigned char *)hostname,
(unsigned int) strlen((const char *)hostname));
MD5Update(&context, (unsigned char *) &uid, sizeof (uid_t));
MD5Update(&context,
(unsigned char *) &timebits, sizeof (time_t));
MD5Update(&context, (unsigned char *) &pidbits,
sizeof (pid_t));
MD5Update(&context, (unsigned char *) &(count), sizeof (int));
MD5Final(output.obuff, &context);
retval = output.v[count % 4];
}
return (retval);
}
/*
* the following "port" function deals with the following issues:
*
* 1 the kernel and ucred deal with a dev_t as a 64 bit value made
* up from a 32 bit major and 32 bit minor.
* 2 User space deals with a dev_t as either the above 64 bit value
* or a 32 bit value made from a 14 bit major and an 18 bit minor.
* 3 The various audit interfaces (except ucred) pass the 32 or
* 64 bit version depending the architecture of the userspace
* application. If you get a port value from ucred and pass it
* to the kernel via auditon(), it must be squeezed into a 32
* bit value because the kernel knows the userspace app's bit
* size.
*
* The internal state structure for adt (adt_internal_state_t) uses
* dev_t, so adt converts data from ucred to fit. The import/export
* functions, however, can't know if they are importing/exporting
* from 64 or 32 bit applications, so they always send 64 bits and
* the 32 bit end(s) are responsible to convert 32 -> 64 -> 32 as
* appropriate.
*/
/*
* adt_cpy_tid() -- if lib is 64 bit, just copy it (dev_t and port are
* both 64 bits). If lib is 32 bits, squeeze the two-int port into
* a 32 bit dev_t. A port fits in the "minor" part of au_port_t,
* so it isn't broken up into pieces. (When it goes to the kernel
* and back, however, it will have been split into major/minor
* pieces.)
*/
static void
adt_cpy_tid(au_tid_addr_t *dest, const au_tid64_addr_t *src)
{
#ifdef _LP64
(void) memcpy(dest, src, sizeof (au_tid_addr_t));
#else /* _LP64 */
dest->at_type = src->at_type;
dest->at_port = src->at_port.at_minor & MAXMIN32;
dest->at_port |= (src->at_port.at_major & MAXMAJ32) <<
NBITSMINOR32;
(void) memcpy(dest->at_addr, src->at_addr, 4 * sizeof (uint32_t));
#endif /* _LP64 */
}
/*
* adt_start_session -- create interface handle, create context
*
* The imported_state input is normally NULL, if not, it represents
* a continued session; its values obviate the need for a subsequent
* call to adt_set_user().
*
* The flag is used to decide how to set the initial state of the session.
* If 0, the session is "no audit" until a call to adt_set_user; if
* ADT_USE_PROC_DATA, the session is built from the process audit
* characteristics obtained from the kernel. If imported_state is
* not NULL, the resulting audit mask is an OR of the current process
* audit mask and that passed in.
*
* The basic model is that the caller can use the pointer returned
* by adt_start_session whether or not auditing is enabled or an
* error was returned. The functions that take the session handle
* as input generally return without doing anything if auditing is
* disabled.
*/
int
adt_start_session(adt_session_data_t **new_session,
const adt_export_data_t *imported_state, adt_session_flags_t flags)
{
adt_internal_state_t *state;
adt_session_flags_t flgmask = ADT_FLAGS_ALL;
/* test and set auditstate */
if (adt_audit_state(AUC_DISABLED)) {
/* c2audit excluded */
*new_session = NULL;
return (0);
}
if ((flags & ~flgmask) != 0) {
errno = EINVAL;
goto return_err;
}
if ((state = calloc(1, sizeof (adt_internal_state_t))) == NULL) {
goto return_err;
}
if (adt_init(state, flags & ADT_USE_PROC_DATA) != 0) {
goto return_err_free; /* errno from adt_init() */
}
/*
* The imported state overwrites the initial state if the
* imported state represents a valid audit trail
*/
if (imported_state != NULL) {
if (adt_import(state, imported_state) != 0) {
goto return_err_free;
}
} else if (flags & ADT_USE_PROC_DATA) {
state->as_session_model = ADT_PROCESS_MODEL;
}
state->as_flags = flags;
DPRINTF(("(%lld) Starting session id = %08X\n",
(long long) getpid(), state->as_info.ai_asid));
*new_session = (adt_session_data_t *)state;
return (0);
return_err_free:
free(state);
return_err:
*new_session = NULL;
adt_write_syslog("audit session create failed", errno);
return (-1);
}
/*
* adt_load_table()
*
* loads the event translation table into the audit session.
*/
void
adt_load_table(const adt_session_data_t *session_data,
adt_translation_t **xlate, void (*preload)(au_event_t, adt_event_data_t *))
{
adt_internal_state_t *state = (adt_internal_state_t *)session_data;
if (state != NULL) {
assert(state->as_check == ADT_VALID);
state->as_xlate = xlate;
state->as_preload = preload;
}
}
/*
* adt_get_asid() and adt_set_asid()
*
* if you use this interface, you are responsible to insure that the
* rest of the session data is populated correctly before calling
* adt_proccess_attr()
*
* neither of these are intended for general use and will likely
* remain private interfaces for a long time. Forever is a long
* time. In the case of adt_set_asid(), you should have a very,
* very good reason for setting your own session id. The process
* audit characteristics are not changed by put, use adt_set_proc().
*
* These are "volatile" (more changable than "evolving") and will
* probably change in the S10 period.
*/
void
adt_get_asid(const adt_session_data_t *session_data, au_asid_t *asid)
{
if (session_data == NULL) {
*asid = 0;
} else {
assert(((adt_internal_state_t *)session_data)->as_check ==
ADT_VALID);
*asid = ((adt_internal_state_t *)session_data)->as_info.ai_asid;
}
}
void
adt_set_asid(const adt_session_data_t *session_data, const au_asid_t session_id)
{
if (session_data != NULL) {
assert(((adt_internal_state_t *)session_data)->as_check ==
ADT_VALID);
((adt_internal_state_t *)session_data)->as_have_user_data |=
ADT_HAVE_ASID;
((adt_internal_state_t *)session_data)->as_info.ai_asid =
session_id;
}
}
/*
* adt_get_auid() and adt_set_auid()
*
* neither of these are intended for general use and will likely
* remain private interfaces for a long time. Forever is a long
* time. In the case of adt_set_auid(), you should have a very,
* very good reason for setting your own audit id. The process
* audit characteristics are not changed by put, use adt_set_proc().
*/
void
adt_get_auid(const adt_session_data_t *session_data, au_id_t *auid)
{
if (session_data == NULL) {
*auid = AU_NOAUDITID;
} else {
assert(((adt_internal_state_t *)session_data)->as_check ==
ADT_VALID);
*auid = ((adt_internal_state_t *)session_data)->as_info.ai_auid;
}
}
void
adt_set_auid(const adt_session_data_t *session_data, const au_id_t audit_id)
{
if (session_data != NULL) {
assert(((adt_internal_state_t *)session_data)->as_check ==
ADT_VALID);
((adt_internal_state_t *)session_data)->as_have_user_data |=
ADT_HAVE_AUID;
((adt_internal_state_t *)session_data)->as_info.ai_auid =
audit_id;
}
}
/*
* adt_get_termid(), adt_set_termid()
*
* if you use this interface, you are responsible to insure that the
* rest of the session data is populated correctly before calling
* adt_proccess_attr()
*
* The process audit characteristics are not changed by put, use
* adt_set_proc().
*/
void
adt_get_termid(const adt_session_data_t *session_data, au_tid_addr_t *termid)
{
if (session_data == NULL) {
(void) memset(termid, 0, sizeof (au_tid_addr_t));
termid->at_type = AU_IPv4;
} else {
assert(((adt_internal_state_t *)session_data)->as_check ==
ADT_VALID);
*termid =
((adt_internal_state_t *)session_data)->as_info.ai_termid;
}
}
void
adt_set_termid(const adt_session_data_t *session_data,
const au_tid_addr_t *termid)
{
if (session_data != NULL) {
assert(((adt_internal_state_t *)session_data)->as_check ==
ADT_VALID);
((adt_internal_state_t *)session_data)->as_info.ai_termid =
*termid;
((adt_internal_state_t *)session_data)->as_have_user_data |=
ADT_HAVE_TID;
}
}
/*
* adt_get_mask(), adt_set_mask()
*
* if you use this interface, you are responsible to insure that the
* rest of the session data is populated correctly before calling
* adt_proccess_attr()
*
* The process audit characteristics are not changed by put, use
* adt_set_proc().
*/
void
adt_get_mask(const adt_session_data_t *session_data, au_mask_t *mask)
{
if (session_data == NULL) {
mask->am_success = 0;
mask->am_failure = 0;
} else {
assert(((adt_internal_state_t *)session_data)->as_check ==
ADT_VALID);
*mask = ((adt_internal_state_t *)session_data)->as_info.ai_mask;
}
}
void
adt_set_mask(const adt_session_data_t *session_data, const au_mask_t *mask)
{
if (session_data != NULL) {
assert(((adt_internal_state_t *)session_data)->as_check ==
ADT_VALID);
((adt_internal_state_t *)session_data)->as_info.ai_mask = *mask;
((adt_internal_state_t *)session_data)->as_have_user_data |=
ADT_HAVE_MASK;
}
}
/*
* helpers for adt_load_termid
*/
static void
adt_do_ipv6_address(struct sockaddr_in6 *peer, struct sockaddr_in6 *sock,
au_tid_addr_t *termid)
{
termid->at_port = ((peer->sin6_port<<16) | (sock->sin6_port));
termid->at_type = AU_IPv6;
(void) memcpy(termid->at_addr, &peer->sin6_addr, 4 * sizeof (uint_t));
}
static void
adt_do_ipv4_address(struct sockaddr_in *peer, struct sockaddr_in *sock,
au_tid_addr_t *termid)
{
termid->at_port = ((peer->sin_port<<16) | (sock->sin_port));
termid->at_type = AU_IPv4;
termid->at_addr[0] = (uint32_t)peer->sin_addr.s_addr;
(void) memset(&(termid->at_addr[1]), 0, 3 * sizeof (uint_t));
}
/*
* adt_load_termid: convenience function; inputs file handle and
* outputs an au_tid_addr struct.
*
* This code was stolen from audit_settid.c; it differs from audit_settid()
* in that it does not write the terminal id to the process.
*/
int
adt_load_termid(int fd, adt_termid_t **termid)
{
au_tid_addr_t *p_term;
struct sockaddr_in6 peer;
struct sockaddr_in6 sock;
int peerlen = sizeof (peer);
int socklen = sizeof (sock);
/* get peer name if its a socket, else assume local terminal */
if (getpeername(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&peer, (socklen_t *)&peerlen)
< 0) {
if (errno == ENOTSOCK) {
return (adt_load_hostname(NULL, termid));
}
goto return_err;
}
if ((p_term = calloc(1, sizeof (au_tid_addr_t))) == NULL) {
goto return_err;
}
/* get sock name */
if (getsockname(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sock,
(socklen_t *)&socklen) < 0) {
goto return_err_free;
}
if (peer.sin6_family == AF_INET6) {
adt_do_ipv6_address(&peer, &sock, p_term);
} else {
adt_do_ipv4_address((struct sockaddr_in *)&peer,
(struct sockaddr_in *)&sock, p_term);
}
*termid = (adt_termid_t *)p_term;
return (0);
return_err_free:
free(p_term);
return_err:
*termid = NULL;
return (-1);
}
static boolean_t
adt_have_termid(au_tid_addr_t *dest)
{
struct auditinfo_addr audit_data;
if (getaudit_addr(&audit_data, sizeof (audit_data)) < 0) {
adt_write_syslog("getaudit failed", errno);
return (B_FALSE);
}
if ((audit_data.ai_termid.at_type == 0) ||
(audit_data.ai_termid.at_addr[0] |
audit_data.ai_termid.at_addr[1] |
audit_data.ai_termid.at_addr[2] |
audit_data.ai_termid.at_addr[3]) == 0)
return (B_FALSE);
(void) memcpy(dest, &(audit_data.ai_termid),
sizeof (au_tid_addr_t));
return (B_TRUE);
}
/*
* adt_get_hostIP - construct a terminal id from a hostname
*
* Returns 0 = success
* -1 = failure and errno = ENETDOWN with the address
* defaulted to IPv4 loopback.
*/
static int
adt_get_hostIP(const char *hostname, au_tid_addr_t *p_term)
{
struct addrinfo *ai = NULL;
int tries = 3;
char msg[512];
int eai_err;
while ((tries-- > 0) &&
((eai_err = getaddrinfo(hostname, NULL, NULL, &ai)) != 0)) {
/*
* getaddrinfo returns its own set of errors.
* Log them here, so any subsequent syslogs will
* have a context. adt_get_hostIP callers can only
* return errno, so subsequent syslogs may be lacking
* that getaddrinfo failed.
*/
(void) snprintf(msg, sizeof (msg), "getaddrinfo(%s) "
"failed[%s]", hostname, gai_strerror(eai_err));
adt_write_syslog(msg, 0);
if (eai_err != EAI_AGAIN) {
break;
}
/* see if resolution becomes available */
(void) sleep(1);
}
if (ai != NULL) {
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET) {
p_term->at_type = AU_IPv4;
(void) memcpy(p_term->at_addr,
/* LINTED */
&((struct sockaddr_in *)ai->ai_addr)->sin_addr,
AU_IPv4);
} else {
p_term->at_type = AU_IPv6;
(void) memcpy(p_term->at_addr,
/* LINTED */
&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)ai->ai_addr)->sin6_addr,
AU_IPv6);
}
freeaddrinfo(ai);
return (0);
} else if (auditstate & (AUC_AUDITING | AUC_NOSPACE)) {
auditinfo_addr_t audit_info;
/*
* auditd is running so there should be a
* kernel audit context
*/
if (auditon(A_GETKAUDIT, (caddr_t)&audit_info,
sizeof (audit_info)) < 0) {
adt_write_syslog("unable to get kernel audit context",
errno);
goto try_interface;
}
adt_write_syslog("setting Audit IP address to kernel", 0);
*p_term = audit_info.ai_termid;
return (0);
}
try_interface:
{
struct ifaddrlist al;
int family;
char ntop[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
/*
* getaddrinfo has failed to map the hostname
* to an IP address, try to get an IP address
* from a local interface. If none up, default
* to loopback.
*/
family = AF_INET6;
if (adt_get_local_address(family, &al) != 0) {
family = AF_INET;
if (adt_get_local_address(family, &al) != 0) {
adt_write_syslog("adt_get_local_address "
"failed, no Audit IP address available, "
"faking loopback and error",
errno);
IN_SET_LOOPBACK_ADDR(
(struct sockaddr_in *)&(al.addr.addr));
(void) memcpy(p_term->at_addr, &al.addr.addr,
AU_IPv4);
p_term->at_type = AU_IPv4;
return (-1);
}
}
if (family == AF_INET) {
p_term->at_type = AU_IPv4;
(void) memcpy(p_term->at_addr, &al.addr.addr, AU_IPv4);
} else {
p_term->at_type = AU_IPv6;
(void) memcpy(p_term->at_addr, &al.addr.addr6, AU_IPv6);
}
(void) snprintf(msg, sizeof (msg), "mapping %s to %s",
hostname, inet_ntop(family, &(al.addr), ntop,
sizeof (ntop)));
adt_write_syslog(msg, 0);
return (0);
}
}
/*
* adt_load_hostname() is called when the caller does not have a file
* handle that gives access to the socket info or any other way to
* pass in both port and ip address. The hostname input is ignored if
* the terminal id has already been set; instead it returns the
* existing terminal id.
*
* If c2audit is excluded, success is returned.
* If the hostname lookup fails, the loopback address is assumed,
* errno is set to ENETDOWN, this allows the caller to interpret
* whether failure is fatal, and if not to have a address for the
* hostname.
* Otherwise the caller would need to be aware of the audit state.
*
* Other errors are ignored if not auditing.
*/
int
adt_load_hostname(const char *hostname, adt_termid_t **termid)
{
char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1];
au_tid_addr_t *p_term;
if (adt_audit_state(AUC_DISABLED)) {
/* c2audit excluded */
*termid = NULL;
return (0);
}
if ((p_term = calloc(1, sizeof (au_tid_addr_t))) == NULL) {
goto return_err;
}
if (adt_have_termid(p_term)) {
*termid = (adt_termid_t *)p_term;
return (0);
}
p_term->at_port = 0;
if (hostname == NULL || *hostname == '\0') {
(void) sysinfo(SI_HOSTNAME, localhost, MAXHOSTNAMELEN);
hostname = localhost;
}
if (adt_get_hostIP(hostname, p_term) == 0) {
*termid = (adt_termid_t *)p_term;
return (0);
} else {
*termid = (adt_termid_t *)p_term;
return (-1);
}
return_err:
*termid = NULL;
if (auditstate & AUC_NOAUDIT) {
return (0);
}
return (-1);
}
/*
* adt_load_ttyname() is called when the caller does not have a file
* handle that gives access to the local terminal or any other way
* of determining the device id. The ttyname input is ignored if
* the terminal id has already been set; instead it returns the
* existing terminal id.
*
* If c2audit is excluded, success is returned.
* The local hostname is used for the local IP address.
* If that hostname lookup fails, the loopback address is assumed,
* errno is set to ENETDOWN, this allows the caller to interpret
* whether failure is fatal, and if not to have a address for the
* hostname.
* Otherwise the caller would need to be aware of the audit state.
*
* Other errors are ignored if not auditing.
*/
int
adt_load_ttyname(const char *ttyname, adt_termid_t **termid)
{
char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1];
au_tid_addr_t *p_term;
struct stat stat_buf;
if (adt_audit_state(AUC_DISABLED)) {
/* c2audit excluded */
*termid = NULL;
return (0);
}
if ((p_term = calloc(1, sizeof (au_tid_addr_t))) == NULL) {
goto return_err;
}
if (adt_have_termid(p_term)) {
*termid = (adt_termid_t *)p_term;
return (0);
}
p_term->at_port = 0;
if (sysinfo(SI_HOSTNAME, localhost, MAXHOSTNAMELEN) < 0) {
goto return_err_free; /* errno from sysinfo */
}
if (ttyname != NULL && *ttyname != '\0') {
if (stat(ttyname, &stat_buf) < 0) {
goto return_err_free;
}
p_term->at_port = stat_buf.st_rdev;
}
if (adt_get_hostIP(localhost, p_term) == 0) {
*termid = (adt_termid_t *)p_term;
return (0);
} else {
*termid = (adt_termid_t *)p_term;
return (-1);
}
return_err_free:
free(p_term);
return_err:
*termid = NULL;
if (auditstate & AUC_NOAUDIT) {
return (0);
}
return (-1);
}
/*
* adt_get_session_id returns a stringified representation of
* the audit session id. See also adt_get_asid() for how to
* get the unexpurgated version. No guarantees as to how long
* the returned string will be or its general form; hex for now.
*
* An empty string is returned if auditing is off; length = 1
* and the pointer is valid.
*
* returns strlen + 1 if buffer is valid; else 0 and errno.
*/
size_t
adt_get_session_id(const adt_session_data_t *session_data, char **buff)
{
au_asid_t session_id;
size_t length;
/*
* output is 0x followed by
* two characters per byte
* plus terminator,
* except leading 0's are suppressed, so a few bytes may
* be unused.
*/
length = 2 + (2 * sizeof (session_id)) + 1;
*buff = malloc(length);
if (*buff == NULL) {
return (0);
}
if (session_data == NULL) { /* NULL is not an error */
**buff = '\0';
return (1);
}
adt_get_asid(session_data, &session_id);
length = snprintf(*buff, length, "0x%X", (int)session_id);
/* length < 1 is a bug: the session data type may have changed */
assert(length > 0);
return (length);
}
/*
* adt_end_session -- close handle, clear context
*
* if as_check is invalid, no harm, no foul, EXCEPT that this could
* be an attempt to free data already free'd, so output to syslog
* to help explain why the process cored dumped.
*/
int
adt_end_session(adt_session_data_t *session_data)
{
adt_internal_state_t *state;
if (session_data != NULL) {
state = (adt_internal_state_t *)session_data;
if (state->as_check != ADT_VALID) {
adt_write_syslog("freeing invalid data", EINVAL);
} else {
state->as_check = 0;
m_label_free(state->as_label);
free(session_data);
}
}
/* no errors yet defined */
return (0);
}
/*
* adt_dup_session -- copy the session data
*/
int
adt_dup_session(const adt_session_data_t *source, adt_session_data_t **dest)
{
adt_internal_state_t *source_state;
adt_internal_state_t *dest_state = NULL;
int rc = 0;
if (source != NULL) {
source_state = (adt_internal_state_t *)source;
assert(source_state->as_check == ADT_VALID);
dest_state = malloc(sizeof (adt_internal_state_t));
if (dest_state == NULL) {
rc = -1;
goto return_rc;
}
(void) memcpy(dest_state, source,
sizeof (struct adt_internal_state));
if (source_state->as_label != NULL) {
dest_state->as_label = NULL;
if ((rc = m_label_dup(&dest_state->as_label,
source_state->as_label)) != 0) {
free(dest_state);
dest_state = NULL;
}
}
}
return_rc:
*dest = (adt_session_data_t *)dest_state;
return (rc);
}
/*
* from_export_format()
* read from a network order buffer into struct adt_session_data
*/
static size_t
adt_from_export_format(adt_internal_state_t *internal,
const adt_export_data_t *external)
{
struct export_header head;
struct export_link link;
adr_t context;
int32_t offset;
int32_t length;
int32_t version;
size_t label_len;
char *p = (char *)external;
adrm_start(&context, (char *)external);
adrm_int32(&context, (int *)&head, 4);
if ((internal->as_check = head.ax_check) != ADT_VALID) {
errno = EINVAL;
return (0);
}
offset = head.ax_link.ax_offset;
version = head.ax_link.ax_version;
length = head.ax_buffer_length;
/*
* Skip newer versions.
*/
while (version > PROTOCOL_VERSION_2) {
if (offset < 1) {
return (0); /* failed to match version */
}
p += offset; /* point to next version # */
if (p > (char *)external + length) {
return (0);
}
adrm_start(&context, p);
adrm_int32(&context, (int *)&link, 2);
offset = link.ax_offset;
version = link.ax_version;
assert(version != 0);
}
/*
* Adjust buffer pointer to the first data item (euid).
*/
if (p == (char *)external) {
adrm_start(&context, (char *)(p + sizeof (head)));
} else {
adrm_start(&context, (char *)(p + sizeof (link)));
}
/*
* if down rev version, neither pid nor label are included
* in v1 ax_size_of_tsol_data intentionally ignored
*/
if (version == PROTOCOL_VERSION_1) {
adrm_int32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_euid), 1);
adrm_int32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_ruid), 1);
adrm_int32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_egid), 1);
adrm_int32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_rgid), 1);
adrm_int32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_info.ai_auid), 1);
adrm_int32(&context,
(int *)&(internal->as_info.ai_mask.am_success), 2);
adrm_int32(&context,
(int *)&(internal->as_info.ai_termid.at_port), 1);
adrm_int32(&context,
(int *)&(internal->as_info.ai_termid.at_type), 1);
adrm_int32(&context,
(int *)&(internal->as_info.ai_termid.at_addr[0]), 4);
adrm_int32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_info.ai_asid), 1);
adrm_int32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_audit_state), 1);
internal->as_pid = (pid_t)-1;
internal->as_label = NULL;
} else if (version == PROTOCOL_VERSION_2) {
adrm_int32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_euid), 1);
adrm_int32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_ruid), 1);
adrm_int32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_egid), 1);
adrm_int32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_rgid), 1);
adrm_int32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_info.ai_auid), 1);
adrm_int32(&context,
(int *)&(internal->as_info.ai_mask.am_success), 2);
adrm_int32(&context,
(int *)&(internal->as_info.ai_termid.at_port), 1);
adrm_int32(&context,
(int *)&(internal->as_info.ai_termid.at_type), 1);
adrm_int32(&context,
(int *)&(internal->as_info.ai_termid.at_addr[0]), 4);
adrm_int32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_info.ai_asid), 1);
adrm_int32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_audit_state), 1);
adrm_int32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_pid), 1);
adrm_int32(&context, (int *)&label_len, 1);
if (label_len > 0) {
/* read in and deal with different sized labels. */
size32_t my_label_len = blabel_size();
if ((internal->as_label =
m_label_alloc(MAC_LABEL)) == NULL) {
return (0);
}
if (label_len > my_label_len) {
errno = EINVAL;
m_label_free(internal->as_label);
return (0);
}
(void) memset(internal->as_label, 0, my_label_len);
adrm_int32(&context, (int *)(internal->as_label),
label_len / sizeof (int32_t));
} else {
internal->as_label = NULL;
}
}
return (length);
}
/*
* adt_to_export_format
* read from struct adt_session_data into a network order buffer.
*
* (network order 'cause this data may be shared with a remote host.)
*/
static size_t
adt_to_export_format(adt_export_data_t *external,
adt_internal_state_t *internal)
{
struct export_header head;
struct export_link tail;
adr_t context;
size32_t label_len = 0;
adrm_start(&context, (char *)external);
if (internal->as_label != NULL) {
label_len = blabel_size();
}
head.ax_check = ADT_VALID;
head.ax_buffer_length = sizeof (struct adt_export_data) + label_len;
/* version 2 first */
head.ax_link.ax_version = PROTOCOL_VERSION_2;
head.ax_link.ax_offset = sizeof (struct export_header) +
sizeof (struct adt_export_v2) + label_len;
adrm_putint32(&context, (int *)&head, 4);
adrm_putint32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_euid), 1);
adrm_putint32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_ruid), 1);
adrm_putint32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_egid), 1);
adrm_putint32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_rgid), 1);
adrm_putint32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_info.ai_auid), 1);
adrm_putint32(&context,
(int *)&(internal->as_info.ai_mask.am_success), 2);
adrm_putint32(&context,
(int *)&(internal->as_info.ai_termid.at_port), 1);
adrm_putint32(&context,
(int *)&(internal->as_info.ai_termid.at_type), 1);
adrm_putint32(&context,
(int *)&(internal->as_info.ai_termid.at_addr[0]), 4);
adrm_putint32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_info.ai_asid), 1);
adrm_putint32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_audit_state), 1);
adrm_putint32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_pid), 1);
adrm_putint32(&context, (int *)&label_len, 1);
if (internal->as_label != NULL) {
/* serialize the label */
adrm_putint32(&context, (int *)(internal->as_label),
(label_len / sizeof (int32_t)));
}
/* now version 1 */
tail.ax_version = PROTOCOL_VERSION_1;
tail.ax_offset = 0;
adrm_putint32(&context, (int *)&tail, 2);
adrm_putint32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_euid), 1);
adrm_putint32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_ruid), 1);
adrm_putint32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_egid), 1);
adrm_putint32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_rgid), 1);
adrm_putint32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_info.ai_auid), 1);
adrm_putint32(&context,
(int *)&(internal->as_info.ai_mask.am_success), 2);
adrm_putint32(&context,
(int *)&(internal->as_info.ai_termid.at_port), 1);
adrm_putint32(&context,
(int *)&(internal->as_info.ai_termid.at_type), 1);
adrm_putint32(&context,
(int *)&(internal->as_info.ai_termid.at_addr[0]), 4);
adrm_putint32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_info.ai_asid), 1);
adrm_putint32(&context, (int *)&(internal->as_audit_state), 1);
/* ignored in v1 */
adrm_putint32(&context, (int *)&label_len, 1);
/* finally terminator */
tail.ax_version = 0; /* invalid version number */
tail.ax_offset = 0;
adrm_putint32(&context, (int *)&tail, 2);
return (head.ax_buffer_length);
}
/*
* adt_ucred_label() -- if label is available, duplicate it.
*/
static m_label_t *
adt_ucred_label(ucred_t *uc)
{
m_label_t *ul = NULL;
if (ucred_getlabel(uc) != NULL) {
(void) m_label_dup(&ul, ucred_getlabel(uc));
}
return (ul);
}
/*
* adt_import() -- convert from network order to machine-specific order
*/
static int
adt_import(adt_internal_state_t *internal, const adt_export_data_t *external)
{
au_mask_t mask;
/* save local audit state */
int local_audit_state = internal->as_audit_state;
if (adt_from_export_format(internal, external) < 1)
return (-1); /* errno from adt_from_export_format */
/*
* If audit isn't enabled on the remote, they were unable
* to generate the audit mask, so generate it based on
* local configuration. If the user id has changed, the
* resulting mask may miss some subtleties that occurred
* on the remote system.
*
* If the remote failed to generate a terminal id, it is not
* recoverable.
*/
if (!(internal->as_audit_state & AUC_DISABLED)) {
if (adt_get_mask_from_user(internal->as_info.ai_auid,
&(internal->as_info.ai_mask)))
return (-1);
if (internal->as_info.ai_auid != internal->as_ruid) {
if (adt_get_mask_from_user(internal->as_info.ai_auid,
&mask))
return (-1);
internal->as_info.ai_mask.am_success |=
mask.am_success;
internal->as_info.ai_mask.am_failure |=
mask.am_failure;
}
}
internal->as_audit_state = local_audit_state;
DPRINTF(("(%lld)imported asid = %X %u\n", (long long) getpid(),
internal->as_info.ai_asid,
internal->as_info.ai_asid));
internal->as_have_user_data = ADT_HAVE_ALL;
return (0);
}
/*
* adt_export_session_data()
* copies a adt_session_data struct into a network order buffer
*
* In a misconfigured network, the local host may have auditing
* off while the destination may have auditing on, so if there
* is sufficient memory, a buffer will be returned even in the
* audit off case.
*/
size_t
adt_export_session_data(const adt_session_data_t *internal,
adt_export_data_t **external)
{
size32_t length = 0;
if ((internal != NULL) &&
((adt_internal_state_t *)internal)->as_label != NULL) {
length = blabel_size();
}
*external = malloc(sizeof (adt_export_data_t) + length);
if (*external == NULL)
return (0);
if (internal == NULL) {
adt_internal_state_t *dummy;
dummy = malloc(sizeof (adt_internal_state_t));
if (dummy == NULL)
goto return_length_free;
if (adt_init(dummy, 0)) { /* 0 == don't copy from proc */
free(dummy);
goto return_length_free;
}
length = adt_to_export_format(*external, dummy);
free(dummy);
} else {
length = adt_to_export_format(*external,
(adt_internal_state_t *)internal);
}
return (length);
return_length_free:
free(*external);
*external = NULL;
return (0);
}
static void
adt_setto_unaudited(adt_internal_state_t *state)
{
if (state->as_audit_state & AUC_DISABLED) {
state->as_ruid = AU_NOAUDITID;
state->as_euid = AU_NOAUDITID;
state->as_rgid = AU_NOAUDITID;
state->as_egid = AU_NOAUDITID;
state->as_pid = (pid_t)-1;
state->as_label = NULL;
} else {
state->as_info.ai_asid = 0;
state->as_info.ai_auid = AU_NOAUDITID;
(void) memset((void *)&(state->as_info.ai_termid), 0,
sizeof (au_tid_addr_t));
state->as_info.ai_termid.at_type = AU_IPv4;
(void) memset((void *)&(state->as_info.ai_mask), 0,
sizeof (au_mask_t));
state->as_have_user_data = 0;
}
}
/*
* adt_init -- set session context by copying the audit characteristics
* from the proc and picking up current uid/tid information.
*
* By default, an audit session is based on the process; the default
* is overriden by adt_set_user()
*/
static int
adt_init(adt_internal_state_t *state, int use_proc_data)
{
/* ensure auditstate is set */
(void) adt_audit_state(0);
state->as_audit_state = auditstate;
if (use_proc_data) {
state->as_ruid = getuid();
state->as_euid = geteuid();
state->as_rgid = getgid();
state->as_egid = getegid();
state->as_pid = getpid();
if (!(state->as_audit_state & AUC_DISABLED)) {
const au_tid64_addr_t *tid;
const au_mask_t *mask;
ucred_t *ucred = ucred_get(P_MYID);
/*
* Even if the ucred is NULL, the underlying
* credential may have a valid terminal id; if the
* terminal id is set, then that's good enough. An
* example of where this matters is failed login,
* where rlogin/telnet sets the terminal id before
* calling login; login does not load the credential
* since auth failed.
*/
if (ucred == NULL) {
if (!adt_have_termid(
&(state->as_info.ai_termid)))
return (-1);
} else {
mask = ucred_getamask(ucred);
if (mask != NULL) {
state->as_info.ai_mask = *mask;
} else {
ucred_free(ucred);
return (-1);
}
tid = ucred_getatid(ucred);
if (tid != NULL) {
adt_cpy_tid(&(state->as_info.ai_termid),
tid);
} else {
ucred_free(ucred);
return (-1);
}
state->as_info.ai_asid = ucred_getasid(ucred);
state->as_info.ai_auid = ucred_getauid(ucred);
state->as_label = adt_ucred_label(ucred);
ucred_free(ucred);
}
state->as_have_user_data = ADT_HAVE_ALL;
}
} else {
adt_setto_unaudited(state);
}
state->as_session_model = ADT_SESSION_MODEL; /* default */
if ((state->as_audit_state & (AUC_AUDITING | AUC_NOSPACE)) &&
auditon(A_GETPOLICY, (caddr_t)&(state->as_kernel_audit_policy),
sizeof (state->as_kernel_audit_policy))) {
return (-1); /* errno set by auditon */
}
state->as_check = ADT_VALID;
adt_load_table((adt_session_data_t *)state, &adt_xlate_table[0],
&adt_preload);
return (0);
}
/*
* adt_set_proc
*
* Copy the current session state to the process. If this function
* is called, the model becomes a process model rather than a
* session model.
*
* In the current implementation, the value state->as_have_user_data
* must contain all of: ADT_HAVE_{AUID,MASK,TID,ASID}. These are all set
* by adt_set_user() when the ADT_SETTID or ADT_NEW flag is passed in.
*
*/
int
adt_set_proc(const adt_session_data_t *session_data)
{
adt_internal_state_t *state;
if (session_data == NULL) {
return (0);
}
state = (adt_internal_state_t *)session_data;
assert(state->as_check == ADT_VALID);
if ((state->as_have_user_data & (ADT_HAVE_ALL & ~ADT_HAVE_IDS)) !=
(ADT_HAVE_ALL & ~ADT_HAVE_IDS)) {
errno = EINVAL;
goto return_err;
}
if (setaudit_addr((auditinfo_addr_t *)&(state->as_info),
sizeof (auditinfo_addr_t)) < 0) {
goto return_err; /* errno set by setaudit_addr() */
}
state->as_session_model = ADT_PROCESS_MODEL;
return (0);
return_err:
adt_write_syslog("failed to set process audit characteristics", errno);
return (-1);
}
static int
adt_newuser(adt_internal_state_t *state, uid_t ruid, au_tid_addr_t *termid)
{
au_tid_addr_t no_tid = {0, AU_IPv4, 0, 0, 0, 0};
au_mask_t no_mask = {0, 0};
if (ruid == ADT_NO_AUDIT) {
state->as_info.ai_auid = AU_NOAUDITID;
state->as_info.ai_asid = 0;
state->as_info.ai_termid = no_tid;
state->as_info.ai_mask = no_mask;
return (0);
}
state->as_info.ai_auid = ruid;
state->as_info.ai_asid = adt_get_unique_id(ruid);
if (termid != NULL)
state->as_info.ai_termid = *termid;
if (adt_get_mask_from_user(ruid, &(state->as_info.ai_mask)))
return (-1);
/* Assume intending to audit as this process */
if (state->as_pid == (pid_t)-1)
state->as_pid = getpid();
if (is_system_labeled() && state->as_label == NULL) {
ucred_t *ucred = ucred_get(P_MYID);
state->as_label = adt_ucred_label(ucred);
ucred_free(ucred);
}
return (0);
}
static int
adt_changeuser(adt_internal_state_t *state, uid_t ruid)
{
au_mask_t mask;
if (!(state->as_have_user_data & ADT_HAVE_AUID))
state->as_info.ai_auid = ruid;
if (!(state->as_have_user_data & ADT_HAVE_ASID))
state->as_info.ai_asid = adt_get_unique_id(ruid);
if (ruid <= MAXEPHUID) {
if (adt_get_mask_from_user(ruid, &mask))
return (-1);
state->as_info.ai_mask.am_success |= mask.am_success;
state->as_info.ai_mask.am_failure |= mask.am_failure;
}
DPRINTF(("changed mask to %08X/%08X for ruid=%d\n",
state->as_info.ai_mask.am_success,
state->as_info.ai_mask.am_failure,
ruid));
return (0);
}
/*
* adt_set_user -- see also adt_set_from_ucred()
*
* ADT_NO_ATTRIB is a valid uid/gid meaning "not known" or
* "unattributed." If ruid, change the model to session.
*
* ADT_NO_CHANGE is a valid uid/gid meaning "do not change this value"
* only valid with ADT_UPDATE.
*
* ADT_NO_AUDIT is the external equivalent to AU_NOAUDITID -- there
* isn't a good reason to call adt_set_user() with it unless you don't
* have a good value yet and intend to replace it later; auid will be
* AU_NOAUDITID.
*
* adt_set_user should be called even if auditing is not enabled
* so that adt_export_session_data() will have useful stuff to
* work with.
*
* See the note preceding adt_set_proc() about the use of ADT_HAVE_TID
* and ADT_HAVE_ALL.
*/
int
adt_set_user(const adt_session_data_t *session_data, uid_t euid, gid_t egid,
uid_t ruid, gid_t rgid, const adt_termid_t *termid,
enum adt_user_context user_context)
{
adt_internal_state_t *state;
int rc;
if (session_data == NULL) /* no session exists to audit */
return (0);
state = (adt_internal_state_t *)session_data;
assert(state->as_check == ADT_VALID);
switch (user_context) {
case ADT_NEW:
if (ruid == ADT_NO_CHANGE || euid == ADT_NO_CHANGE ||
rgid == ADT_NO_CHANGE || egid == ADT_NO_CHANGE) {
errno = EINVAL;
return (-1);
}
if ((rc = adt_newuser(state, ruid,
(au_tid_addr_t *)termid)) != 0)
return (rc);
state->as_have_user_data = ADT_HAVE_ALL;
break;
case ADT_UPDATE:
if (state->as_have_user_data != ADT_HAVE_ALL) {
errno = EINVAL;
return (-1);
}
if (ruid != ADT_NO_CHANGE)
if ((rc = adt_changeuser(state, ruid)) != 0)
return (rc);
break;
case ADT_USER:
if (state->as_have_user_data != ADT_HAVE_ALL) {
errno = EINVAL;
return (-1);
}
break;
case ADT_SETTID:
assert(termid != NULL);
state->as_info.ai_termid = *((au_tid_addr_t *)termid);
/* avoid fooling pam_setcred()... */
state->as_info.ai_auid = AU_NOAUDITID;
state->as_info.ai_asid = 0;
state->as_info.ai_mask.am_failure = 0;
state->as_info.ai_mask.am_success = 0;
state->as_have_user_data = ADT_HAVE_TID |
ADT_HAVE_AUID | ADT_HAVE_ASID | ADT_HAVE_MASK;
return (0);
default:
errno = EINVAL;
return (-1);
}
if (ruid == ADT_NO_AUDIT) {
state->as_ruid = AU_NOAUDITID;
state->as_euid = AU_NOAUDITID;
state->as_rgid = AU_NOAUDITID;
state->as_egid = AU_NOAUDITID;
} else {
if (ruid != ADT_NO_CHANGE)
state->as_ruid = ruid;
if (euid != ADT_NO_CHANGE)
state->as_euid = euid;
if (rgid != ADT_NO_CHANGE)
state->as_rgid = rgid;
if (egid != ADT_NO_CHANGE)
state->as_egid = egid;
}
if (ruid == ADT_NO_ATTRIB) {
state->as_session_model = ADT_SESSION_MODEL;
}
return (0);
}
/*
* adt_set_from_ucred()
*
* an alternate to adt_set_user that fills the same role but uses
* a pointer to a ucred rather than a list of id's. If the ucred
* pointer is NULL, use the credential from the this process.
*
* A key difference is that for ADT_NEW, adt_set_from_ucred() does
* not overwrite the asid and auid unless auid has not been set.
* ADT_NEW differs from ADT_UPDATE in that it does not OR together
* the incoming audit mask with the one that already exists.
*
* adt_set_from_ucred should be called even if auditing is not enabled
* so that adt_export_session_data() will have useful stuff to
* work with.
*/
int
adt_set_from_ucred(const adt_session_data_t *session_data, const ucred_t *uc,
enum adt_user_context user_context)
{
adt_internal_state_t *state;
int rc = -1;
const au_tid64_addr_t *tid64;
au_tid_addr_t termid, *tid;
ucred_t *ucred = (ucred_t *)uc;
boolean_t local_uc = B_FALSE;
if (session_data == NULL) /* no session exists to audit */
return (0);
state = (adt_internal_state_t *)session_data;
assert(state->as_check == ADT_VALID);
if (ucred == NULL) {
ucred = ucred_get(P_MYID);
if (ucred == NULL)
goto return_rc;
local_uc = B_TRUE;
}
switch (user_context) {
case ADT_NEW:
tid64 = ucred_getatid(ucred);
if (tid64 != NULL) {
adt_cpy_tid(&termid, tid64);
tid = &termid;
} else {
tid = NULL;
}
if (ucred_getauid(ucred) == AU_NOAUDITID) {
adt_setto_unaudited(state);
state->as_have_user_data = ADT_HAVE_ALL;
rc = 0;
goto return_rc;
} else {
state->as_info.ai_auid = ucred_getauid(ucred);
state->as_info.ai_asid = ucred_getasid(ucred);
state->as_info.ai_mask = *ucred_getamask(ucred);
state->as_info.ai_termid = *tid;
}
state->as_have_user_data = ADT_HAVE_ALL;
break;
case ADT_UPDATE:
if (state->as_have_user_data != ADT_HAVE_ALL) {
errno = EINVAL;
goto return_rc;
}
if ((rc = adt_changeuser(state, ucred_getruid(ucred))) != 0)
goto return_rc;
break;
case ADT_USER:
if (state->as_have_user_data != ADT_HAVE_ALL) {
errno = EINVAL;
goto return_rc;
}
break;
default:
errno = EINVAL;
goto return_rc;
}
rc = 0;
state->as_ruid = ucred_getruid(ucred);
state->as_euid = ucred_geteuid(ucred);
state->as_rgid = ucred_getrgid(ucred);
state->as_egid = ucred_getegid(ucred);
state->as_pid = ucred_getpid(ucred);
state->as_label = adt_ucred_label(ucred);
return_rc:
if (local_uc) {
ucred_free(ucred);
}
return (rc);
}
/*
* adt_alloc_event() returns a pointer to allocated memory
*
*/
adt_event_data_t
*adt_alloc_event(const adt_session_data_t *session_data, au_event_t event_id)
{
struct adt_event_state *event_state;
adt_internal_state_t *session_state;
adt_event_data_t *return_event = NULL;
/*
* need to return a valid event pointer even if audit is
* off, else the caller will end up either (1) keeping its
* own flags for on/off or (2) writing to a NULL pointer.
* If auditing is on, the session data must be valid; otherwise
* we don't care.
*/
if (session_data != NULL) {
session_state = (adt_internal_state_t *)session_data;
assert(session_state->as_check == ADT_VALID);
}
event_state = calloc(1, sizeof (struct adt_event_state));
if (event_state == NULL)
goto return_ptr;
event_state->ae_check = ADT_VALID;
event_state->ae_event_id = event_id;
event_state->ae_session = (struct adt_internal_state *)session_data;
return_event = (adt_event_data_t *)&(event_state->ae_event_data);
/*
* preload data so the adt_au_*() functions can detect un-supplied
* values (0 and NULL are free via calloc()).
*/
if (session_data != NULL) {
session_state->as_preload(event_id, return_event);
}
return_ptr:
return (return_event);
}
/*
* adt_getXlateTable -- look up translation table address for event id
*/
static adt_translation_t *
adt_getXlateTable(adt_translation_t **xlate, au_event_t event_id)
{
/* xlate_table is global in adt_xlate.c */
adt_translation_t **p_xlate = xlate;
adt_translation_t *p_event;
while (*p_xlate != NULL) {
p_event = *p_xlate;
if (event_id == p_event->tx_external_event)
return (p_event);
p_xlate++;
}
return (NULL);
}
/*
* adt_calcOffsets
*
* the call to this function is surrounded by a mutex.
*
* i walks down the table picking up next_token. j walks again to
* calculate the offset to the input data. k points to the next
* token's row. Finally, l, is used to sum the values in the
* datadef array.
*
* What's going on? The entry array is in the order of the input
* fields but the processing of array entries is in the order of
* the output (see next_token). Calculating the offset to the
* "next" input can't be done in the outer loop (i) since i doesn't
* point to the current entry and it can't be done with the k index
* because it doesn't represent the order of input fields.
*
* While the resulting algorithm is n**2, it is only done once per
* event type.
*/
/*
* adt_calcOffsets is only called once per event type, but it uses
* the address alignment of memory allocated for that event as if it
* were the same for all subsequently allocated memory. This is
* guaranteed by calloc/malloc. Arrays take special handling since
* what matters for figuring out the correct alignment is the size
* of the array element.
*/
static void
adt_calcOffsets(struct entry *p_entry, int tablesize, void *p_data)
{
int i, j;
size_t this_size, prev_size;
void *struct_start = p_data;
for (i = 0; i < tablesize; i++) {
if (p_entry[i].en_type_def == NULL) {
p_entry[i].en_offset = 0;
continue;
}
prev_size = 0;
p_entry[i].en_offset = (char *)p_data - (char *)struct_start;
for (j = 0; j < p_entry[i].en_count_types; j++) {
if (p_entry[i].en_type_def[j].dd_datatype == ADT_MSG)
this_size = sizeof (enum adt_generic);
else
this_size =
p_entry[i].en_type_def[j].dd_input_size;
/* adj for first entry */
if (prev_size == 0)
prev_size = this_size;
if (p_entry[i].en_type_def[j].dd_datatype ==
ADT_UINT32ARRAY) {
p_data = (char *)adt_adjust_address(p_data,
prev_size, sizeof (uint32_t)) +
this_size - sizeof (uint32_t);
prev_size = sizeof (uint32_t);
} else {
p_data = adt_adjust_address(p_data, prev_size,
this_size);
prev_size = this_size;
}
}
}
}
/*
* adt_generate_event
* generate event record from external struct. The order is based on
* the output tokens, allowing for the possibility that the input data
* is in a different order.
*
*/
static int
adt_generate_event(const adt_event_data_t *p_extdata,
struct adt_event_state *p_event,
adt_translation_t *p_xlate)
{
struct entry *p_entry;
static mutex_t lock = DEFAULTMUTEX;
p_entry = p_xlate->tx_first_entry;
assert(p_entry != NULL);
p_event->ae_internal_id = p_xlate->tx_internal_event;
adt_token_open(p_event);
/*
* offsets are not pre-calculated; the initial offsets are all
* 0; valid offsets are >= 0. Offsets for no-input tokens such
* as subject are set to -1 by adt_calcOffset()
*/
if (p_xlate->tx_offsetsCalculated == 0) {
(void) mutex_lock(&lock);
p_xlate->tx_offsetsCalculated = 1;
adt_calcOffsets(p_xlate->tx_top_entry, p_xlate->tx_entries,
(void *)p_extdata);
(void) mutex_unlock(&lock);
}
while (p_entry != NULL) {
adt_generate_token(p_entry, (char *)p_extdata, p_event);
p_entry = p_entry->en_next_token;
}
return (adt_token_close(p_event));
}
/*
* adt_put_event -- main event generation function.
* The input "event" is the address of the struct containing
* event-specific data.
*
* However if auditing is off or the session handle
* is NULL, no attempt to write a record is made.
*/
int
adt_put_event(const adt_event_data_t *event, int status, int return_val)
{
struct adt_event_state *event_state;
adt_translation_t *xlate;
if (event == NULL) {
errno = EINVAL;
return (-1);
}
event_state = (struct adt_event_state *)event;
/* if this is a broken session or not auditing, exit */
if ((event_state->ae_session == NULL) ||
!(event_state->ae_session->as_audit_state &
(AUC_AUDITING | AUC_NOSPACE))) {
return (0);
}
assert(event_state->ae_check == ADT_VALID);
event_state->ae_rc = status;
event_state->ae_type = return_val;
/* look up the event */
xlate = adt_getXlateTable(event_state->ae_session->as_xlate,
event_state->ae_event_id);
if (xlate == NULL) {
errno = EINVAL;
return (-1);
}
DPRINTF(("got event %d\n", xlate->tx_internal_event));
if (adt_selected(event_state, xlate->tx_internal_event, status)) {
return (adt_generate_event(event, event_state, xlate));
}
return (0);
}
/*
* adt_free_event -- invalidate and free
*/
void
adt_free_event(adt_event_data_t *event)
{
struct adt_event_state *event_state;
if (event == NULL)
return;
event_state = (struct adt_event_state *)event;
assert(event_state->ae_check == ADT_VALID);
event_state->ae_check = 0;
free(event_state);
}
/*
* adt_is_selected -- helper to adt_selected(), below.
*
* "sorf" is "success or fail" status; au_preselect compares
* that with success, fail, or both.
*/
static int
adt_is_selected(au_event_t e, au_mask_t *m, int sorf)
{
int prs_sorf;
if (sorf == 0)
prs_sorf = AU_PRS_SUCCESS;
else
prs_sorf = AU_PRS_FAILURE;
return (au_preselect(e, m, prs_sorf, AU_PRS_REREAD));
}
/*
* selected -- see if this event is preselected.
*
* if errors are encountered trying to check a preselection mask
* or look up a user name, the event is selected. Otherwise, the
* preselection mask is used for the job.
*/
static int
adt_selected(struct adt_event_state *event, au_event_t actual_id, int status)
{
adt_internal_state_t *sp;
au_mask_t namask;
sp = event->ae_session;
if ((sp->as_have_user_data & ADT_HAVE_IDS) == 0) {
adt_write_syslog("No user data available", EINVAL);
return (1); /* default is "selected" */
}
/* non-attributable? */
if ((sp->as_info.ai_auid == AU_NOAUDITID) ||
(sp->as_info.ai_auid == ADT_NO_AUDIT)) {
if (auditon(A_GETKMASK, (caddr_t)&namask,
sizeof (namask)) != 0) {
adt_write_syslog("auditon failure", errno);
return (1);
}
return (adt_is_selected(actual_id, &namask, status));
} else {
return (adt_is_selected(actual_id, &(sp->as_info.ai_mask),
status));
}
}
/*
* Can't map the host name to an IP address in
* adt_get_hostIP. Get something off an interface
* to act as the hosts IP address for auditing.
*/
static int
adt_get_local_address(int family, struct ifaddrlist *al)
{
struct ifaddrlist *ifal;
char errbuf[ERRBUFSIZE] = "empty list";
char msg[ERRBUFSIZE + 512];
int ifal_count;
int i;
if ((ifal_count = ifaddrlist(&ifal, family, 0, errbuf)) <= 0) {
int serrno = errno;
(void) snprintf(msg, sizeof (msg), "adt_get_local_address "
"couldn't get %d addrlist %s", family, errbuf);
adt_write_syslog(msg, serrno);
errno = serrno;
return (-1);
}
for (i = 0; i < ifal_count; i++) {
/*
* loopback always defined,
* even if there is no real address
*/
if ((ifal[i].flags & (IFF_UP | IFF_LOOPBACK)) == IFF_UP) {
break;
}
}
if (i >= ifal_count) {
free(ifal);
/*
* Callers of adt_get_hostIP() can only return
* errno to their callers and eventually the application.
* Picked one that seemed least worse for saying no
* usable address for Audit terminal ID.
*/
errno = ENETDOWN;
return (-1);
}
*al = ifal[i];
free(ifal);
return (0);
}