tls.c revision 3ee0e49223f178da635734759b9167f924321ff0
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000-2006 Sendmail, Inc. and its suppliers.
* All rights reserved.
*
* By using this file, you agree to the terms and conditions set
* forth in the LICENSE file which can be found at the top level of
* the sendmail distribution.
*
*/
#pragma ident "%Z%%M% %I% %E% SMI"
#include <sendmail.h>
#if STARTTLS
# ifndef HASURANDOMDEV
# endif /* ! HASURANDOMDEV */
# if !TLS_NO_RSA
# endif /* !TLS_NO_RSA */
# else /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */
# endif /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */
# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L
# endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */
# define CONST097
# else /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */
# define CONST097 const
# endif /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */
static bool tls_safe_f __P((char *, long, bool));
# if !NO_DH
static unsigned char dh512_p[] =
{
0xDA,0x58,0x3C,0x16,0xD9,0x85,0x22,0x89,0xD0,0xE4,0xAF,0x75,
0x6F,0x4C,0xCA,0x92,0xDD,0x4B,0xE5,0x33,0xB8,0x04,0xFB,0x0F,
0xED,0x94,0xEF,0x9C,0x8A,0x44,0x03,0xED,0x57,0x46,0x50,0xD3,
0x69,0x99,0xDB,0x29,0xD7,0x76,0x27,0x6B,0xA2,0xD3,0xD4,0x12,
0xE2,0x18,0xF4,0xDD,0x1E,0x08,0x4C,0xF6,0xD8,0x00,0x3E,0x7C,
0x47,0x74,0xE8,0x33
};
static unsigned char dh512_g[] =
{
0x02
};
static DH *
{
return NULL;
return NULL;
return dh;
}
# endif /* !NO_DH */
/*
** TLS_RAND_INIT -- initialize STARTTLS random generator
**
** Parameters:
** randfile -- name of file with random data
** logl -- loglevel
**
** Returns:
**
** Side Effects:
** initializes PRNG for tls library.
*/
# define RF_OK 0 /* randfile OK */
# define RI_NONE 0 /* no init yet */
static bool tls_rand_init __P((char *, int));
static bool
char *randfile;
int logl;
{
# ifndef HASURANDOMDEV
bool ok;
int randdef;
/*
** initialize PRNG
*/
/* did we try this before? if yes: return old value */
return done == RI_SUCCESS;
/* set default values */
ok = false;
# if EGD
{
randfile += 4;
{
"STARTTLS: RAND_egd(%s) failed: random number generator not seeded",
randfile);
}
else
ok = true;
}
else
# endif /* EGD */
{
int fd;
long sff;
randfile += 5;
if (DontLockReadFiles)
sff |= SFF_NOLOCK;
{
{
"STARTTLS: can't fstat(%s)",
randfile);
}
else
{
use = true;
problem = false;
/* max. age of file: 10 minutes */
{
problem = true;
"STARTTLS: RandFile %s too old: %s",
use ? "unsafe" :
"unusable");
}
{
problem = true;
"STARTTLS: size(%s) < %d: %s",
use ? "unsafe" :
"unusable");
}
if (use)
{
"STARTTLS: RAND_load_file(%s) failed: random number generator not seeded",
randfile);
}
if (problem)
ok = false;
}
{
/* add this even if fstat() failed */
}
}
else
{
"STARTTLS: Warning: safeopen(%s) failed",
randfile);
}
}
{
"STARTTLS: Error: no proper random file definition %s",
randfile);
}
{
"STARTTLS: Error: missing random file definition");
}
{
int i;
long r;
unsigned char buf[MIN_RAND_BYTES];
/* assert((MIN_RAND_BYTES % sizeof(long)) == 0); */
for (i = 0; i <= sizeof(buf) - sizeof(long); i += sizeof(long))
{
r = get_random();
}
"STARTTLS: Warning: random number generator not properly seeded");
ok = true;
}
return ok;
# else /* ! HASURANDOMDEV */
return true;
# endif /* ! HASURANDOMDEV */
}
/*
** INIT_TLS_LIBRARY -- Calls functions which setup TLS library for global use.
**
** Parameters:
** none.
**
** Returns:
** succeeded?
*/
bool
{
/* basic TLS initialization, ignore result for now */
# if 0
/* this is currently a macro for SSL_library_init */
# endif /* 0 */
}
/*
** TLS_SET_VERIFY -- request client certificate?
**
** Parameters:
** ctx -- TLS context
** ssl -- TLS structure
** vrfy -- require certificate?
**
** Returns:
** none.
**
** Side Effects:
** Sets verification state for TLS
**
# if TLS_VRFY_PER_CTX
** Notice:
** This is per TLS context, not per TLS structure;
** the former is global, the latter per connection.
** It would be nice to do this per connection, but this
** doesn't work in the current TLS libraries :-(
# endif * TLS_VRFY_PER_CTX *
*/
void
bool vrfy;
{
# if !TLS_VRFY_PER_CTX
# else /* !TLS_VRFY_PER_CTX */
NULL);
# endif /* !TLS_VRFY_PER_CTX */
}
/*
** status in initialization
** these flags keep track of the status of the initialization
** i.e., whether a file exists (_EX) and whether it can be used (_OK)
** [due to permissions]
*/
# if _FFR_TLS_1
# endif /* _FFR_TLS_1 */
/* Type of variable */
# define TLS_T_OTHER 0
# define TLS_T_SRV 1
# define TLS_T_CLT 2
/*
** TLS_OK_F -- can var be an absolute filename?
**
** Parameters:
** var -- filename
** fn -- what is the filename used for?
** type -- type of variable
**
** Returns:
** ok?
*/
static bool
char *var;
char *fn;
int type;
{
/* must be absolute pathname */
return true;
if (LogLevel > 12)
return false;
}
/*
** TLS_SAFE_F -- is a file safe to use?
**
** Parameters:
** var -- filename
** sff -- flags for safefile()
** srv -- server side?
**
** Returns:
** ok?
*/
static bool
char *var;
long sff;
bool srv;
{
int ret;
return true;
if (LogLevel > 7)
return false;
}
/*
** TLS_OK_F -- macro to simplify calls to tls_ok_f
**
** Parameters:
** var -- filename
** fn -- what is the filename used for?
** req -- is the file required?
** st -- status bit to set if ok
** type -- type of variable
**
** Side Effects:
** uses r, ok; may change ok and status.
**
*/
{ \
if (r) \
else if (req) \
ok = false; \
}
/*
** TLS_UNR -- macro to return whether a file should be unreadable
**
** Parameters:
** bit -- flag to test
** req -- flags
**
** Returns:
** 0/SFF_NORFILES
*/
# define TLS_KEYSFF(req) \
/*
** TLS_SAFE_F -- macro to simplify calls to tls_safe_f
**
** Parameters:
** var -- filename
** sff -- flags for safefile()
** req -- is the file required?
** ex -- does the file exist?
** st -- status bit to set if ok
** srv -- server side?
**
** Side Effects:
** uses r, ok, ex; may change ok and status.
**
*/
{ \
if (r) \
else if (req) \
ok = false; \
}
/*
** INITTLS -- initialize TLS
**
** Parameters:
** ctx -- pointer to context
** req -- requirements for initialization (see sendmail.h)
** srv -- server side?
** certfile -- filename of certificate
** keyfile -- filename of private key
** cacertpath -- path to CAs
** cacertfile -- file with CA(s)
** dhparam -- parameters for DH
**
** Returns:
** succeeded?
*/
/*
** The session_id_context identifies the service that created a session.
** This information is used to distinguish between multiple TLS-based
** servers running on the same server. We use the name of the mail system.
** Note: the session cache is not persistent.
*/
static char server_session_id_context[] = "sendmail8";
/* 0.9.8a and b have a problem with SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG */
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL)
# define SM_SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG 1
#else
# define SM_SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG 0
#endif
bool
unsigned long req;
bool srv;
{
# if !NO_DH
# endif /* !NO_DH */
int r;
bool ok;
char *who;
# if _FFR_TLS_1
# endif /* _FFR_TLS_1 */
# if SM_CONF_SHM
extern int ShmId;
# endif /* SM_CONF_SHM */
# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L
# endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */
long rt_version;
#endif
status = TLS_S_NONE;
{
/* NOTREACHED */
}
/* already initialized? (we could re-init...) */
return true;
ok = true;
# if _FFR_TLS_1
/*
** look for a second filename: it must be separated by a ','
** no blanks allowed (they won't be skipped).
** we change a global variable here! this change will be undone
** before return from the function but only if it returns true.
** this isn't a problem since in a failure case this function
** won't be called again with the same (overwritten) values.
** otherwise each return must be replaced with a goto endinittls.
*/
{
*cf2++ = '\0';
*kf2++ = '\0';
}
# endif /* _FFR_TLS_1 */
/*
*/
# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L
# endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */
# if _FFR_TLS_1
/*
** if the second file is specified it must exist
** XXX: it is possible here to define only one of those files
*/
{
}
{
}
# endif /* _FFR_TLS_1 */
/*
** valid values for dhparam are (only the first char is checked)
** none no parameters: don't use DH
** 512 generate 512 bit parameters (fixed)
** 1024 generate 1024 bit parameters
** default is: 1024 for server, 512 for client (OK? XXX)
*/
{
{
char c = *dhparam;
if (c == '1')
req |= TLS_I_DH1024;
else if (c == '5')
req |= TLS_I_DH512;
else if (c != 'n' && c != 'N' && c != '/')
{
if (LogLevel > 12)
"STARTTLS=%s, error: illegal value '%s' for DHParam",
}
}
else if (*dhparam == '/')
{
}
}
if (!ok)
return ok;
/* certfile etc. must be "safe". */
if (DontLockReadFiles)
sff |= SFF_NOLOCK;
# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L
# endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */
if (!ok)
return ok;
# if _FFR_TLS_1
{
}
{
}
# endif /* _FFR_TLS_1 */
/* create a method and a new context */
SSLv23_client_method())) == NULL)
{
if (LogLevel > 7)
"STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_%s_method()) failed",
if (LogLevel > 9)
return false;
}
# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L
{
/* get a pointer to the current certificate validation store */
{
{
}
else
{
if (LogLevel > 9)
{
"STARTTLS=%s, error: PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(%s)=failed",
}
/* avoid memory leaks */
return false;
}
}
else if (LogLevel > 9)
"STARTTLS=%s, error: BIO_new=failed", who);
}
# if _FFR_CRLPATH
{
{
if (LogLevel > 9)
{
"STARTTLS=%s, error: X509_STORE_add_lookup(hash)=failed",
}
return false;
}
}
# endif /* _FFR_CRLPATH */
# endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */
# if TLS_NO_RSA
/* turn off backward compatibility, required for no-rsa */
# endif /* TLS_NO_RSA */
# if !TLS_NO_RSA
/*
** Create a temporary RSA key
** XXX Maybe we shouldn't create this always (even though it
** is only at startup).
** It is a time-consuming operation and it is not always necessary.
** maybe we should do it only on demand...
*/
# if SM_CONF_SHM
&& ShmId != SM_SHM_NO_ID &&
# else /* SM_CONF_SHM */
&& 0 /* no shared memory: no need to generate key now */
# endif /* SM_CONF_SHM */
)
{
if (LogLevel > 7)
{
"STARTTLS=%s, error: RSA_generate_key failed",
who);
if (LogLevel > 9)
}
return false;
}
# endif /* !TLS_NO_RSA */
/*
** load private key
** XXX change this for DSA-only version
*/
SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0)
{
if (LogLevel > 7)
{
"STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(%s) failed",
if (LogLevel > 9)
}
return false;
}
/* get the certificate file */
SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0)
{
if (LogLevel > 7)
{
"STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(%s) failed",
if (LogLevel > 9)
}
return false;
}
/* check the private key */
(r = SSL_CTX_check_private_key(*ctx)) <= 0)
{
/* Private key does not match the certificate public key */
if (LogLevel > 5)
{
"STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_check_private_key failed(%s): %d",
if (LogLevel > 9)
}
return false;
}
# if _FFR_TLS_1
/* XXX this code is pretty much duplicated from above! */
/* load private key */
{
if (LogLevel > 7)
{
"STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(%s) failed",
if (LogLevel > 9)
}
}
/* get the certificate file */
{
if (LogLevel > 7)
{
"STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(%s) failed",
if (LogLevel > 9)
}
}
/* also check the private key */
(r = SSL_CTX_check_private_key(*ctx)) <= 0)
{
/* Private key does not match the certificate public key */
if (LogLevel > 5)
{
"STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_check_private_key 2 failed: %d",
who, r);
if (LogLevel > 9)
}
}
# endif /* _FFR_TLS_1 */
/* SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(*ctx, 1); violation of standard? */
/*
** In OpenSSL 0.9.8[ab], enabling zlib compression breaks the
** padding bug work-around, leading to false positives and
** failed connections. We may not interoperate with systems
** with the bug, but this is better than breaking on all 0.9.8[ab]
** systems that have zlib support enabled.
** Note: this checks the runtime version of the library, not
** just the compile time version.
*/
rt_version = SSLeay();
{
}
#endif
# if !NO_DH
/* Diffie-Hellman initialization */
{
{
{
{
unsigned long err;
err = ERR_get_error();
"STARTTLS=%s, error: cannot read DH parameters(%s): %s",
if (LogLevel > 9)
}
}
else
{
if (LogLevel > 5)
{
"STARTTLS=%s, error: BIO_new_file(%s) failed",
if (LogLevel > 9)
}
}
}
{
/* this takes a while! (7-130s on a 450MHz AMD K6-2) */
}
else
{
if (LogLevel > 9)
{
unsigned long err;
err = ERR_get_error();
"STARTTLS=%s, error: cannot read or set DH parameters(%s): %s",
}
return false;
}
else
{
/* important to avoid small subgroup attacks */
if (LogLevel > 13)
"STARTTLS=%s, Diffie-Hellman init, key=%d bit (%c)",
}
}
# endif /* !NO_DH */
/* XXX do we need this cache here? */
{
(void *) &server_session_id_context,
sizeof(server_session_id_context));
(void) SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(*ctx,
}
else
{
(void) SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(*ctx,
}
/* load certificate locations and default CA paths */
{
cacertpath)) == 1)
{
# if !TLS_NO_RSA
# endif /* !TLS_NO_RSA */
/*
** We have to install our own verify callback:
** SSL_VERIFY_PEER requests a client cert but even
** though *FAIL_IF* isn't set, the connection
** will be aborted if the client presents a cert
** that is not "liked" (can't be verified?) by
** the TLS library :-(
*/
/*
** XXX currently we could call tls_set_verify()
** but we hope that that function will later on
** only set the mode per connection.
*/
NULL);
/* install verify callback */
NULL);
}
else
{
/*
** can't load CA data; do we care?
** the data is necessary to authenticate the client,
** which in turn would be necessary
** if we want to allow relaying based on it.
*/
if (LogLevel > 5)
{
"STARTTLS=%s, error: load verify locs %s, %s failed: %d",
if (LogLevel > 9)
}
return false;
}
}
/* XXX: make this dependent on an option? */
# if _FFR_TLS_1
/* install our own cipher list */
{
{
if (LogLevel > 7)
{
"STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(%s) failed, list ignored",
who, CipherList);
if (LogLevel > 9)
}
/* failure if setting to this list is required? */
}
}
# endif /* _FFR_TLS_1 */
if (LogLevel > 12)
# if _FFR_TLS_1
# if 0
/*
** this label is required if we want to have a "clean" exit
** see the comments above at the initialization of cf2
*/
# endif /* 0 */
/* undo damage to global variables */
*--cf2 = ',';
*--kf2 = ',';
# endif /* _FFR_TLS_1 */
return ok;
}
/*
** TLS_GET_INFO -- get information about TLS connection
**
** Parameters:
** ssl -- TLS connection structure
** srv -- server or client
** host -- hostname of other side
** mac -- macro storage
** certreq -- did we ask for a cert?
**
** Returns:
** result of authentication.
**
** Side Effects:
** sets macros: {cipher}, {tls_version}, {verify},
** {cipher_bits}, {alg_bits}, {cert}, {cert_subject},
** {cert_issuer}, {cn_subject}, {cn_issuer}
*/
int
bool srv;
char *host;
bool certreq;
{
SSL_CIPHER *c;
int b, r;
long verifyok;
char *s, *who;
char bitstr[16];
c = SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
/* cast is just workaround for compiler warning */
(char *) SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
b = SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(c, &r);
s = SSL_CIPHER_get_version(c);
if (s == NULL)
s = "UNKNOWN";
if (LogLevel > 14)
"STARTTLS=%s, get_verify: %ld get_peer: 0x%lx",
{
unsigned int n;
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
n = 0;
{
static const char hexcodes[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
for (r = 0; r < (int) n; r++)
{
}
}
else
}
else
{
}
switch (verifyok)
{
case X509_V_OK:
{
s = "OK";
r = TLS_AUTH_OK;
}
else
{
r = TLS_AUTH_NO;
}
break;
default:
s = "FAIL";
r = TLS_AUTH_FAIL;
break;
}
/* do some logging */
if (LogLevel > 8)
{
/* XXX: maybe cut off ident info? */
"STARTTLS=%s, relay=%.100s, version=%.16s, verify=%.16s, cipher=%.64s, bits=%.6s/%.6s",
who,
if (LogLevel > 11)
{
/*
** Maybe run xuntextify on the strings?
** That is easier to read but makes it maybe a bit
** more complicated to figure out the right values
** for the access map...
*/
"STARTTLS=%s, cert-subject=%.256s, cert-issuer=%.256s, verifymsg=%s",
}
}
return r;
}
/*
** ENDTLS -- shutdown secure connection
**
** Parameters:
** ssl -- SSL connection information.
**
** Returns:
** success? (EX_* code)
*/
int
char *side;
{
{
int r;
if ((r = SSL_shutdown(ssl)) < 0)
{
if (LogLevel > 11)
{
"STARTTLS=%s, SSL_shutdown failed: %d",
side, r);
}
ret = EX_SOFTWARE;
}
/*
** Bug in OpenSSL (at least up to 0.9.6b):
** From: Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE
** Message-ID: <20010723152244.A13122@serv01.aet.tu-cottbus.de>
** To: openssl-users@openssl.org
** Subject: Re: SSL_shutdown() woes (fwd)
**
** The side sending the shutdown alert first will
** not care about the answer of the peer but will
** immediately return with a return value of "0"
** the value of "0" and as the shutdown alert of the peer was
** not received (actually, the program did not even wait for
** the answer), an SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL is flagged, because this
** is the default rule in case everything else does not apply.
**
** For your server the problem is different, because it
** receives the shutdown first (setting SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN),
** then sends its response (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN), so for the
** server the shutdown was successfull.
**
** As is by know, you would have to call SSL_shutdown() once
** and ignore an SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL returned. Then call
** SSL_shutdown() again to actually get the server's response.
**
** In the last discussion, Bodo Moeller concluded that a
** rewrite of the shutdown code would be necessary, but
** probably with another API, as the change would not be
** compatible to the way it is now. Things do not become
** easier as other programs do not follow the shutdown
** guidelines anyway, so that a lot error conditions and
** compitibility issues would have to be caught.
**
** For now the recommondation is to ignore the error message.
*/
else if (r == 0)
{
if (LogLevel > 15)
{
"STARTTLS=%s, SSL_shutdown not done",
side);
}
ret = EX_SOFTWARE;
}
# endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x0090602fL */
}
return ret;
}
# if !TLS_NO_RSA
/*
** TMP_RSA_KEY -- return temporary RSA key
**
** Parameters:
** s -- TLS connection structure
** export --
** keylength --
**
** Returns:
** temporary RSA key.
*/
# ifndef MAX_RSA_TMP_CNT
# endif /* ! MAX_RSA_TMP_CNT */
/* ARGUSED0 */
static RSA *
SSL *s;
int export;
int keylength;
{
# if SM_CONF_SHM
extern int ShmId;
extern int *PRSATmpCnt;
++(*PRSATmpCnt) < MAX_RSA_TMP_CNT)
return rsa_tmp;
# endif /* SM_CONF_SHM */
{
if (LogLevel > 0)
"STARTTLS=server, tmp_rsa_key: RSA_generate_key failed!");
}
else
{
# if SM_CONF_SHM
# if 0
/*
** XXX we can't (yet) share the new key...
** The RSA structure contains pointers hence it can't be
** easily kept in shared memory. It must be transformed
** into a continous memory region first, then stored,
** and later read out again (each time re-transformed).
*/
if (ShmId != SM_SHM_NO_ID)
*PRSATmpCnt = 0;
# endif /* 0 */
# endif /* SM_CONF_SHM */
if (LogLevel > 9)
"STARTTLS=server, tmp_rsa_key: new temp RSA key");
}
return rsa_tmp;
}
# endif /* !TLS_NO_RSA */
/*
** APPS_SSL_INFO_CB -- info callback for TLS connections
**
** Parameters:
** s -- TLS connection structure
** where -- state in handshake
** ret -- return code of last operation
**
** Returns:
** none.
*/
static void
int where;
int ret;
{
int w;
char *str;
if (LogLevel > 14)
"STARTTLS: info_callback where=0x%x, ret=%d",
w = where & ~SSL_ST_MASK;
if (bitset(SSL_ST_CONNECT, w))
str = "SSL_connect";
else if (bitset(SSL_ST_ACCEPT, w))
str = "SSL_accept";
else
str = "undefined";
{
if (LogLevel > 12)
"STARTTLS: %s:%s",
str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
}
{
if (LogLevel > 12)
"STARTTLS: SSL3 alert %s:%s:%s",
}
{
if (ret == 0)
{
if (LogLevel > 7)
"STARTTLS: %s:failed in %s",
str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
}
else if (ret < 0)
{
if (LogLevel > 7)
"STARTTLS: %s:error in %s",
str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
}
}
}
/*
** TLS_VERIFY_LOG -- log verify error for TLS certificates
**
** Parameters:
** ok -- verify ok?
** ctx -- x509 context
**
** Returns:
** 0 -- fatal error
** 1 -- ok
*/
static int
int ok;
char *name;
{
char buf[512];
{
/* internal error */
"STARTTLS: internal error: tls_verify_cb: ssl == NULL");
return 0;
}
"STARTTLS: %s cert verify: depth=%d %s, state=%d, reason=%s",
return 1;
}
/*
** TLS_VERIFY_CB -- verify callback for TLS certificates
**
** Parameters:
** ctx -- x509 context
**
** Returns:
** accept connection?
** currently: always yes.
*/
static int
# else /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */
void *unused;
# endif /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */
{
int ok;
if (ok == 0)
{
if (LogLevel > 13)
return 1; /* override it */
}
return ok;
}
/*
** TLSLOGERR -- log the errors from the TLS error stack
**
** Parameters:
**
** Returns:
** none.
*/
void
const char *who;
{
unsigned long l;
unsigned long es;
char buf[256];
# define CP (const char **)
es = CRYPTO_thread_id();
!= 0)
{
ERR_error_string(l, buf),
}
}
# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L
/*
** X509_VERIFY_CB -- verify callback
**
** Parameters:
** ctx -- x509 context
**
** Returns:
** accept connection?
** currently: always yes.
*/
static int
int ok;
{
if (ok == 0)
{
if (LogLevel > 13)
{
return 1; /* override it */
}
}
return ok;
}
# endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */
#endif /* STARTTLS */