278N/A<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>

278N/A<!DOCTYPE manualpage SYSTEM "/style/manualpage.dtd">

278N/A<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="/style/manual.en.xsl"?>

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278N/A

278N/A<manualpage metafile="security_tips.xml.meta">

278N/A <parentdocument href="./">Miscellaneous Documentation</parentdocument>

278N/A

278N/A <title>Security Tips</title>

278N/A

278N/A <summary>

278N/A <p>Some hints and tips on security issues in setting up a web server.

278N/A Some of the suggestions will be general, others specific to Apache.</p>

278N/A </summary>

278N/A

278N/A <section id="uptodate"><title>Keep up to Date</title>

278N/A

278N/A <p>The Apache HTTP Server has a good record for security and a

278N/A developer community highly concerned about security issues. But

278N/A it is inevitable that some problems -- small or large -- will be

278N/A discovered in software after it is released. For this reason, it

278N/A is crucial to keep aware of updates to the software. If you have

278N/A obtained your version of the HTTP Server directly from Apache, we

278N/A highly recommend you subscribe to the <a

278N/A href="http://httpd.apache.org/lists.html#http-announce">Apache

278N/A HTTP Server Announcements List</a> where you can keep informed of

278N/A new releases and security updates. Similar services are available

278N/A from most third-party distributors of Apache software.</p>

278N/A

278N/A <p>Of course, most times that a web server is compromised, it is

278N/A not because of problems in the HTTP Server code. Rather, it comes

278N/A from problems in add-on code, CGI scripts, or the underlying

278N/A Operating System. You must therefore stay aware of problems and

278N/A updates with all the software on your system.</p>

278N/A

278N/A </section>

278N/A

278N/A <section id="serverroot">

278N/A

278N/A <title>Permissions on ServerRoot Directories</title>

278N/A

278N/A <p>In typical operation, Apache is started by the root user, and it

278N/A switches to the user defined by the <directive

278N/A module="mpm_common">User</directive> directive to serve hits. As is the

278N/A case with any command that root executes, you must take care that it is

278N/A protected from modification by non-root users. Not only must the files

278N/A themselves be writeable only by root, but so must the directories, and

278N/A parents of all directories. For example, if you choose to place

278N/A ServerRoot in /usr/local/apache then it is suggested that you create

278N/A that directory as root, with commands like these:</p>

278N/A

278N/A <example>

278N/A mkdir /usr/local/apache <br />

278N/A cd /usr/local/apache <br />

278N/A mkdir bin conf logs <br />

278N/A chown 0 . bin conf logs <br />

278N/A chgrp 0 . bin conf logs <br />

278N/A chmod 755 . bin conf logs

278N/A </example>

278N/A

278N/A <p>It is assumed that /, /usr, and /usr/local are only modifiable by

278N/A root. When you install the <program>httpd</program> executable, you

278N/A should ensure that it is similarly protected:</p>

278N/A

278N/A <example>

278N/A cp httpd /usr/local/apache/bin <br />

278N/A chown 0 /usr/local/apache/bin/httpd <br />

278N/A chgrp 0 /usr/local/apache/bin/httpd <br />

278N/A chmod 511 /usr/local/apache/bin/httpd

278N/A </example>

278N/A

278N/A <p>You can create an htdocs subdirectory which is modifiable by other

278N/A users -- since root never executes any files out of there, and shouldn't

278N/A be creating files in there.</p>

278N/A

278N/A <p>If you allow non-root users to modify any files that root either

278N/A executes or writes on then you open your system to root compromises.

278N/A For example, someone could replace the <program>httpd</program> binary so

278N/A that the next time you start it, it will execute some arbitrary code. If

278N/A the logs directory is writeable (by a non-root user), someone could replace

278N/A a log file with a symlink to some other system file, and then root

278N/A might overwrite that file with arbitrary data. If the log files

278N/A themselves are writeable (by a non-root user), then someone may be

278N/A able to overwrite the log itself with bogus data.</p>

278N/A

278N/A </section>

278N/A

278N/A <section id="ssi">

278N/A

278N/A <title>Server Side Includes</title>

278N/A

278N/A <p>Server Side Includes (SSI) present a server administrator with

278N/A several potential security risks.</p>

278N/A

278N/A <p>The first risk is the increased load on the server. All

278N/A SSI-enabled files have to be parsed by Apache, whether or not

278N/A there are any SSI directives included within the files. While this

278N/A load increase is minor, in a shared server environment it can become

278N/A significant.</p>

278N/A

278N/A <p>SSI files also pose the same risks that are associated with CGI

278N/A scripts in general. Using the "exec cmd" element, SSI-enabled files

278N/A can execute any CGI script or program under the permissions of the

278N/A user and group Apache runs as, as configured in httpd.conf.</p>

278N/A

278N/A <p>There are ways to enhance the security of SSI files while still

278N/A taking advantage of the benefits they provide.</p>

278N/A

278N/A <p>To isolate the damage a wayward SSI file can cause, a server

278N/A administrator can enable <a href="/suexec.html">suexec</a> as

278N/A described in the <a href="#cgi">CGI in General</a> section</p>

278N/A

278N/A <p>Enabling SSI for files with .html or .htm extensions can be

278N/A dangerous. This is especially true in a shared, or high traffic,

278N/A server environment. SSI-enabled files should have a separate extension,

278N/A such as the conventional .shtml. This helps keep server load at a

278N/A minimum and allows for easier management of risk.</p>

278N/A

278N/A <p>Another solution is to disable the ability to run scripts and

278N/A programs from SSI pages. To do this replace <code>Includes</code>

278N/A with <code>IncludesNOEXEC</code> in the <directive

278N/A module="core">Options</directive> directive. Note that users may

278N/A still use &lt;--#include virtual="..." --&gt; to execute CGI scripts if

278N/A these scripts are in directories desginated by a <directive

278N/A module="mod_alias">ScriptAlias</directive> directive.</p>

278N/A

278N/A </section>

278N/A

278N/A <section id="cgi">

278N/A

278N/A <title>CGI in General</title>

278N/A

278N/A <p>First of all, you always have to remember that you must trust the

278N/A writers of the CGI scripts/programs or your ability to spot potential

278N/A security holes in CGI, whether they were deliberate or accidental. CGI

278N/A scripts can run essentially arbitrary commands on your system with the

278N/A permissions of the web server user and can therefore be extremely

278N/A dangerous if they are not carefully checked.</p>

278N/A

278N/A <p>All the CGI scripts will run as the same user, so they have potential

278N/A to conflict (accidentally or deliberately) with other scripts e.g. User

278N/A A hates User B, so he writes a script to trash User B's CGI database. One

278N/A program which can be used to allow scripts to run as different users is

278N/A <a href="/suexec.html">suEXEC</a> which is included with Apache as of

278N/A 1.2 and is called from special hooks in the Apache server code. Another

278N/A popular way of doing this is with

278N/A <a href="http://cgiwrap.unixtools.org/">CGIWrap</a>.</p>

278N/A

278N/A </section>

278N/A

278N/A <section id="nsaliasedcgi">

278N/A

278N/A <title>Non Script Aliased CGI</title>

278N/A

278N/A <p>Allowing users to execute CGI scripts in any directory should only be

278N/A considered if:</p>

278N/A

278N/A <ul>

278N/A <li>You trust your users not to write scripts which will deliberately

278N/A or accidentally expose your system to an attack.</li>

278N/A <li>You consider security at your site to be so feeble in other areas,

278N/A as to make one more potential hole irrelevant.</li>

278N/A <li>You have no users, and nobody ever visits your server.</li>

278N/A </ul>

278N/A

278N/A </section>

278N/A

278N/A <section id="saliasedcgi">

278N/A

278N/A <title>Script Aliased CGI</title>

278N/A

278N/A <p>Limiting CGI to special directories gives the admin control over what

278N/A goes into those directories. This is inevitably more secure than non

278N/A script aliased CGI, but only if users with write access to the

278N/A directories are trusted or the admin is willing to test each

278N/A new CGI script/program for potential security holes.</p>

278N/A

278N/A <p>Most sites choose this option over the non script aliased CGI

278N/A approach.</p>

278N/A

278N/A </section>

278N/A

278N/A <section id="dynamic">

278N/A

278N/A <title>Other sources of dynamic content</title>

278N/A

278N/A <p>

278N/A Embedded scripting options which run as part of the server itself,

278N/A such as mod_php, mod_perl, mod_tcl, and mod_python, run under the

278N/A identity of the server itself (see the <directive

278N/A module="mpm_common">User</directive> directive), and therefore

278N/A scripts executed by these engines potentially can access anything the

server user can. Some scripting engines may provide restrictions, but

it is better to be safe and assume not.</p>

</section>

<section id="systemsettings">

<title>Protecting System Settings</title>

<p>To run a really tight ship, you'll want to stop users from setting

up <code>.htaccess</code> files which can override security features

you've configured. Here's one way to do it.</p>

<p>In the server configuration file, put</p>

<example>

&lt;Directory /&gt; <br />

AllowOverride None <br />

&lt;/Directory&gt;

</example>

<p>This prevents the use of <code>.htaccess</code> files in all

directories apart from those specifically enabled.</p>

</section>

<section id="protectserverfiles">

<title>Protect Server Files by Default</title>

<p>One aspect of Apache which is occasionally misunderstood is the

feature of default access. That is, unless you take steps to change it,

if the server can find its way to a file through normal URL mapping

rules, it can serve it to clients.</p>

<p>For instance, consider the following example:</p>

<example>

# cd /; ln -s / public_html <br />

Accessing <code>http://localhost/~root/</code>

</example>

<p>This would allow clients to walk through the entire filesystem. To

work around this, add the following block to your server's

configuration:</p>

<example>

&lt;Directory /&gt; <br />

Order Deny,Allow <br />

Deny from all <br />

&lt;/Directory&gt;

</example>

<p>This will forbid default access to filesystem locations. Add

appropriate <directive module="core">Directory</directive> blocks to

allow access only in those areas you wish. For example,</p>

<example>

&lt;Directory /usr/users/*/public_html&gt; <br />

Order Deny,Allow <br />

Allow from all <br />

&lt;/Directory&gt; <br />

&lt;Directory /usr/local/httpd&gt; <br />

Order Deny,Allow <br />

Allow from all <br />

&lt;/Directory&gt;

</example>

<p>Pay particular attention to the interactions of <directive

module="core">Location</directive> and <directive

module="core">Directory</directive> directives; for instance, even

if <code>&lt;Directory /&gt;</code> denies access, a <code>

&lt;Location /&gt;</code> directive might overturn it</p>

<p>Also be wary of playing games with the <directive

module="mod_userdir">UserDir</directive> directive; setting it to

something like "./" would have the same effect, for root, as the first

example above. If you are using Apache 1.3 or above, we strongly

recommend that you include the following line in your server

configuration files:</p>

<example>

UserDir disabled root

</example>

</section>

<section id="watchyourlogs">

<title>Watching Your Logs</title>

<p>To keep up-to-date with what is actually going on against your server

you have to check the <a href="/logs.html">Log Files</a>. Even though

the log files only reports what has already happened, they will give you

some understanding of what attacks is thrown against the server and

allows you to check if the necessary level of security is present.</p>

<p>A couple of examples:</p>

<example>

grep -c "/jsp/source.jsp?/jsp/ /jsp/source.jsp??" access_log <br />

grep "client denied" error_log | tail -n 10

</example>

<p>The first example will list the number of attacks trying to exploit the

<a href="http://online.securityfocus.com/bid/4876/info/">Apache Tomcat

Source.JSP Malformed Request Information Disclosure Vulnerability</a>,

the second example will list the ten last denied clients, for example:</p>

<example>

[Thu Jul 11 17:18:39 2002] [error] [client foo.bar.com] client denied

by server configuration: /usr/local/apache/htdocs/.htpasswd

</example>

<p>As you can see, the log files only report what already has happened, so

if the client had been able to access the <code>.htpasswd</code> file you

would have seen something similar to:</p>

<example>

foo.bar.com - - [12/Jul/2002:01:59:13 +0200] "GET /.htpasswd HTTP/1.1"

</example>

<p>in your <a href="/logs.html#accesslog">Access Log</a>. This means

you probably commented out the following in your server configuration

file:</p>

<example>

&lt;Files ~ "^\.ht"&gt; <br />

Order allow,deny <br />

Deny from all <br />

&lt;Files&gt;

</example>

</section>

</manualpage>