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33d0a7767d53cb366039fd0ac4f63cf8a9c351b0Tinderbox User<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h1 class="title">
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User<a name="Bv9ARM.ch07"></a>Chapter�7.�<acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 Security Considerations</h1></div></div></div>
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User<div class="toc">
33d0a7767d53cb366039fd0ac4f63cf8a9c351b0Tinderbox User<p><b>Table of Contents</b></p>
ba751492fcc4f161a18b983d4f018a1a52938cb9Evan Hunt<dl class="toc">
ba751492fcc4f161a18b983d4f018a1a52938cb9Evan Hunt<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch07.html#Access_Control_Lists">Access Control Lists</a></span></dt>
ba751492fcc4f161a18b983d4f018a1a52938cb9Evan Hunt<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch07.html#id-1.8.4"><span class="command"><strong>Chroot</strong></span> and <span class="command"><strong>Setuid</strong></span></a></span></dt>
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User<dd><dl>
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch07.html#id-1.8.4.7">The <span class="command"><strong>chroot</strong></span> Environment</a></span></dt>
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch07.html#id-1.8.4.8">Using the <span class="command"><strong>setuid</strong></span> Function</a></span></dt>
33d0a7767d53cb366039fd0ac4f63cf8a9c351b0Tinderbox User</dl></dd>
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User<dt><span class="section"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch07.html#dynamic_update_security">Dynamic Update Security</a></span></dt>
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User</dl>
ba751492fcc4f161a18b983d4f018a1a52938cb9Evan Hunt</div>
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User <div class="section">
ba751492fcc4f161a18b983d4f018a1a52938cb9Evan Hunt<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both">
ba751492fcc4f161a18b983d4f018a1a52938cb9Evan Hunt<a name="Access_Control_Lists"></a>Access Control Lists</h2></div></div></div>
ba751492fcc4f161a18b983d4f018a1a52938cb9Evan Hunt
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User <p>
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User Access Control Lists (ACLs) are address match lists that
281ed127e3ed6c7e07792c19c3bc4562f71cfa90Tinderbox User you can set up and nickname for future use in
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User <span class="command"><strong>allow-notify</strong></span>, <span class="command"><strong>allow-query</strong></span>,
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User <span class="command"><strong>allow-query-on</strong></span>, <span class="command"><strong>allow-recursion</strong></span>,
c40906dfad6dd6e3a3e3c94b8c8847bc9bc064e5Mark Andrews <span class="command"><strong>blackhole</strong></span>, <span class="command"><strong>allow-transfer</strong></span>,
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User <span class="command"><strong>match-clients</strong></span>, etc.
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User </p>
ba751492fcc4f161a18b983d4f018a1a52938cb9Evan Hunt <p>
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User Using ACLs allows you to have finer control over who can access
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User your name server, without cluttering up your config files with huge
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User lists of IP addresses.
33d0a7767d53cb366039fd0ac4f63cf8a9c351b0Tinderbox User </p>
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User <p>
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User It is a <span class="emphasis"><em>good idea</em></span> to use ACLs, and to
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User control access to your server. Limiting access to your server by
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User outside parties can help prevent spoofing and denial of service
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User (DoS) attacks against your server.
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User </p>
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User <p>
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User ACLs match clients on the basis of up to three characteristics:
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User 1) The client's IP address; 2) the TSIG or SIG(0) key that was
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User used to sign the request, if any; and 3) an address prefix
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User encoded in an EDNS Client Subnet option, if any.
ba751492fcc4f161a18b983d4f018a1a52938cb9Evan Hunt </p>
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User <p>
7911e6f9de303bca5a3d8b34f4330c8f7cecffaeTinderbox User Here is an example of ACLs based on client addresses:
ba751492fcc4f161a18b983d4f018a1a52938cb9Evan Hunt </p>
ba751492fcc4f161a18b983d4f018a1a52938cb9Evan Hunt
<pre class="programlisting">
// Set up an ACL named "bogusnets" that will block
// RFC1918 space and some reserved space, which is
// commonly used in spoofing attacks.
acl bogusnets {
0.0.0.0/8; 192.0.2.0/24; 224.0.0.0/3;
10.0.0.0/8; 172.16.0.0/12; 192.168.0.0/16;
};
// Set up an ACL called our-nets. Replace this with the
// real IP numbers.
acl our-nets { x.x.x.x/24; x.x.x.x/21; };
options {
...
...
allow-query { our-nets; };
allow-recursion { our-nets; };
...
blackhole { bogusnets; };
...
};
zone "example.com" {
type master;
file "m/example.com";
allow-query { any; };
};
</pre>
<p>
This allows authoritative queries for "example.com" from any
address, but recursive queries only from the networks specified
in "our-nets", and no queries at all from the networks
specified in "bogusnets".
</p>
<p>
In addition to network addresses and prefixes, which are
matched against the source address of the DNS request, ACLs
may include <code class="option">key</code> elements, which specify the
name of a TSIG or SIG(0) key, or <code class="option">ecs</code>
elements, which specify a network prefix but are only matched
if that prefix matches an EDNS client subnet option included
in the request.
</p>
<p>
The EDNS Client Subnet (ECS) option is used by a recursive
resolver to inform an authoritative name server of the network
address block from which the original query was received, enabling
authoritative servers to give different answers to the same
resolver for different resolver clients. An ACL containing
an element of the form
<span class="command"><strong>ecs <em class="replaceable"><code>prefix</code></em></strong></span>
will match if a request arrives in containing an ECS option
encoding an address within that prefix. If the request has no
ECS option, then "ecs" elements are simply ignored. Addresses
in ACLs that are not prefixed with "ecs" are matched only
against the source address.
</p>
<p>
When <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 is built with GeoIP support,
ACLs can also be used for geographic access restrictions.
This is done by specifying an ACL element of the form:
<span class="command"><strong>geoip [<span class="optional">db <em class="replaceable"><code>database</code></em></span>] <em class="replaceable"><code>field</code></em> <em class="replaceable"><code>value</code></em></strong></span>
</p>
<p>
The <em class="replaceable"><code>field</code></em> indicates which field
to search for a match. Available fields are "country",
"region", "city", "continent", "postal" (postal code),
"metro" (metro code), "area" (area code), "tz" (timezone),
"isp", "org", "asnum", "domain" and "netspeed".
</p>
<p>
<em class="replaceable"><code>value</code></em> is the value to search
for within the database. A string may be quoted if it
contains spaces or other special characters. If this is
an "asnum" search, then the leading "ASNNNN" string can be
used, otherwise the full description must be used (e.g.
"ASNNNN Example Company Name"). If this is a "country"
search and the string is two characters long, then it must
be a standard ISO-3166-1 two-letter country code, and if it
is three characters long then it must be an ISO-3166-1
three-letter country code; otherwise it is the full name
of the country. Similarly, if this is a "region" search
and the string is two characters long, then it must be a
standard two-letter state or province abbreviation;
otherwise it is the full name of the state or province.
</p>
<p>
The <em class="replaceable"><code>database</code></em> field indicates which
GeoIP database to search for a match. In most cases this is
unnecessary, because most search fields can only be found in
a single database. However, searches for country can be
answered from the "city", "region", or "country" databases,
and searches for region (i.e., state or province) can be
answered from the "city" or "region" databases. For these
search types, specifying a <em class="replaceable"><code>database</code></em>
will force the query to be answered from that database and no
other. If <em class="replaceable"><code>database</code></em> is not
specified, then these queries will be answered from the "city",
database if it is installed, or the "region" database if it is
installed, or the "country" database, in that order.
</p>
<p>
By default, if a DNS query includes an EDNS Client Subnet (ECS)
option which encodes a non-zero address prefix, then GeoIP ACLs
will be matched against that address prefix. Otherwise, they
are matched against the source address of the query. To
prevent GeoIP ACLs from matching against ECS options, set
the <span class="command"><strong>geoip-use-ecs</strong></span> to <code class="literal">no</code>.
</p>
<p>
Some example GeoIP ACLs:
</p>
<pre class="programlisting">geoip country US;
geoip country JAP;
geoip db country country Canada;
geoip db region region WA;
geoip city "San Francisco";
geoip region Oklahoma;
geoip postal 95062;
geoip tz "America/Los_Angeles";
geoip org "Internet Systems Consortium";
</pre>
<p>
ACLs use a "first-match" logic rather than "best-match":
if an address prefix matches an ACL element, then that ACL
is considered to have matched even if a later element would
have matched more specifically. For example, the ACL
<span class="command"><strong> { 10/8; !10.0.0.1; }</strong></span> would actually
match a query from 10.0.0.1, because the first element
indicated that the query should be accepted, and the second
element is ignored.
</p>
<p>
When using "nested" ACLs (that is, ACLs included or referenced
within other ACLs), a negative match of a nested ACL will
the containing ACL to continue looking for matches. This
enables complex ACLs to be constructed, in which multiple
client characteristics can be checked at the same time. For
example, to construct an ACL which allows queries only when
it originates from a particular network <span class="emphasis"><em>and</em></span>
only when it is signed with a particular key, use:
</p>
<pre class="programlisting">
allow-query { !{ !10/8; any; }; key example; };
</pre>
<p>
Within the nested ACL, any address that is
<span class="emphasis"><em>not</em></span> in the 10/8 network prefix will
be rejected, and this will terminate processing of the
ACL. Any address that <span class="emphasis"><em>is</em></span> in the 10/8
network prefix will be accepted, but this causes a negative
match of the nested ACL, so the containing ACL continues
processing. The query will then be accepted if it is signed
by the key "example", and rejected otherwise. The ACL, then,
will only matches when <span class="emphasis"><em>both</em></span> conditions
are true.
</p>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both">
<a name="id-1.8.4"></a><span class="command"><strong>Chroot</strong></span> and <span class="command"><strong>Setuid</strong></span>
</h2></div></div></div>
<p>
On UNIX servers, it is possible to run <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym>
in a <span class="emphasis"><em>chrooted</em></span> environment (using
the <span class="command"><strong>chroot()</strong></span> function) by specifying
the <code class="option">-t</code> option for <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span>.
This can help improve system security by placing
<acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> in a "sandbox", which will limit
the damage done if a server is compromised.
</p>
<p>
Another useful feature in the UNIX version of <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> is the
ability to run the daemon as an unprivileged user ( <code class="option">-u</code> <em class="replaceable"><code>user</code></em> ).
We suggest running as an unprivileged user when using the <span class="command"><strong>chroot</strong></span> feature.
</p>
<p>
Here is an example command line to load <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> in a <span class="command"><strong>chroot</strong></span> sandbox,
<span class="command"><strong>/var/named</strong></span>, and to run <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> <span class="command"><strong>setuid</strong></span> to
user 202:
</p>
<p>
<strong class="userinput"><code>/usr/local/sbin/named -u 202 -t /var/named</code></strong>
</p>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.8.4.7"></a>The <span class="command"><strong>chroot</strong></span> Environment</h3></div></div></div>
<p>
In order for a <span class="command"><strong>chroot</strong></span> environment
to
work properly in a particular directory
(for example, <code class="filename">/var/named</code>),
you will need to set up an environment that includes everything
<acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> needs to run.
From <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym>'s point of view, <code class="filename">/var/named</code> is
the root of the filesystem. You will need to adjust the values of
options like
like <span class="command"><strong>directory</strong></span> and <span class="command"><strong>pid-file</strong></span> to account
for this.
</p>
<p>
Unlike with earlier versions of BIND, you typically will
<span class="emphasis"><em>not</em></span> need to compile <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span>
statically nor install shared libraries under the new root.
However, depending on your operating system, you may need
to set up things like
<code class="filename">/dev/zero</code>,
<code class="filename">/dev/random</code>,
<code class="filename">/dev/log</code>, and
<code class="filename">/etc/localtime</code>.
</p>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title">
<a name="id-1.8.4.8"></a>Using the <span class="command"><strong>setuid</strong></span> Function</h3></div></div></div>
<p>
Prior to running the <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> daemon,
use
the <span class="command"><strong>touch</strong></span> utility (to change file
access and
modification times) or the <span class="command"><strong>chown</strong></span>
utility (to
set the user id and/or group id) on files
to which you want <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym>
to write.
</p>
<div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;">
<h3 class="title">Note</h3>
Note that if the <span class="command"><strong>named</strong></span> daemon is running as an
unprivileged user, it will not be able to bind to new restricted
ports if the server is reloaded.
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="section">
<div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both">
<a name="dynamic_update_security"></a>Dynamic Update Security</h2></div></div></div>
<p>
Access to the dynamic
update facility should be strictly limited. In earlier versions of
<acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym>, the only way to do this was
based on the IP
address of the host requesting the update, by listing an IP address
or
network prefix in the <span class="command"><strong>allow-update</strong></span>
zone option.
This method is insecure since the source address of the update UDP
packet
is easily forged. Also note that if the IP addresses allowed by the
<span class="command"><strong>allow-update</strong></span> option include the
address of a slave
server which performs forwarding of dynamic updates, the master can
be
trivially attacked by sending the update to the slave, which will
forward it to the master with its own source IP address causing the
master to approve it without question.
</p>
<p>
For these reasons, we strongly recommend that updates be
cryptographically authenticated by means of transaction signatures
(TSIG). That is, the <span class="command"><strong>allow-update</strong></span>
option should
list only TSIG key names, not IP addresses or network
prefixes. Alternatively, the new <span class="command"><strong>update-policy</strong></span>
option can be used.
</p>
<p>
Some sites choose to keep all dynamically-updated DNS data
in a subdomain and delegate that subdomain to a separate zone. This
way, the top-level zone containing critical data such as the IP
addresses
of public web and mail servers need not allow dynamic update at
all.
</p>
</div>
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<td width="40%" align="left" valign="top">Chapter�6.�<acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 Configuration Reference�</td>
<td width="20%" align="center"><a accesskey="h" href="Bv9ARM.html">Home</a></td>
<td width="40%" align="right" valign="top">�Chapter�8.�Troubleshooting</td>
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<p xmlns:db="http://docbook.org/ns/docbook" style="text-align: center;">BIND 9.11.0pre-alpha</p>
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